Evolution and the Christian doctrine of human worth : a vindication of human values from the standpoint of biology, anthropology and psychology by Paton, Robert
EVOLUTION AND THE CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE OF HUMAN WORTH
A Yindioation of Human Values 
From the Standpoint of Biology, 
Anthropology and Psychology.
An Essay
Written and Submitted By
ROBERT BATON
Towards th« Degr^t of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY,
UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH, 1931
<r
TABLE Off CONTENTS 
INTRODUCTION
SECTION ONE Page 17
i. Bra-Darwinian Anticipations of Evolution Page 18 










2. Charles Darwin Page 31 
The Effect of the Darwinian Theory 
Some Influences Moulding Darwin 1 s Thought 
Malthus ; The Main Source of Natural Selection 
Critical Appreciation of Natural Selection
3. Huxley & Has ok el £age 45
4. We ismarm Page 49
5. The Inheritance of Acquired Characteristics gage 55






7. Ward & The Psychic Factor in Evolution page 69
8« Continuation of the Lieohanistic Interpretation page 73 
Mendelism
The Mutation Theory 
The Chromosome Theory 
Criticism 
Mutation as a Principle of Interpretation
9. Three Sign!fioant Trends in Modern Biology page 89 
Science & Philosophy of Organism.Driesoh 
Psycho-"bio logy Russell 
Emergent Evolution Morgan 
Contribution of these to the Christian 
DOGtrine of Human Worth.
3BQTIQIM TWO
1. The Upmrd Qlimb Page 110
The Transcendent Factor in the Advance 
Prom Protoplasm to Personality.
Significance of Form & Function.
Structural Resemblance & Kinship 
Convergent 3volution
The Psychic Synthesis Preparatory 
To the Emergence of Man
Retention of Primitive Unspeoialised 
Features in Man
Preparation for the Mind Life
Wood Jones* Non-anthropoid Evolution of llan
Interpretation
2. The Factor of Discontinuity in Human Evolution gage 144
3. Anthropoid Fossil Helios Page 148
4. The Antiquity of Man 'Page 151





£ litdown Man 
Rhodasian Man 
Sinanthropus
Factors Suggesting Mutational Origin of Man 
Prevalance of Discontinuity in Nature
f
SECT ION THREB EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY & HUMAN VALUES
1. Introductory. Bacon. Looke. Berkeley .Hume . Kant Page 181
2. Evolution Related to Human Values Pa gt 188
3. The Uniqueness of Man Page 192 
Examination of the Animal -Human Relationship 
Antecedents & Consequences.
The Dynamic Time Factor in Human Consciousness 
Significance of Remorse
4. The Organism "Alive & Whole". An Ultimate Principle Page 205
5. The Relation of Instinct & Personality Page 211 
Instinct functions in the Interests of a Self 
Instinct & Human Heeds 
The 'Religious Instinct 1




Elliot Smith & the Quest for "Life" 
Religion as Projection.
7. Conscience Page 244
8. The Positive Contribution of the New Psychology gage 250 
To the Christian Doctrine of Human JTorth
9. Sin. The Negative Element in Human Worth ?&£  257 
Evolutionary Interpretations Rejected. 
Sin as Religious Relationship 
Religious Value of Defective Personality
10. CONSTRUCTIVE CONCLUSION Page 270




garl Helm's Doctrine of The Perspective Figurs 
ATN.iVhitehead's Organismal Theory of Evolution
considered as An Application of the
Perspective Figure to Nature in Gene ral
The Significance of Jesus
in Pelaticn tc Evolution
and the Christian Doctrine of
Human Worth.
BIBLIOGRAPHY ' Page 306
$
Introduction
Interpretations of the life process hara a tendency to 
fall into on© or other of two main classes. They are either 
ideological or holistic. That is to say, the mind, in 
interpreting the data of its experience may regard life as 
the progressive apprehension of a preformed structure, whose 
condition,although gradually unfolded, is nevertheless 
originally foreordained. On the other hand, it may see life 
as the milieu within which there is appearance in time of 
genuinely new characters, whose development is provoked "by 
intensification of hitherto undif ferentiate d data.
These two general mind types are well illustrated by 
the contrasted philosophical outlooks of Plato and 
Aristotle. Plato, influenced by the teaching of Parmenides, 
concerned himself chiefly with contemplation of, and 
participation in, those eternal but immobile ideas which 
underlie all experience. He visualised life throrugh the 
static perspective of forms and qualities, whose incessant 
recurrence within the mind tends to invest them with all 
the attributes of genuine fixity. Aristotle, whose 
philosophical affinities are with Heracleitus rather than 
Parmenides, was impressed by the forward movement of life, 
internally destined to attain a future definite end. He saw 
the intensity of function rather than the fixity of form.
It was the Platonic conception of essential fixity 
which proved more congenial to the Christian idea of 
separate species created by special divine fiat. Hence, 
in the main, the Christian doctrine of human worth has
a been influenced by the Platonic more than by the Aristotelian 
tradition.
Up till recent times, natural science has more or 
less fitted into the ideological schema. It has proceeded 
upon the assumption that all it had to do in order to mkke 
contact with ultimate reality was to work its way back in 
analytical regress to some primitive preformed structure 
which was unfolding itself serially in time. To reveal the 
successive stages and elements out of rah ich all -tilings have 
come was taken to be equivalent to a disclosure of the 
finally valuable. Hence ultimate origins were wedded with 
ultimate values. The union, however, has proved to be barren.
Doubtless the mechanistic trend of the 17Hi century 
added great impetus to this movement. The universe became 
a machine, y;hile man degenerated into a robot. Each was 
motivated by an extrinsic agency, hence examination of 
forms seemed possible without prejudice to functions. The 
introduction of the microscope furthered the hope that 
structural analysis v/ould yield the key to original values.
Biologically, this ideology is illustrated by the 
preformation theories of the 17th and 18th centuries. 
Beginning with Malpiphi, it was assumed that the or^ns of 
the adult were already pre-existent in miniature in the 
embryo. Development was simply the "unpacking" of a structure 
already "there". The developed organism could be explained 
in terms of its antecedents.
Preformation reached its peak, and passed it, with Bonnet. 
For Bonnet, however, not the completed adult, but organic foci, 
forming the nucleus of the future development, wero pre-existent 
in the embryo. This waw the ideological legacy bequeathed by 
preformation to the 18th century. It was to appear later in 
the cellular atomism of V/eismann. Prom the standpoint of 
biology, human values were reduced to "dot erminants" and "ids" 
and "biophores" and "chromosomes" and "genes".
This molecular trend in biology is closely correlated by 
a similar atomism in physics. Atoms and electrons were 
expected to deliver up the secret of the universe, and of man. 
In psychology and anthropology, the same quest for values 
throu^i sub-human antecedents was enthusiastically taken up, 
with proportionate devaluation of the religious worth of man. 
Man in the 19th century was estimated in terms of what he 
had come from, rather tban in terms of what he was capable 
of. "Then the full implications of Darwinism came home to 
religious thinkers, and the quest for values through origins 
was intensified, then there began for many,
that enormous plunge into the nigi t;voyaging throu^i
ten thousand years,
through boundless darkness without si gilt of land,
...all that agony cf loss
as one by one the beacon fires of faith
are drowned in blackness.
Today the intellectual climate is changing. Human values, 
we believe are on the way towards rehabilitation. Hot all the 
original details of the Christian valuation of man will be
vindicates, but the essential worth of man as a religious 
being is no longer in danger of being disrupted by natural
science.
The disillusionment of science in general began 
about & generation ago, vfcen it was discovered that the atom 
itself was no ultimate element, but was possessed of a'structure 1 
which included features not explicable in terms of physical 
analysis. Its parts could no longer be described in terms of 
'matter 1 . The biological denouement came with Lloyd Morgan's 
interpretation of evolution as a creative pro cess,holistically 
expressing itself through the emergence of genuinely new 
characters, and increasingly richer wholes. Continuity of
"l^j£^^^^^^^^«c^^^TjT<i^£^^^^j^^c^"^^^^^^^^^^^^jr^^*T^j^^^^gl^^^^^^^^^^^3^^TTj^^^T^j^'^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^jTj^^^^*^^«^^^^^^^^^^^^^t^\
frightJ Itvilo of life.
Science ceased to look backwards and began to 
look ahead. In looking ahead it found itself within a dynamic 
world where spiritual values were an integral part of the cosmos. 
The method of regressive analysis towards origins, instead of 
bringing science to grips with reality brought it face to face 
with human symbols aomfl mental abstractions.
It is seen now that the whole combines more than 
the sum of its parts, that things are not only what they have 
come out of, nor even yet what they have become; they are also,
and essentially what they migh t yet become. The evolutionary
i 
process is no t^ me re re-arrangement of pre-existent mate rial ;it
is a creative process constantly issuing in the genuinely new and 
the increa singly r ich . Man as the "emergence" par excellence
regains the dignity which he at first sight seemed 
to have lost, for with the emergence of the essentially 
human there has developed a cosmic companionship possible 
to no other order of life.
The purpose of this essay is to assess 
this changing climate insofar as it pertains to the 
influence of evolutionary theory upon the Christian 
doctrine of human worth, more especially from the 
standpoint of "bi ology, anthropology and psychology. 
The question at once arises, V/rat are we
" ¥
to consider the doctrine of human worth to be? ^e 
are compelled to answer that there is no systematic 
treatment of the doctrine of man in the scriptures 
of the Old or the New Testament. Consequently no 
attempt will be made herein to enumerate in detail 
all the factors that might enter into such an 
evaluation. This is the task of the systematic 
theologian rather than the philosopher of religion. 
At the same time Christian anthropology is based 
upon certain fundamental conceptions of the worth of 
man arising out of the religious experiences of
LuwtAMlM
maft preserved for us 771 thin the scriptures.
In the Old Testament man is introduced 
to us as the centre of creation. Tn o ! her words, 
from the very outset he is presented as being of
genuihe worth in the sight of God. He is held to 
"be separate from and superior to the brute creation 
"by reason of his being created in the express image 
of God.. The immediate consequence of this special 
creation is that man is aloof from all other life 
in his ability to enter into direct communion with 
his Creator. All of his possibilities of 
personality are finally traced back to this fact.
"Evolutionary theory then is com- 
pelled to deal with these two elements of personality, 
human possibilitiy arising out of its relation to 
God and man's sense of dependence upon the divine 
at every stage of his career.
At the same time ,the Old Testament 
emphatically declares that man's possibilities for 
good are counterbalanced by his propensities for evil. 
Man is endowed with the powee to rebel but not finally 
to prevail against. God.
The >Tew Testament tacitly assumes
the human values on which the Old Testament is based, 
but carries them along to new levels. Here again there 
is no s^aternatic treatment of human worth. "Put the good 
news of Jesus Christ is inseparable from the supreme 
emphasis which He placed upon every individual soul. 
Behind every recorded transaction of Jesus with men
there is a profound sense of the sacredness and the 
eternal worth of human personality in the eight of God. 
Full recognition is given to the moral depravity of 
the human race. Jesus distinctly declared that He 
came to deal with sinners, not righteous folk. He 
accepted the fact of sin in human experience without 
argument. Nevertheless His faith in the final worth 
of man never faltered. It was axiomatic in all His 
teaching and practice that the roots of spiritual 
possibility struck deeper into the human soul than the 
roots of evil. ~he keynote of the New Testament is 
its unbdunded faith in the possibility of new 
beginnings for human life when the life of man is 
linked up to the life of God. Even the abandoned 
and the lost meant much to Jesus because they meant 
everything to God. This is the very core of the 
Christian doctrine of human worth, that God and man 
are knit together in a fellowship of reconciliation 
which transcends the natural order of existence and which 
is broken only by the deliberate choice of man himself.
Arising out this,then, we assume for
the purposes of our thesis that the religious worth of 
man is broadly conceived as follows. T> fan is regarded 
as a self conscious individual. To a certain extent he 
is able to determine the course of his own development. 
K
4*.
He enjoys a genuine affinty with certain personality- 
enriching features in his environment. In other words 
we are men "by reason of that self consciousness and 
self determination which which unites us to the eternal 
spirit of the universe. And it reasonably assumed 
that man has potential worth,in spite of present 
devaluation, arising out of his free fellowship with 
the divine.
Beyond all the irafcBixx worth that accrues 
to human life through the operation of the laws of 
natural causality there is a fund of spiritual 
possibility traceable in the last analysis to the 
fact that "Our life is hid with God in Christ 11 .
All interpretations of life are necessarily 
selective,although not thereby arbitrary, ^e select 
biology and psychology because it will be part of our 
thesis to ma ntain that these studies must never be 
separated. There is no such thing as a biology which can 
ignore the functional nature and therefore the psychic 
integration of the organism which it studies. It will be 
maintained however that the psychic integration in man 
is more than psychcQbiologiieal.
Our interest in anthropology is chiefly 
to shew that origins d£ affect ultimate values.
Ge IB rally, th e ar gurne nt fo 1 lows th re  mai n 
divisions, biological, anthropological and psychological, 
followed "by a constructive statement. Since our chief 
interest is from Charles Darwin onwards, only "brief
t
rtierence is made to the p re-Darwinian phase of evolution. 
Early Greek anticipations of the idea are outlined, with 
particular reference to Aristotle, whose functional 
approach is "becoming more and tare important for modern 
theory. The continuity of the general idea of evolution 
is then traced through such pioneers as Descartes, Leibnitz,
Buffon, Erasmus Darwin, and Lamarck.
4»""A 
It was with Charles Darwin that evolution first
came to close grips with the Christian doctrine of human 
worth. Darwin's theory is stated and its effect upon human 
 values noted. The relation of Darwin to Lam re k and Kalthus 
is discussed, and his main principle of natural selection 
critically estimated.
Following Darwin, religious values suffered 
eclipse from the mechanistic biology of V/eismann. His theory 
of the continuity of the germ-plasm is reviewed in the light 
of modern criticism, and evidence is submitted to show the 
reality of the inheritance of acquired characteristics.
Examination is then made of the various theories 
to explain memory, put forward by Butler, Her ing, Semon.Ittgnano, 
and Bousfield, the principle being established that the organism 
is characterised by a psychic integration without which its
role in evolution is not adequately understood. Philosophic 
support for the reality of the agent in evolutionary 
development is seen in the work of James Ward.
The continuation of the mechanistic trend in "biology 
is then traced through Mendelism, Mutationism, and the 
Chromosome Theory. The importance of these movements is 
assessed in terms of their relation to human worth. From 
the Mutation Theory we deduce the valuable principle that 
a mutation is fruitfully regarded as "biological evidence 
of the organism's inherent ability to make a qualitative 
change of its evolutionary direction when confronted with a 
critical survival problem.
The biological section of the argument closes with 
a critical review of some salient features in three modern 
trends in evolutionary biology, and their significance for 
our thesis estimated. These are, "The Science and Philosophy 
of The Organism", which establishes the category of the y/hole, 
"Psycho-biology", which hyphenates two inseparables, ard. 
"Emergent Evolution", vii ich guarantees the important principle 
of the emergence of the genuinely new. All of these have 
unique worth for the Christian valuation of human vrcrth.
/?
In the second division of the argument, the upvard 
climb of the manward-headed organism is traced, and the 
important principles discovered in the biological field 
applied to the important facts of anthropology. It is 
claimed that in the ascent from protoplasm to personality, 
there is evidence of the functioning of a transcendent 
factor, and that the salvation of the humanwauil Imaiflud
0l0flfK|rcV'
wwfc,at every stage of its developing career,has depended 
upon constant cooperation wl th this psychic factor.
Preparatory to a criticism of "the my Hi of our ape- 
ancestry", the relation of structure and function is
a* * 
discussed, the importance of the law of convergent evolution
lnH^Hg pointed out. The or g^nic synthesis of structural 
development, the retention in man of primitive unspe cialised 
features, the preparation for the mind life, are then 
considered, and Wood Jones 1 argument for the non-anthropoid 
evolution of man reviewed.
771 thin the continuity of evolution, there has been a 
mutational factor at v/orlr. This mutational principle is 
now applied to the actual evolution of man himself, and 
evidence of his uniqueness discovered in the fact of his 
qualitative divergence from the historical life staeam. The 
paucity of anthropoid fossils and the danger of generalisation 
from anything less than the organism "alive and vtfiole" is
pointed out. Finally the antiquity of man is reviev/ed, and 
the evidence of the chief fossil humanoid remains evaluated. 
Argument is submitted that "the big brained tendency" in the
human ward^ moving s took effected a unique reorienta tion of 
its evolutionary directio^, thereby making possible the 
emergence of homo-sapiens as a self-conscious being. The 
section then closes v/i th evidence of the general prevalence 
in nature of the factor of discontinuity.
The third phase of the argument deals with 
the relation of evolutionary psychology to the religious 
worth of man. In the preceding stage, the qualitatively no?/ 
emergence of the distinctly human has been argued, hence we 
may now take it as a basic principle that man carries with in 
himself, not in his antecedents, the norm of the interpretation 
of his own genius.
The place of the mind in osychology is
briefly traced from Bacon, through Looke, Berke3$r, Hume and 
Kant. The effect of the evolutionary theory's is noted, and 
the conclusion reached that the evolutionary conception of 
mind spiritualises nature rather 1han naturalises the spirit. 
Later on, the advance from Kant is seen in the philosophy of 
Karl Heim.
The true uniqueness of man, psychologically,
is now considered, aid the anirnal-human relationship considered. 
The urge to become, the relation of antecedents to consequents, 
the dynamic factor in self-conscious ness and the significance 
of remorse are evaluated in support of the uniqueness of the 
spirit of man.
In anticipation of the analysis of instinct, the 
principle of "the organism as a 1*1 ole" is asserted to be 
ultimate for the religious interpretation of human worth. 
The relation of instinct to personality is then examined
to show that instinct always operates in the interests
/*
of a self, which has certain fundamental needs, the role
of instinct being to satisfy these needs. The religious 
worth of man is closely related to these fundamental life 
needs, since they bear witness to man's awareness of God. 
The discussion of the "religious instinct" evokes the 
claim that religion is sui generis, a"God-relationahip fl .
The assessment of instinct in terms of needs, paves 
the way for an examination of psycho-analysis insofar as 
it affects religious values. Freud and Tansley are 
selected as representative for our purpose. Elliot Smith 
is quoted as evidence that the fundamental human quest is 
a search for "life". The validity of the religious 
"projection" is upheld, a distinction being drawn between 
the motivss underlying projection considered psychologically 
and religiously, and the uniqueness of conscience as a 
religious relationship is argued.
4
A constructive statement is offered of the 
contribution ma.de by the new psychology to the religious 
interpretation of human values. The problem of sin as a 
negative factor in human 7*10 rth is considered, and finally 
assessed as a religious relationship wMch carries real 
tvidenct of the worth of man.
The consideration of the problem of sin open* the 
<jie st ion) defective; -per so nality , necessitating a statement 
of our metaphysical assumptions. This includes belief in 
a teleologioal interpretation of nature, evidence for vfaich 
-is seen in the studies of Eenderson. The relation of 
evolution to potentiality is then considered. The law of 
increasing entropy is recognised but held to be superseded 
in the value enriching relationship between man and a 
creative God. The pmotiool faith of Jootn ond Foul in
4- J - —
In support of our claim that the self is always en 
rapport with a creative background of experience, Karl 
Heim's doctrine of The Perspective Figure is reviewed. 
_ The application of this doctrine to the evolutionary 
process in general is held to be implied in A.W.Whitehead's 
philosophy of the organisn.
The argument closes with a consideration of the person 
of Jeaus in relation to evolutionary development. It is 
maintained that we must appeal to more than evolutionary 
categories to account for the testimony of history and the
witness of experience. He is the Logos of God, come in the
b 
fulness of time,, safeguard the destiny of the race. Hence
the Incarnation is the divine witness to the eternal worth 
of man.
We take this opportunity of acknowledging 
our indebtedness to Principal Hughes, Professor Lament, 
and Professor Simpson. While they are i$. no wise 
responsible for the opinions stated herein, their 
generosity of suggestion and criticism has "been 
exceedingly helpful.
SECTION ONE
Prt-Darwinian anticipations of Evolution. . 
The Early Greeks
It is quite clear now that the idea of a developing 
process in nature is as old at least as the philosophers 
of ancient Greece. Earlier civilisations there have been, 
but their contribution to scientific knowledge is so 
closely interwoven with primitive mythology and theology 
as to be of little importance. It was the Greek who first 
made bold to seek a naturalistic interpretation of the 
phenomena of life. Yet it is not always appreciated to 
what a remarkable degree these pioneer speculators 
anticipated the modern evolutionary theory.
Anaximander(GlG-54Q B.C), a pupil of Shales, 
surmised that the universe began as a sort of "boundless 
infinite", an undifferentiated mass whence everything 
had arisen by a process of "separation of opposites". 
All things were but a transitory manifestation of this 
infinite ground plan, and were destined to be swallowed 
up eventually in their original source. Centuries later, 
Herbert Spencer was to theorise on the "homogeneous" and 
"alternating integration and differentiation". It is 
obvious that the Spencerian categories find their proto- 
types in the "infinite" and the "eternalmotion" ofi ^ 
Anaximandar.
i. c.f Taylor. Evolution i£ the Light of Modern Knowledge.p441
•7
But Anaximander's most striking anticipation 
of modern theory is his intuition that man has an ancestry 
going "back through the fishes. Pondering the helplessness 
of human infancy,he shrewdly argued that man could not have 
existed always as he is in his -present f orm$ his infantile 
helplessness would long ago have led to his annihilation. 
Aware of the existence of certain sharks, which in time of 
danger protect their young by swallowing them,Anaximander 
coupled the genealogy of man with this fish. His full 
conclusion was that life originated in the sea,but was 
driven to the land owing to the receding of the waters, 
that some such creature as the shark.able to protect its 
young .developed the ability to breathe the air, adopted a 
land habitat, changed its habits and structure accordingly, 
and became the progenitor of all land life. This striking 
speculation reads like a page from a textbook of modern 
biology.
A doctrine of perpetual motion was advanced 
in the'flux'philosophy of Heracleitus(530-470 B.C.). All 
things flow in a ceaseless becoming; nothing is at rest; 
there is motion even in the seemingly still matter. This 
hypothesis of 'constant variation 1 in nature was supplemented 
by another striking anticipation of the later Darwinian 
theory of the struggle for existence and the survival of
the fittest through natural selection. "Through strife 1 , 
declared Eeracleitus,'all things rise and pass away.... 
war is the father and king of all...some he has made gods, 
and some men, some free and some slaves". Yet through 
all this flux of struggle and variation and selection 
there is the constancy of law. "This order, the same for 
all things, no one of gods or men has made; but it always 
was and is and shall be . "
Evolutionary ideas were still further anticipated 
in the doctrines of Empedocles( c.445 B.C. ) It was the belief 
of this philosopher that nature, in its experiments with 
organisms tproduces various combinations that meet environmental 
needs. When this occurs the organism survives and perpetuates
its kind; otherwise it perishes.
*H* 
lith^Atomists,however, this trend of speculative
interpretation found itself in a cul-de-sac. The universe, 
hitherto abounding with life and a measure of spontaneity, 
degenerated into a vast mechanism. "Everything" declared 
Leucippus , ! is driven by necessity". "In reality,there 
are only atoms and the void" said Democritus. Design was 
denied. But even the Atomists',in their belief that these 
types survived which beet fitted their environment touched 
in spirit the essence of the theory of natural selection 1 . 
We might add that their belief that new worlds are constantly
arising by the 'selective aggregation 1 of similar atoms 
forms a suggestive background for the modern theory of 
evolution "by ' emergence 1 1 which proceeds from 'favorable
combinations*"
This line of fmuitful theori sing-it can 
scarcely be termed scientific investigation- was 
submerged for a time while the attention of men was 
claimed by the ethi&al and political philosophies of 
the Sophists and Socrates and Plato. It was rescued 
again by the genius of Aristotle(385-322 B.C.)
Lewes, in his treatise on Aristotle, gleans 
from Pliny the information that Alexander the Great 
instructed his hunters and gamekeepers and gardeners and 
fishermen to send to his friend Aristotle all the biological 
and botanical material that the philosopher might request. 
With this material Aristotle established a magnificent 'zoo 1 . 
His deductions, gleaned from observation of his specimens, 
are of particular interest for modern evolutionary theory.
With suoh a wealth cf material before him 
Aristotle could not avoid the conclusion,that despite the 
great variety manifested in life, this variety could never- 
theless be arranged in a continuous series. Life in all 
respects,of structure, sensation, etc, could be arranged in 
an ascending scale with minute gradations linking the lowest
i Aristo*le; London 1864.
organisms to the highest. Nature makes so gradual a 
transition from the inanimate to the animate kingdom that 
the "boundary lines which separate them are indistinct and 
doubtful. There may even be some degree of life in the 
apparently lifeless. In certain species also, the line
of demarcation between plant and animal is blurred. While
g 
life has thus grown steadily in complexity and in power,
intelligence has increased in correlation with complexity
of structure and mobility of form. There has been increasing
specialisation of function together with a continuous
3 
centralisation of physiological control. Life was moving
towards the achievement of a brain, driving steadily towards 
richer relationship with the living environment.
Embryology comes to birth with Aristotle,
so that he can say that'he who has se^n things grow will have 
the finest view of them.* Even the Mendelian Law of Inheritance 
had been at least a problem for Aristotle for he considers the 
case of a white woman who married a negro; the first generation
of children was all white; in the next generation negroes
, 4 
appeared. Where was the blackness hidden in the middle generation?
1. Hist. Animalium,viii.
2. De Anima ii,2.
3. De Partibus Animalium. iv, 5-6.
4. Gomperz 'Greek Thinkers' vol iv p.169
For the above references we are indebted to the chapter
on Aristotle in "The Story of Philosop&y" W.Durant New York 1926
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The progressive development which Aristotle 
saw in life was no haphasard affair. The world was ruled 
by ends. Life manifested itself in wholes, seen first in 
organisms,rising in the 'scale 1 according to their degree of 
articulateness. Everything living was motivated by a tendency 
to become better than it was in its present form. The whole 
living process was really a striving upwards of 'matter 1 
towards form. A thing is at once the 'form 1 that has growh 
out of its 'matter 1 , and in its turn that 'form 1 becomes the 
'matter' out of which a still higher 'form 1 may develop. 
By 'form 1 , Aristotle signifies the realising of the capacities 
latent in 'matter'.
The trend of life is thus tov/ards a definite 
fulfilment. Everything is internally guided by its own 
dynamic nature and structure, or its 'entelechy 1 , that is to 
say, literally 'having its being within'. The egg of the 
chick moves towards its own destined end.'It is internally 
organised to become not a duck but a chick.' This design 
is due to no external influence; it is inherent in the very 
nature and function of the organism to develop into something 
richer.
To this doctrine of the dynamic autonomy of 
the living organism, modern biology is paying respectful 
attention. It now seems that, some such interpretation as that 
sponsored by Aristotle will require to be adopted to do 
justice to the discovered facts.
The fertile speculations of the early Greeks 
failed to take root in the anoient world. The science which 
Greece finally passed on to succeeding ages was the thought of 
a universe where the same elements had always existed,and the 
same species had maintained themselves unchanged.
With the passing of Aristotle,the definitely 
scientific interest disappeared for practically a thousand 
years. Christian theology, in its search for human values, swung 
in another direction. Speculation about life and nature was 
governed by the Genesis stories of Creation,and the preservation 
of the animals at the flood. Hence it was accepted as axiomatic 
that the various life-forms came directly as they were from the 
hand of God.
Dtscartes But the naturalistic interpretation of life 
did net perish. V/hen the authority of ec clesiasticism began to 
wane,man's mind again sought a plain understanding of nature. 
It was Descartes(1596-1650 ) who gave a first sketch of a 
scientific cosmology, advancing the notion of a gradual 
building up of the world from simple beginnings by means of 
powers inhe rent within nature herself. Descartes also suggested 
the possibility that the higher lorrns of life might have been 
produced from the lower by a process of mechanical evolution.
He w?,s ca/r eful,however, to say that this
was merely one of many possible hypotheses, and not necessarily 
his own opinion. Science was not yet free to speak its own 
mind apart frcm theological censure.
A generation later , Leibnitz opposed the
mechanism of Descartes with what amounted to a theory of 
evolution on a large scale. Given an initial push by a "dens 
ex machine", Descartes had been cable to get his universe into 
motion. Development could then be explained from some homogen- 
eous substance, exist ing at first in a disintegrated form-a 
notion which was later developed in the nebular theories of 
Kant and Laplace.
For the inert matter of Descartes, Leibnitz
substituted an energy which was all-pervasive. This energy was 
no mere occasional forte, but a continuous activity. It left 
no gaps requiring an outside stimulus to set it going again. 
Moreover , this immanent energy was a steady movement in the 
direction of perfection. Even if progress was slow it was at 
any rate certain, for although the forward steps might be 
infinitesimally small, their minuteness was more than counter- 
balanced by their infinite frequency.
Here was evolution magnificently conceived. This 
developmental optimise of Leibnitz was read to pood purpose in 
France, with the result that his ideas 'spread rapidly among 
eighteenth century thinkers, to become the stimulus for many 
fanciful evolutionary theories.
Buff on It wa,s about this time that Buff on, the great 
French naturalist, was cautiously giving expres ion to his 
evolutionary convictions, swaying, as Butler says, "between
the orthodoxy of the Sorbonne, and a "belief in I 1 enchain erne nt
  i 
des Stres" Buffon was probably the first modern to account
for unity of plan on the basis of community of origin and he 
supported his views with a theory of the direct modification 
of animals by environment. Buff on had as his pupil., Lamarck, 
Tfoo at the beginning of the 19th century became an ardent 
champion of biological evolution.
Erasmus Darwin. Erasmus Darwin, grandfather of the 
greatar Charles Darwin, had meanwhile asserted thaf'from 
the metamorphoses of animals...we are led to conclude that 
they have been alike produced from & similar living filament". 
To explain these metamorphoses he made use of a principle 
of'response to need 1 which was to receive fuller elaboration 
at the hands of his contemporary Lamarck. In the words of 
Darwin, :7 all animals undergo perpetual transformations,which 
are in part produced by their own exertions in consequence
of their desires and aversions...many of these acquired forms
2 
or properties are transmitted to their progeny."
Lamarck* Lamarck, in early years a materialist, 
became at an admanced age one of the most ardent of vital!st 
evolutionists. He shared with Erasmus Darwin the conviction 
that the chief factor in evolution was the transmission of 
traits acquired througi adaptation to environment.Environmental
i.S. Butler. Evolution, p.165 
2.Zoonomia. 1794. Sec.xxxix, 4. p.501
influences stimulate certain needs in the organism; in response 
to these needs the organism develops certain characteristics 
and passes them on to its offspring.
It was this doctrine of 'response to need 1 which 
was later to mark the main "battle ground between the Lamarckian 
and the Neo-Darwinian interpretations of evolution. Lamarck laid 
great stress on the presence of a psychic factor in development. 
It will be worth while to quote him at length here. "It must not 
"be supposed that its surroundings directly affect any modificat- 
ion whatever in the ifbrm and organisation of an anim*l. Great 
changes in surroundings involve great changes in the wants of 
animals, and these changes in their wants involve corresponding 
changes in their actions. If these 7/ants become permanent,or of 
very long duration, the animals contract new habits which last as 
long as the wants that give rise to Uiem. .on the other hand,new 
wants have rendered a part necessary,which part has accordingly
•
been created by a succession of efforts..use has kept it in
existence, .disuse has led to its gradually ceasing to receive the
i 
development which other parts attain to..and in time disappears."
The changes produced by this OJgaioiomal 
«L 4W e<4a»k'»*' 
striving are capable of being transmitted to offspring.
i. S. Butler. Evol. 221-25.
In opposition to the Larnarckian recognition of a 
psychic factor in evolutionary change, Neo-Darwinism was to 
maintain with equal insistence that evolution proceeded in 
consequence of a rigorously mechanistic principle of 'natural 
selection. ' The attack on Lamarckianisrn was led by Cuvier, 
so that,when the star of Charles Darwin was shining "bright in 
the evolutionary firmament, the doctrine of 'response to need 1 
was generally discredited among men of science.
Today there is a decided trend towards the 
Aristotelian and the Lamarckian emphasis. '.7e shall have 
occasion later on to return to the doctrine of needs. In 
passing, it is worthy of notice that   the modern theory of 
hormones has "been curiously anticipated "by the words of 
Lamarck. "V/hen an animal is prompted to this or that action, 
there is an excess of nervous fluid to the prgans which are
»
to execute it."
Evolutionary theory was enthusiastically championed 
by the philosopher Schelling, °.nd also b' his successor Hegel. 
But these men coupled evolution with a metaphysical interpret- 
ation that could not commeno itself to scientific opinion. 
Had Hegel lived some twenty years longer than he did- he 
died just a ye^r after the publishing of the 'Origin of 
Species'- his philosophy of nature might have been touched
i. Butler. Evolution, p.309
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more with flesh and "blood. As it was, he sensed evolution 
only in a ghostly fashion; it was real only because it was 
'ideal 1 "Metamorphoses can "be ascribed only to the notion 
as such, because it alone is evolution.... it is a clumsy 
idea.....to regard the transformation from one natural form 
and sphere to a higher as an outward and actual production."
Meanwhile the old creationist outlook was receiving 
hammer blows in other realms of thought as well as the 
biological. The Nebular hypotheses of Kant and Laplace, 
the pioneer work of John Hut ton, and more especially the 
geological principles of Lyell had compelled thoughtful men 
to consider evolutionary ideas. Lyell f s 'Principles of 
Geology 1 appeared in 1830, furnishing a much needed time 
scale for the interpretation of the biologic J. facts that had 
been forth/coming. In 1844 f an anonymous author published 
'Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation 1 , in which were 
set forth cogent arguments for evolution from the standpoint 
of biology,cosmology,and geology. By 1852, only seven years 
previous to Darwin's'Origin of Species', Herbert Spenoer 
published an essay on 'The Developmental Hypothesis',submitting 
a powerful philosophical argument for the progressive evolution 
of the whole universe, including man and society. But science 
was witholding its complete assent till the objective evidence 
for evolution was forthcoming in systematic fashion. The stage 
was set for the appearance of a genius.
In 1858 came the joint announcement of the 
hypothesis of natural selection by Charles Darwin and 
Alfred Russell Wallace. The following year the 'Origin 
of Species 1 appeared^and evolution came into its own. The 
facts which had "been steadily accumulating since the 
beginning of the century seemed to find their natural 
explanation in the Darwinian hypothesis.
J/
E. Charles Darwin.
We have seen that the idea of evolution
itself had a history before its great vindication through 
Charles Darwin. But even if the idea did $ot originate 
with Darwin, it was certainly he who brought home with 
telling effect,supported by a great mass of evidence, the 
significance of it. It was Darwin T s amazingly systematic 
presentation of the multitudinous facts that compelled 
thoughtful people to see the real issue. The situation is 
summed up by Butler,who deola/res,"to the end of time, if the 
question be asked 'who taught the people to believe in
evolution 1 , there can be only one answer-that it v/as Mr
i 
Darwin."
Darwin was driven to his theory of evolution
by the pressure cf facts in the fields of comparative anatomy, 
of geological succession, of embryology, and of the geographical 
distribution of living and extinct forms. Along these lines 
he organised the great wealth of data amassed through his 07,71 
observations of plants an£ animals. Confronted by the fact' 
of multitudinous existing species, his problem resolved itself 
into a search for the origin of such species, a quest for some 
explanatory principle which might reasonably be advanced as an 
hypothesis to account for the present variety of life from 
some originally simple expression of matter,
Life in the beginning he took for granted.
i. Butler. Life & Habit, p.277.
A simple calculation proved to Darwin that some 
selective agency must be at work upon life, sincen if every 
"born member of every species survived and propagated in natural 
ratio, even a short time would be sufficient to over-populate 
the earth so that life would become impossible.
To illustrate from the case of the common thrush.In 
a completed life cycle of the parent birds,say ten years,if all 
the progeny survived and bred in ordinary ratio, their offspring 
would mean a population of nineteen and a half millions. In 
some twenty years, this would become two hundred millions, and 
in thirty years, one hundred and twenty trillions. In other 
words, in a very short time, with no depletion in their ranks, 
there could not be room for a fraction of such an army on the 
whole surface of the earth,if they were all ranged side by 
side.
The case of the thrush is paralleled by the history 
of the herring. Neither earth nor sky nor sea could support 
the unrestricted progeny of all living creatures. The obvious 
explanation of the existing facts was to assume that nature 
placed a premium upon survival.
This premium,Darwin and V7alla.ee ,working
independently, discovered in the principle of natural selection, 
based upon the struggle for existence and the survival of the 
fittest. Recognising that no two plants or animals are exactly 
alike, Darwin assumed that their differences had a survival 
meaning. They represented in fact the conservation of some
characteristic which had proved valuable to its possessor 
in the struggle for existence, a struggle in which none 
but the favoured few could possibly win out. Such 
preferential variations might be infinitesimally small, 
developed and transmitted over long periods of time, but 
the nascent science of geology supported Darwin with a 
convenient time schema. His conclusion was that these 
infinitesimal preferential variations,. operating over an 
infinity of time, would accumulate from generation to 
generation, and so at last account for the present variety of 
living forms upon the earth.
In other words,all organisms vary continually 
and t£eir variations are herer"itable. In the struggle for 
existence, by a process of rigorous natural selection, those 
individuals ore eliminated which are not possessed of 
preferential variations moving in the direction of increasing 
adaptation to their environment. "If variations,useful to 
any organic being do occur, assuredly individuals thus 
characterised will have the best chance of being preserved 
in the struggle for life, and from the strong principle cf
inheritance, these will tend to produce offspring similarly
i 
characterised."
i. Origin of Species 1902. p.160
The effect of Darwin's theory of evolution.
Whitehead states that 'by a "blindness which 
was almost judicial as "being a penalty affixed to hasty 
superficial thinking,many religious thinkers opposed the 
new doc trine,although in truth a thoroughgoing evolutionary 
philosophy is inconsistent with materialism". This of course 
is very true, but it scarcely does justice to the feelings 
of the men who met the first onslaught of Darwinism on human 
values. The main attack was launched through the theory of 
natural selection. If natural selection were henceforth to 
be regarded as the true cause of evolution, then God of course 
was no longer needed; He was bowed none too politely out of 
existence and His place taken by a blind automatic natural 
force working not so much for righteousness as for survival 
of the fittest. When the problem came to be narrowed down to 
man himself, it seemdd that man was to be completely assimilated 
to nature, and the shaping of his destiny left to the whimsical 
action of the same natural force that controlled the movements 
of all other species. God f so to speak.,died a natural death 
and man became a waif of circumstances, linked by his 
evolutionary genealogy with the lowest forms of animal life, 
from which by slow and insensible gradations his physical and 
mental faculties had been developed.
i. Whitehead. A,B. Science & the Modern World. 1926.ed. p.157
Beneath the ignorance and the violence of the 
first opposition to Darwinism, the re was a genuine assertion 
of the spirit of man which legitimately rebelled against 
this disintegration of its eternal worth. Men rightly refused 
to believe that the mark of the "beast was equivalent to the 
insignia of divine sonship. It is only right of courts to 
point out that the great naturalists who sponsored evolution 
refrained ftfom directly pressing this devaluation of human 
worth, but the logic of their premises pointed to no other 
conclusion at the time.
It is only now, when the heat of the original 
controversy has passed, and man had had time to see evolution 
itself in true perspective, that we begin to see that the 
natural body which was laid in the grave by Darwinism has been 
resurrected into a more spiritual body. Par from laying man 
in the dust, a true estimate of evolution rehabilitates man 
to the dignity from which he was first dethroned by Gopernicus. 
The process by which all the existing forms of life are held 
to be related by descent to the simpler forms of long ago has 
proved itself an intuition of genius supremely valuable for 
our under?tanding of life. It has also confirmed in the minds 
of thoughtful men that supreme conviction of the religious 
experience, that there is discovered a 'sense of the eternal 
in the present moment 1 .
There are those who assert that the present disintegrat- 
ion of spiritual values is a direct outcome of the process of 
denudation that commenced with the Darwinian conclusions."The 
present depression of humanity has its origin...solely in man's 
sense of his origin. The human race feels itself like a rat 
in a trap....humanity rots for a new definition of life." i
We are inclined to agree with this verdict. In a 
large measure human progress is dependent upon a genuine 
recognition of the worth of a man in his relation to the 
universal scheme of things. *7e venture to predict that 
humanity will not make a forward advance until it rediscovers 
the essential worth of its history and finds a worthy 
interpretation of nature in relation to its humanity. 
It is the admitted purpose of this essay to seek to discover 
the valuable elements of human life in relation to the facts 
advanced by the evolutionary hypothesis, more particularly 
as these facts have been revealed througi biology, anthropology 
and psychology.
i. The Glass of Fashion, p.170
si
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Some Influences Wiich Moulded Darwin's Thought.
Darwin's epoch-making "Origin of Species" was first 
published in 1859. But the idea that 'man is the modified 
descendant of some pre-existing form 1 ,while jghiefly the result 
of Darwin's work, is a/dmitted by the great naturalist to be 
much older than himself. In a letter to Lyell the geologist, 
in March 186 3, Darwin states that "Plato, Buff on, my grandfather- 
Erasmus Darwin,-before Lamarck and others, propounded the 
obvious view that if species were not created separately, they
must have been descended from some other species."
i
Again,he speaks of Lamarck as upholding"the doctrine ft
that all species,including man,are descended from other species. 
The real genius of Darwin was his masterly and
systematic presentation of the evidence for evolution in such
a way as to compel assent to his conclusions.
Darwin came early into touch with the work of
Lamarck. During his service as naturalist on the 'Beagle',
Darwin had read with avidity Lyell's "Principles of Geology''.
Lye 11, stand ing out aga/inst the general trend of contemporary
scientific opinion,championed Lamarck, and had given a
2 
chapter of his book on geology to an exposition of the
Lamarckian theory of evolution. Darwin,in framing his own 
hypothesis, came to repudiate the Lamarckian factor,asserting
1. Histor. sketch to later ed. of Origin of Species.
2. c.f 10th ed. Vol.2. p.246.ff
i
that ffom Lamarck's 'wretched book' he had learned nothing.
Yet although he was inclined to treat the Lamarckian viewpoint 
with scant respect,it is significant to note that in later years 
Darwin profoundly modified his views, so that he could declare, 
"In my opinion the greatest error which I have made has been not
allowing sufficient weight to the direct influence of environment     2 
t ,.independently of natural selection."
This admission is typical of an admirable
trait in the great naturalist, to recognise at all times his own 
limitations. We feel that the true scientist speaks in these
words. As a matter of fact, Darwin had availed himself from the
3
first of the Lamarjkian principle of use and disuse,where
natural selection failed him. The longer he lived it seems that 
the more Lamarckian he became.
The Main Source of Natural Selection. Malthus
In 1798,Rev.Thomas Robert Malthus, a
Surrey curate who was interested in economics,published an 
essay on'Population'. It is to this work that Darwin is 
indebted for the central idea of his evolutionary hypothesis, 
the doctrine of natural selection. The thesis of Malthus was 
that humanity tends to reproduce its kind at a rate which 
outstrips the means of subsistence, and is kept within bounds 
only bysuch natural restrictions as famine,pestilence,war,etc.
1.'Darwin. Life and Letters.' vol.iii.p.14.
2. 2nd ed. of Descent of Man. 1876.
S7. c.f Origin of Speoias. p.170-3 for rtlation of blindn«ss 
to oavt lift.
Through these agencies, SKDODO individuals are eliminated,
Darwin, fifteen months after his return from the 
"Beagle" expedition, immersed in his sea of data, chanced 
to read,as he says,for amusemant, the work of Malthus, 
and ""being well prepared to appreciate the struggle for 
existence which everywhere goes on, from long and continued 
observation of plants and animals, it at once struck me 
that under these circumstances,favorable variations would 
tend to "be preserved and unfavorable ones to be destroyed.
The result of this would be the formation of new species.
i 
Here then I had a theory by which to work."
The fertile mind of Darwin,pregnant with the data 
of his own observations, labouring hard, gave birth to its 
great intuition. If slowly propagating man outstrips the 
means of subsistence, how much more both plants and animals' 
So natural Selection was born.
This Malthus-Darwin inspiration was to prove a 
real nightmare to the nineteenth centurjr. Its final outcome 
was the abstracted and hypothetical "economic man". However 
it is not our business to trace his fortunes here. It is 
sufficient to state that a study of all the factors involved 
in population movement now shows conclusively that the thesis 
of Malthus rests upon a misreading of the population expanse
i. W.C.D.Dampier-Whetham. A History of Science, p.295
which came with the advent of the new industrial order 
in England,a transitory condition 7/hich could not be 
expected to furnish a universal rule of population 
"behaviour for normal times. In a later edition of his 
work,Malthus recognised this. The evolutionary generalisation 
based upon the Malthusian doctrine naturally suffers 
corresponding devaluation.
Critical Appreciation of Natural Selection.
We are in a better position .today to estimate the 
worth of this principle of natural selection. To begin 
with, the primary struggle for existence, hailed as the 
raison d'etre of natural selection, needs to be reinterpreted. 
"Nature red in tooth and claw" is no longer a fair judgment 
of nature as a whole, and nothing less than the principle of 
the whole will suffice as interpretative today. Any account 
of the life-striving is incomplete which fails to acknowledge
the significant fact of mutual aid and cooperation between
i 
species. Life is not primarily a mere snatching for self;
on that basis it could never have attained the richness that 
it has reached. Life has its fine moments; the facts of 
parental care, of the willingness to surrender life for off- 
spring, these are but indications of an altruism and cooperation 
without which nature is not legitimately evaluated. Moreover,
o-g-f. H.Drummond. Irttie Ascent of Man. 1 , oh.7. 
for an ear^y recognition of these facts.
i
when the full facts of symbiosis have been brought to light,
we venture to declare that it will then be seen that the 
struggle for individual existence does not relate one half of 
the whole life story. Nature is permeated with instances of 
cooperative living; social life is the rule rather than the 
exception, and social life implies a conception of individual 
and mutual worth which the raw struggle for survival denied.
The works of Kropotkin and J.A.Thomson clearly show 
that the 'mutual aid 1 spread over the T web of nature 1 involves 
a communal relationship betv^en creature and creature, and 
between creature and environment, which divests the struggle 
for existence of its ruthlessness,and sets 'natural selection 1 
in its real perspective.
It becomes increasingly evident today, that there is 
inherent in the developing organism a spontaneity of outreach 
and responsiveness which calls for recognition in terms that 
transcend natural selection. In proportion as we rise 
higher in the scale of organic life,** that spontaneity 
becomes more and more significant, until £n man we find it
manifesting itself as cooperation with value-indue ing and value-
0n sustaining features in me environment,where natural selection
becomes non-operative, and wherein man achieves a dignity which 
sets him above nature. Natural selection is itself increasingly
i. We are indebted to Prof. J.Y.Bimpson for a reference to 
the work of Buchner which sets out very clearly the all 
pervasive presence of symbiosis in nature.
selected in the interest of an emerging moral and religious 
criterion. It finally becomes possible for man to say that 
it is in God that he lives and moves and has his being, a 
declaration which is at the heart of the Christian valuation 
of man.
It is in virtue of "this spentaneity-whieh 
we maintain to be the characteristic of organic life-that 
the organism is enabled to rise above natural selection and 
to !fi &e^**er its environment, jethog tbma to eiatmit te To si it g 
mada --nver feyT-pa.r»iLy m"fan? *& "  ffto£»ye. Natural selection is 
opposed,for the most part successfully, by what we would 
designate as 'autonomous selection 1 , the primary capacity 
of the organism to adapt and assimilate where it cannot 
create. The outcome of this autonomy is that the organism 
best fitted for survival becomes not so much that which has 
been naturally selected, as that \riiich can best discover in 
its general environment those special features which will most 
adequately contribute to its life as w whole. Once this fact 
of autonomous selection has been recognised,this ability of 
the organism to cooperate wi th the life-enriching activities 
in the environment, an environment whose contribution becomes 
richer in proportion to the ability of the organism to 
assimilate, then the whoie interpretation of evolution is 
radically altered. Man as the outreacher and responder and 
oooperator and assimilator par excellence, received back
tenfold the dignity which he seemed at first sight to have 
lost. Evolution ie not a Chapter of accidents',sponsored 
"by an arbitrary principle of natural selection. It becomes
meaningful when its latest product t man,is liNMmwd as a
*V-ka. fe*'i<H«»' 4. -i -teternal values.
\ f
iieH*s**^>3 reckoned with the
profound truth that other means of survival than fitness 
for aggressive strife have proved highly successful. It 
now becomes possible to save one's life on a higher level 
by refusing to assert it aggressively on the lower. 
Biological evidence is not lacking to support the claim 
that individuals and groups have emerged victorious in the 
life quest by resigning a world which might have been theirs.
This we shall submit at a later stage, has been 
a vital factor in the upward climb of man, his readiness 
and his power to surrender present and temporary advantage 
for the sake of the future and the higher good. In this 
connection the Old Testament doctrine of survival through , 
an obedient remnant opens up a criterion of survival value 
more illuminating than that of natural selection. Values 
may be achieved through surrender rather than through 
aggression. To live may be loss, whereas to die might be 
gain. To turn the other cheek commands a higher survival 
value than mere fitness to exist.
It was the mechanistic rigour of natural selection 
which lay so heavily on the minds of nineteenth centurjr 
religious thinkers. In Darwin, man had been bold to claim 
that design was possible without the necessity of mind. 
Darwin assumed the fact of variation, which is obvious and 
undeniable, and that through the transmission of small chance 
variations an adaptation was attained which entitled its 
owner to survive. But it is manifestly incredible that such 
small variations, requiring to be accumulated and conserved 
throughout many generations,should occur in such a well 
defined directional series, culminating in a valuable end- 
product, simply on the blind principle of chance variation. 
Variability cannot be divorced from its complementary 
principle of 'subjective selection", as Ward called it, the 
organism's power to reciprocate with chosen features in its 
environment. The'natural 1 principle of selection is never 
isolated from psychic control.
Darwin, we have seen, did not himself uphold
the all-sufficient efficacy of natural selection as a complete 
explanation of the evolutionary process. In a letter to 
Hooker, in 1844, he had insisted upon a distinction between 
his ovaa interpretation of the method of variation, and that 
of Lamarck. Further study led him to revise his position 
and to include the possibility of the factor which he had at
first rejected. Indeed he protested against those who 
misrepresented him to the extent of declaring that he
attributed the modification of species entirely to 
natural selection1 and insisted that this principle was
'aided in an important manner by the inherited effects of
i 
use and disuse of parts". That is to say,he admitted
the Lamarckian factor.
3. Huxley and Haeckel.
The logic of the Darwinian premises was
carried to the illogical extreme of interpretation by Hurley 
$nd Haeckel. Thos,Henry Huxley, styling himself 'Darwin's 
bull-dog 1 , championed evolution,and made its his work to 
popularise the Darwinian discoveries. He suceeded to a 
remarkable degree, expounding the evidence in 'Man's Place 
in Nature 1 and in a series of essays^collected in ' Darwiniana'. 
The debate at CSxford, between Huxley and Bishop Wilberforce, 
with the resulting discomfiture of the latter,is typical of 
the triumph flf evolution at this time.
It was in Germany,however, that the
'Darwinisrnus'cult prevailed most. In the 'Biddle of the Universe 1 , 
Haeckel erected a thoroughgoing materialism on the base of 
Darwinism. Maintaining the unity of inorganic and organic 
nature he claimed that the spontaneity of the organism was 
simply a function of the chemical properties of carbon, and 
that throu^i spontaneous generation,protoplasm in simple form
i Crigin of Species, ed. 6 p.421.
must arise from inorganie nitrogenous carbon compounds.
i 
In the chapter on 'Darwin as Anthropologist 1 ,Haeckel
mavintrdns that 1*the principle of evolution throughout the 
universe compels us to formulate a single supreme law, the all-
i
embracing 'law of substance 1 , or the united laws of the 
'constancy of matter 1 and the ' conservation of energy 1 . V/e should 
never have reached this supreme conclusion if Charles Darv/in 
had not prepared the way by his theory of descent by natural 
selection, and crowned the great work of his life by the 
association of the theory wi th a naturalistic anthropology."
Such dogmatic materialism is hard put to it to support 
itself today. Even if it were to be shown, and we are still far
from it, that psychic properties arise directly out of chemical
2 
and physical media, the whole trend of modern physics is in
the direction of confessing- a 'principle of indeterminacy' in 
the original constituents of'matter 1 . When this is supplemented 
by the biological recognition of the autonomous functioning of 
the organism, it is only sheer unscientific determinism which 
is able to deny the category of possibility as inherent in the 
very nature of life itself.
To recognise possibility is to discover the physical 
and chemical and biological correlate of what Christianity holds 
to be the core of the spiritual valuation of man.
1. in 'Darwin and Modern Science' p. 151.
2. see footnote on following page. 'Baly of Liverpool 1
As a matter of fact,Haeckel's bark was worse than his 
"bite,for we find him declaring that "to the two fundamental
attributes, .extension and energy, we now add a third,psychoma,
i 
sensitiveness or soul." Surely here is a Haeokel come to
judgment! The stalwart apoitle of materialism once 
characterised Weismann's conception of the germ-plasm as 
'mystical 1 . It would be interesting to be able to record a 
Weismannian verdict on Haeckel 's 'psychoma 1 .
To sum this matter up, there are important realms of 
real experience where natural selection is either non-operative, 
or else functions only in the presence of equally powerful 
psychic factors. Natural selection cannot create the material 
upon which it works; its nature is to prune rather than to 
produce;but in the fact of productivity lies the real creative 
genius of organic activity. As we advance up the ladder of life 
we find natural selection a factor of decreasing importance.Its 
function cannot be separated from processes which include a 
vital as well as a mechanical efficacy. The tendency to vary, 
the urge of heredity, the attraction to creative expression, 
the behaviour of the organism as a unit, none of these are
i. Darwin and Modern Science, p . 142 .
Baly of Liverpool claims that in the presence of light, 
moisture and carbon-dioxide, he has produced formaldehyde 
and sugar at the surface of certain inorganic compounds, 
i.e. he has suggested how we might imagine certain organic 
substances to have been produced from the inorganic. He has 
so to speak,reconstrueted the first steps which go on in the 
cells of plants in producing fructose.
It must net be overlooked however that in all such work there 
is behind the experiment the deliberate functioning of a 
creative and organising mind,guaranteeing and relating the 
conditions necessary for the 'emergence 1 . 
Moreover, formaldehyde is not personality.
translatable into mechanical or natural categories,and these 
are always involved in any situation info ere natural selection 
operates. These represent the internal,as complementary, 
though not opposed to, the external factors of evolution.
Finally we repeat that natural selection is 
practically quiescent when man emerges from the level of 
mere existence into the deliberately selected life of the 
spirit.in which he discovers his true worth. Sorley well 
argues that 'it is not owing to, but in spite of natural 
selection that the mind of man affirms its unity with truth
and beauty and goodness,and undismayed by opposition seeks
i. 
its home among ideals." Beyond the restricted operation
of natural selection there is possible to outreaching 
humanity an interlocking spiritual reciprocity with the 
environment which fully vindicates the Christian valuation of 
human worth without exposing it to the dangers attendant upon 
abstracting man from the natural order to which he is 
organically related.
i. Sorley W.R. Moral Values & the Idea of God. p.326.
4. Weismannism. Its significance for Human Values.
With the widespread acceptance of Darwinism, 
it "became increasingly clear that the main struggle for 
human values was to he between the older Lamarckian 
interpretation,which relied upon the presence of a 
teleological factor without which there could he no real 
evolution, and the He ©"Darwinian school which insisted 
that organic evolution was governed throughout wholly 
by mechanistic principles. Huxley denied what Lamarck 
had maintained, the fact of the transmissibility of 
acquired characteristics. Weismann set the seal of 
experimental approval on the denial of Huxley. Lamarck 
in substance had argued for a complementary relationship 
between organism and environment,with due recognition of 
the part played by each. Weismann now declared that the 
environment played no part in evolution, that the mechanics 
of development were regulated wholly from within the 
organism itself, and that on strictly mechanistic lines*
Towards the end of the 19th century he
advance(i his famous theory of the continuity of the germ- 
plasm, as the result of his experiments with Hydromeduiae. 
Galton had previously shown that f in development the bulk 
of the germinal material of the fertilised egg-cell goes to 
form the 'body 1 of the embryo...but a certain residue is
kept apart from the development of the 'body 1 to form the 
primordium of the reproductive organs of the offspring, 
whence will be launched in due time another similar vessel 
on the adventurous voyage of life". Following up this 
important generalisation.Weismann made a rigid separation 
"between these two functional aspects of the germ plasm, 
maintaining that the reproductive portion of the germ-plasm 
preserved its own uninterrupted continuity of existence from 
generation to gene ration.inviolate, wholly unaffected by any 
influence that might reach the 'body 1 part of the developing 
orgahism. No matter what adaptation the 'body 1 was required 
to malce by the environment, the inherited part of the germ- 
plasm remained always what it had originally been, from 
generation to generation. "The continuity of the germ-plasm 
is founded upon the idea that heredity is brought about by 
the transmission from one generation to another, of a substance 
with a definite chemical, and above all,molecular constitution. 
I have called this substance ' germ-pi asm', and have assumed 
that it possesses a highly complex structure,conferring upon 
it the power of developing into a complex organism. I have 
attempted to explain heredity by supposing that in each 
ontogeny,a part of the specific germ-plasm is not used up in 
the construction of the body of the offspring,but is reserved
unchanged for the formation of the germ cells of the following
2 
generation"
1. Thomson J.A. System of Animate Nature vol.2. p.48&
2. Weismann A. Essays upon Heredity, vol.1, p.74
Once granted this assumption of the segregated 
germinal continuity,it was a logical step to assert that in 
the 'germ-cell 1 there were to be discovered the factors which 
governed the transmission of inheritance. leismann further 
maintained that apart from possible re-shuffling of the 
original deposit of chemical determinants no new hereditary 
variants could appear. Hence,if true, "Jeismannism imposed 
upon the Christian doctrine of man a biological necessitarianism 
from which theoretically there seemed to be no escape.
For religious values the implications of this 
rigidly deterministic schema were far reaching. In the first 
place, the contrast between the immortality of the germ-plasm, 
and the evanescence of the body-plasm was absolute. The only 
value seemingly left for the individual was to provide a 
convenient means of protection and nourishment for the germ- 
plasm.
More signifieantly,We$8mannism implied that 
man could not detach himself from the natural rock whence he 
was hewn. The germ-plasm of the fathers was visited upon the 
children,not only unto the third and fourth generations, but 
ad infinitum.
In its practical day id day field work,
Christianity had operated on the faith that the environment 
did make its impact upon the life of the individual,for good or 
for ba/d, and that ijan had within himself the ability to throw
off the 'old man 1 , in response Eto the challenge of the 'new/^&~-*-&^
ti
creature 1 . It was part of th® considered policy of religion to 
seek those ameliorating and invigorating elements of environment 
which would call forth the finer functionings of the spirit of 
man in response to these conditions. But if the body and the 
transmitted life were to "be o eV^ct*^m e at a d in V/eismannian 
fashion, the enrichment througi external environment was of no 
nse so far as entailing the spiritual experience was concerned. 
All that could "be expected v/as temporary alleviation of faulty 
adaptation, each generation "beginning patiently at the beginning. 
Certainly there was no possibility of stimulating the evolution 
of a better stock, for the initial constituents of the germ-cell 
had pre-de termined what the stock should be, and no outside 
influence could reach the original deposit.
Religion,through this new devaluation of human 
values,was assailed at the heart of it.
The most far-reaching implication of Weismannism, 
for religion, was its negation of human freedom. On the 
assumption of the initial packing of the germ-plasm, all 
spontaneity and freedom and possibility were necessarily ruled 
out. Henceforth religion was in the hands of Ecclesiastes. IT The 
thing that hath been, it is that which shall be, and that which 
is done is that which shall be done; and there is no new thing
•
unfler the sun." Man was simply bread in the hands of the bakerr; 
kneaded and moulded by a divine workman who supplied the flour 
and the yeast which enabled it to rise. If the yeast were bad, 
the inheritance faulty, then there was no escaioe ffom its
i. Eocles. 1. 9.
foreordained consequences. By wrestling with the powers of 
eril man could never hope to alter the original character 
of his make-up or pass the increments of experience into an 
altered race. "He that is filthy, let him be filthy still" 
took precedence ovwr 'Whosoverar will, may.' Weismannism 
denied what Christianity sherished, the possibility of 
creative cooperation between the individual and his environment 
resulting in enhanced personality, and it also took away any 
hope of handing on to succeeding generations the benefits of 
any acquired experience.
the sting of Weismannism has been withdrawn,
A 
In the first place, the separation T»1?w*en the germ-plasm and
the body -plasm has been grossly overstated. Weismann himself 
did admit that the effects of alcohol and syphilis could reach 
the germ-plasm and be transmitted to offspring. So far is it 
from being true that the germ -cells live a life apart from the 
general life of the organism as a whole that 'every cell of the 
body and every chromosome and chondriosome factor is... a centre 
of bio-chemical influence to v;hich other cells and chromosomes 
respond in their mode of action. . .there is a transfusion of 
their bio-chemical products; hence every cell is... steeped in 
a 'bio-chemical brew' of bewildering complexity., and the germinal 
cells, no less than the somatic cells, are steeped in thi* bio- 
chemical brew".
i. C.L.Morgan. Evolution in the Light of Modern Knowledge.157-8
Experimentally it has been demonstrated that 
"when both ovaries, thei r capsules, portions of the Fallopian 
tubes, the fat bodies,and portions of the surrounding tissues 
are removed from adult mioe, new ovaries containing new sex 
cells may be developed. These new ovaries perform their normal
function of reestablighing the oestral cycle,even leading to
i 
normal pregnancy. :t Obviously, in the face of such facts it
is impossible any longer to maintain the isolation of the germ- 
cells*
Again, the discovery of the pervasive functioning 
of the hormonic elements associated with the endocrine or 
ductless glands is but one more testimony militating against 
any other interpretation of the organism except as a unity, 
It is no longer sound biology to regard the prganisrn as a 
composite of isolated fragments. The functioning of every 
part is vitally related to the functioning of the whole. This 
doctrine of wholeness is as vital for the Christian doctrine of 
human worth as it is for biology.
i. Proc. Roy Soc. 1927. Series B. vol 101. No.710 p.31.
5. The Inheritance of Acquired Characteristics.
Today there is a constantly increasing weight 
of evidence in favour of the Lamarokian doctrine of the 
transmiseibility of acquired characteristics. The repudiation 
of Weismannism proceeds apace. Kammerer of Austria, whose 
work was out short "by a tragic suicide, advanced experimental 
evidence in his observation of the salamander. MacBride sums 
up his own conclusions regarding this experiment as follows. 
! The animal responds to a change in environment by an alteration 
in the proportions of its pigment; this response produces an 
effect on the offspring, so that they tend to start s±f where 
their parents left of f.".... ."The results of Kammerer±s have
been entirely confirmed by the completely independent work of
i 
Durkhen on the cabbage Tifoite butterfly" Both of these
workers are in agreement with the experiments of Pavlov on 
mice. MacBride continues"we consider that these results of 
Kammerer and Durkhen are literally epoch making for the theory 
of evolut ion.... .the mainspring of evolution,as Lamarck said over
a hundred years ago is the response of the animal to its
2 
environment"
Bower describes a remarkable case of inherited
adaptation in the ferns,'the shifting of the sorus from the ,
3 ! 
margin of the sporophyll....to a place on its lower surface".
1. Evolution in the Light of Modern Knowledge, p.241.
2. ibid. p.242.
3. ibid.p. 198.
He concludes 1 tHit 'this change. ..suggests very strongly an
inheritance of a character that has "been adaptive, acquired
i 
itf. inceasing intensity by two successions of individual lives."
Dr Adami has demonstrated that even among the
bacteria acquired properties of certain orders are inherited
2 
through numerous generations.
An experiment which is very significant for the 
inheritance of acquired characteristics is described by Harrison 
in connection with the egg-laying instincts of a gall-making 
saw-fly. Consequent upon a change of food plant, not only the 
appearance but also the behaviour of the sawfly was modified, 
and more significantly,both the structural and the functional 
alterations were passed on to succeeding generations. A new 
egg-laying habit was acquired ana germinally fixed, leading 
Harrison to the conclusion that in this experiment f we are thus
dealing with an incontrovertible case of the inheritance of
3 
acquired characteristics"*
We have been at pains to make a critical
examination of the Weismannian hypothesis; our main object 
in so doing was to emphasise the fact that the living organism 
is not primarily a f spatially distributed material structure 1 
but a creatively functioning unity, vitally in touch wi th a 
living environment, able to reach out and absorb vitalising
1. Evolution in the Light of Modern Knowledge, p.
2. Medical Contributions to the Study of Evolution p.70
3. Proc. Roy. Soc. 1927 B. vol.101 No.707 p.115 ff.
sustenance from its environment, and to pass on at least 
some increments of experience. It may "be-as Ward maintains- 
that the repetitions which will suffice to make'use' a 
second nature, or a habit automatic for a lifetime,are very 
far from sufficing to ensure heredity for future generations, 
yet "unless the facility and familiarity acquired in a single 
lifetime are transmit ted-it may be in infinitesimal degree- 
there could obviously "be no transmission at all"
The religious man who has taken a good look
at nature, both human and cosmic, is not dismayed by the element 
of time involved in progress. Progress, if it has any element 
of necessity at all, is necessarily slow. Any fair-minded view 
of life must see all things'sub specie aeternitatis'. But the 
worth of human life is negated entirely unless we are sure 
that we are making some gains and conserving them, and trans- 
mitting valuable experiences learned in OTJT own adjustments. 
The religious man has always believed this to be the case. He 
welcomes whatever approval evolutionary biology can bring to 
his intuitions* But he will not allow that biology has the 
last word in this or any other realm of experiential values 
when the category of personality is involved.
i. Ward J. Psychological Principles. p.427.
6 The attempts to explain Memory*
By his uncompromising assertion of the 
chemical constitution of the germ-plasm, Weismann had 
made the issue quite clear, althiugh he was compelled 
by the logic of his thesis to posit in the original 
stuff of heredity a complexity of structure and function 
which seemed mystical even to Haeckel. It was inevitable 
then, that attention should come to be concentrated in a 
problem which called for solution in connection with the 
method of the germ-plasm's functioning in heredity*
Between tha organie and the physico-chemical 
interpretations of evolutionary change lay the difficulty 
of memory. If there was continuity of experience from one 
generation to another,some explanation must be sought for the 
manner of transmission*
The first coupling of development with memory 
was made by Bwald Bering in Germany. Samuel Butler, working 
independently in England, at tacked the same problem in a 
different fashion.
Butler.
Butler's theory of memory and heredity is
significant for its radical break with the methodology of his 
day. For Butler, memory is heredity. Neo-Darwinism had 
insisted that heredity could be explained only through 
material structures, Butler maintained that the problem
of/
called for a psychological solution. Stressing the role 
of habit in individual development,he argued that habit 
sustained throughout many generations finally eventuated 
in the perfection of unconscious automaticity. A^lyiaag 
thie to 'the case of the developing embryo it would seem 
that the growing organism's sense of its direction in 
development was likewise unconscious automaticity,achieved 
througfc countless previous repetitions. Hence it appeared 
that there was a real continuity of experience between 
parent and offspring which reached right back to the
t
'*' beginnings of life. "The successor is bona-fide but a part 
of the life of his progenitor, inbued with all his memories, 
profiting by all his experiences -which are in fact his own- 
and only unconscious of the extent of his own memories and
experiences owing to their vastness and already infinite
i 
repetitions"*
In 1887, Butler gave more specific articulat- 
ion to his theory, maintaining that'the race is one long 
individual living indeed in pulsations,so to speak, but no 
more losing continuous personality by living in successive
generations than an individual loses it by living in
g 
consecutive days"* In other words, not continuity of
the germ-plasm, but continuity of real experience furnished 
the key to the riddle of heredity.
1. S.Butler. Life & Habit. Pifield reprint.1910.p.50
2. do Luck or Cunning.Fifielt 1909 p.25
Butler's viewpoint,however,failed to commend 
itself to the scientific opinion of his day. To admit 
memory,and hence psychology, into heredity, was biological 
heresy in the nineteenth century.
But for once the intuition of the amateur 
prevailed over the generalisation of the expert. The 
validity of Butler's intuition w<js strikingly sustained 
a few years after his death-he died in 1902-v/hen Sir 
Francis Darwin,in a Presidential Address, held it to he 
consistent with the doctrine of continuity that in all 
living Ihings there is something psychic. "As the ovum 
develops into the perfect organism it passes through a 
series of changes whioh are "believed to represent the 
successive forms through vfaich its ancestors passed in
the process of evolution. This is precisely paralleled
i 
by our own experience of memoryV
It was but a few years after this that 
philosophic support was to be forthcoming from the pen 
of James ",7ard for the part played by the psychic factor 
in development.
i. British Association Report. 1908. pp.1-27
Ewald Bering*,
Bering linked heredity with memory from 
the viewpoint of the physiologist. He gave full 
recognition to the fact that in the organism there is 
a psyohic as well as a physical phase; but as a physiologist 
he felt bound to seek interpretation through the material 
structure. The psychologist was equally free to interpret 
his data through the psychic categories*
In the conscious activities of the organism, 
Bering was confronted with memory and habit, these not being 
discoverable in the material structure. On the other hand, 
it was obvious that memory itself is not always conscious- 
witaaess the break in conscious continuity which occurs 
between the sleeping and the waking condition. Part of the 
experiential bond of continuity then is in the unconscious, 
and "we know nothing of this except what we learn from our 
investigations of matter; and since in a purely empirical 
consideration t matter and the unconscious must be regarded as 
identical, the physiologist may justly define memory in 
a wider sense, to be a faculty of the brain, the results
of which to a great extent belong to both consciousness and
i 
unoonsci ousness . "
i. Memory. Open Court Publ. 4th ed. p. 9.
1913. Chicago & London.
Thus, for Bering, memory depends upon a material 
impression made upon living matter, by the original situation, 
uhich is later 'remembered 1 , "After the extinction of 
conscious sensations, some material vestiges still remain in 
our nervous system, implying a change of its molecular and 
atomic structure, by which the nervous substance is enabled 
to reproduce such psychical processes as are connected with
the corresponding physical processes of sensation and
i 
perception." Memory is regarded is a property of
organised matter*
Hi chard Semon.
This skeleton of the mnemic theory,articulated 
by Bering, was clothed with flesh by Richard Semon. But the 
corpse still lacked the pulse of life. Semon presented 
biology with a new vocabulary, but his approach to the 
problem of memory is merely an elaboration of the 
fundamental ideas of Bering.
For Semon, organised matter is characterised 
by the f mneme f , in all of its reproductive processes, * 
including rawnory, heredity, or habit-even the ontogenetic 
functions   In virtue of this mnemic property, the organism
i. ibid. p,7.
is able to retain the effect of stimuli as 'engrams 1 
which may "be revived under suitable conditions.
The first law of'the mneme' is that "all
simultaneous excitations within an organism form a coherent 
simultaneous excitation-complex, which acts engraphically;
that is,it leaves behind a connected engram-coraplex
i 
constituting a coherent unity." Subsequent stimuli
of a similar or associated kind elicit an 'ecphorio* 
response of the 'whole simultaneous engram-complex 1  
The mnemic property of the organism is,of course, 
construed in purely physiologioal terms. Moreover.since 
the mneme operates over all reproductive processes, the 
engrams,together with their associational complexes, are 
stored in the g» rm-cells,as well as in the brain, thus 
making it possible for the impress of experience to be 
transmitted to offspring.
E. Rignano.
In 1906, the engram theory was rigorously 
elaborated by E. Rignano, in an ingenious attempt to 
discover a physical foundation for the facts of memory. 
Underlying fiignano's theory there is the assumption that 
the stream of nervous energy in organisms is of many
i. R. Sernon. The Mneme. p.273.
specifio varieties, and closely analogous to the flow 
of energy in an eleotrio current* Locating his 'accumulators 1 
in the material structure of the brain, Rignano contended 
that "the specific potential elements "through which the 
'mnemonic property'functions, are "accumulators of specific 
nervous energy-or specific elementary accumulators". "In the 
capacity of restoring again the same specificity of nervous 
current as that by which each element had been deposited, one 
would look for the cause of the mnemonic faculty in the 
widest sense, which all living matter possesses.. .The very
essence of the mnemonic faculty would consist entirely in
i 
this restitution."
But no such "specific nervous energies" 
have ever yet been revealed by physiological experiment. 
The relation between nervous energy and electrical 
energy does not proceed by analogy into identity.
Moreover, it is pertinent to remind ourselves, 
ifcen considering all 'engram' and 'accumulator 1 theories, that 
while these may afford a plausible explanation for the 
preservation and reproduction of actual sense impressions, 
or their'assooiational complexes', they can never account 
for real memory,which has to do not so much with actually 
reproduced sensations as with the meanings of these. And
i. B. Rignano. Upon the Inheritance of Acquired
Characteristics. Trans. Chioagol911.
as MeDougall has pointed out, 'meaning 1 as such, is not
represented "by any particular physiological correlate
i 
in the material structure of the "brain. Meaning is a
function of the total psychic activity, rather than a 
specialised function of specific matter. Furthermore, 
memory differs from the re-indufction of previously 
captured sensory traces in that it implies the activity 
of an integrated sel^ capable of identifying and of 
focussing attention upon a'remembered 1 experience, 
selected out of the past, and at the same time considered 
in relation to it. Memory is inexplainable apart from
the psychic unity of the experiencing organism.
2 
In later works^Rignano advanced the
thesis of 'affective tendencies' in an endeavour to 
explain teleological activity on mechanistic grounds. 
Every affective tendency in the organism is to be explained 
on the basis of a general tendency 1 'to maintain or restore 
its stationary physiological state' Organisms have a 
tendency to restore their condition of chemical equilibrium 
after disturbance, and all actions are incidents in such 
disturbance. "This property constitutes the foundation and 
essence of all 'needs', of all 'desires', of all the most
1.Body & Mind. p.311.
2.Psychology of Seasoning. London 1923.
important organic 'appetites' . For Bignano, this
2 
'complacency tendency 1 as Eaup has called it,is
interpreted wholly in physiological terms, but it is 
obvious that the mechanical categories have been filled 
up with life. Addressing the psychological section of 
the British Association in 1926, Rignano suggested that 
there should be postulated in living organisms a peculiar 
form of physical energy that operates teleologically.
W. R» Bousfield.
The logical terminus of the attempts to
explain memory on a physical basis would seem to have been
i 
reached in the theory of W.R.Bousfield. In his search
for the basis of memory,Bousfield is driven to postulate a 
factor which is'physical though immaterial 1 . Confessing the
i
insufficiency of 'engrams 1 'preserved in protoplasmic 
structure'to account for the psychic side of memory, he 
proposes that 'we must examine the alternative hypothesis 
of traces in psychic structure 1 . This in turn means that 
we must 'abandon our natural prejudice against recognising 
something which our senses do not reveal to us 1 . Hence, 
for Bousfield, memory is possible not as an'engram'record, 
preserved in protoplasmic structure, but a 'psychoplasm* , 
preserved in an'immaterial' structure, on the ground that
i. W.R.Bousfield. The Mind and its Mechanism. London 1926 
do. The Basis of Memory London 1928
The theory is expounded in both works. 
2 - Oomplaoenoy.tfae Foundation of Human Behaviour. E ev; *«<. .-ja*1
"every living cell has not only a protoplasmic structure, 
which is the material basis of life, "but also a psycho- 
plasmio structure, which is the basis of psychic life,
capable of being affefited by psychio factors and of
i 
retaining mnemonic traoes."
It would seem th^n that in this region of 
evolutionary biology we discover an increasing tendency 
towards recognition of the psychological factor, and a 
decreasing tendency to equate human worth to the level of 
the physico-chemical. Should this line of approach to the 
problem of memory and inheritance prove fertile it will 
have great significance for the Christian interpretation 
of man. It is never the strategy of wisdom, of course, to 
build too much or too soon upon tentative hypotheses in 
any science, but if the biologist is not afraid to speak 
of the possibility of the survival of mental experience througfc 
the medium of an "immaterial* l*psycho-plasmic"s trueture, 
we see no reason why Christian philosophy should retreat 
from its fundamental intuition that human personality has 
profound survival value apart from its temporary present 
embodiment in a 'proto-plasmic structure 1 . Christian theory 
asks for nothing more hopeful than a searching out of the 
whole truth that can be discovered in every segment of the 
total life experience. It is pledged to wholeness in the
^•^•••^•••••••^^^^•^•••^••••••••^•••••••^•••^•••••iMI^BMMB^BMHBHgB''1^'1*'11111''
i. The Basis of Memory.
search for that truth which alone can establish ite values, 
and at its best it will always insist that the enduring 
values of personality are discoverable in terms of the 
living whole. The strength, and therefore the weakness, 
of all mechanistic interpretations lies in a faulty
The analysis of a unit into its component parts is 
legitimate only when the analyst remembers that he has 
temporarily ignored the most important characteristic 
of his object of analysis, namely its functional unity.
For Christian theory this functional 
itself is inexplicable apart from environmental affinity.
7. James Ward. Recognition of the Psycho-biological Schema
A decisive reoogait ion of the psychological 
factor involved in all evolutionary change came from the 
pen of James Ward. In his Gifford Lectures'Naturalism 
and Agnosticism", published in 1899, Ward broke a lance 
with biological theory for its neglect of the active agent, 
which is the really significant factor in all change. 
Granted that an organism lives and moves and has its 
being in a generalised environment, nevertheless 'special
environments are singled out by different individuals from
i 
the general environment common to all" This teleological
selection is always at work, determining definite variations 
as distinct fftm fortuitous ones,'definite in the sense of 
bringing the individual into closer rapport with that 
portion of the general environment which^it is selecting" 
The agent is real; he makes a real selaction, and the 
selection involves a living relationship with a value^ 
sustaining environment. Organism and environment are as 
strictly correlated in biology as subject and object in
psychology.
Biological experiment has amply confirmed
the claims of Ward that a psychic factor is always at. work 
in the developing organism. Consider for instance the new
i. Naturalism & Agnosticism, vol.1.p.295
understanding of the facts of embryonic development,stimulated 
by the work of Roux, and amply confirmed by Speman and 
Ear risen. Roux made it clear that development is characterised 
by two stages; an earlier, when the sheer inheritance of the 
embryo seems to predominate, and a later, when the embryo 
asserts its a-utonomy, shaping its inheritance in accordance 
with its own requirements*
Harrison, following this lead, demonstrated the 
facts clearly by his experiments with limb-bud grafts. When 
the lirab-bud of one embryo was grafted upon another embryo, 
in the early stage, the host embryo took over the control,to 
the extent of developing into a normally dispositioned limb, 
a grafted bud which had been rotated through an angle of 
180 degrees. The host even took over the development of an 
engrafted forelimb bud and transformed it into a hind limb. 
But at a critical sta^re of embryonic development, the limb- 
bud will have so asserted its own autonomy, that when grafted 
on to its host, the graft takes control of its own development,
the power to organise life being henceforth vested in its own
i 
individuality.
The developing organism has its own real part 
to play in its relation to its environment. It responds as 
only it can, and the measure of its power to respond increases 
in proportion to its scale of development. Hocking states the 
case well when he declares that "no account of the philosophy
i. for similar experiment by Speman c.f .
Proc. Roy. Soc. Deo. 1927. Series B.vol.102. No.716. p.177
of change is complete which refers it alcne to the elan 
vital with its perpetual creativity, nor yet to the Unmoved 
Mover that "beckons all men to its absolute good. To these 
must be added the driving power of the standards or systems
which are due to the action of the human analysis and concept
i 
making". The organian is no mere puppet of circumstances,
"but an entity,'capable alike of an ever more definite 
individuality and of ever more complex interaction with its 
surroundings and its fellows"
The Christian philosophy of man can well afford 
to endorse such, admissions of the genuineness of the part 
played by the creature in the cosmic activity; it need never 
cross swords with a psycho-biological interpretation which so 
guarantees the worth of human personality. Yet in witholding 
its hand,it will also reserve the right to maintain that the 
psychobiological category of organism and environment is not 
in itself exhaustively explanatory of the experiential 
relationship between man and his environment,or his God, For 
man received as well as gives, and Christianity in its 
valuation of human worth is persuaded that the richest phase 
of the human-divine experience is the contribution of the 
divine. Yet even this aspect of organism has received an 
ungrudging admission f^om biology."The doctrine of the
i. Hum an Nature and its Remaking, p. 348
philosophy of prganism is that however far the sphere of 
efficient causation is pushed in the determinations of the 
components of a concrescence,its data,its emotions,its 
appreciations, its purpose, its phases of subjective aim,.. 
"beyond the determination of these components there always 
remains the final reaction of the self-creative unity of 
the universe. This final reaction completes the self- 
oreative act by putting the decisive stamp of creative 
emphasis upon the determinations of efficient cause. Each 
occasion exhibits its measure of creative emphasis in 
proportion to its measure of subjective intensity. The
absolute standard of such intensity is that of the primordial
i 
nature of God."
i. nhitehead A,N. Process & Reality, p.65
8. Continuation of the Mechanistic Interpretation.
4
Our interest in following the growing recognition of 
the psychological factor in development has temporarily 
diverted our attention from an antagonistic phase of the 
evolutionary story which must aow be dealt with.
Darwin's ultimate explanation of evolution tended 
towards a belief in fortuitous variations occurring in every 
direction in every part of the organism. Upon the material 
thus supplied to it, natural selection operated t with the 
consequence that fortunate characters were preserved, and 
perpetuated.
Darwin, at the same time, had recognised the existence
i 
of so-called 'sports'. These, although useful to the
artificial breeder of plants of animals, seemed to Darwin 
to play a very minor role in evolution. It was his opinion 
that such divergent types would soon lose their identity by 
oross-breeding with more typical forms.
But the stone thus rejected was to become the head 
of the earner. Soon this question of'discontinuous variations' 
or mutations, was to loom up as important for the theory of 
evolution.
To Bateson is chiefly due the credit for fooussing 
the attention of English workers upon this phase of evolution.
i. c.f his list of instances in
Animals & Plants under Domestication. Vol.1, ch.3.
Mendel•
Contemporaneous with the work of Darwin, important 
discoveries were "being made in a monastery garden at Brtinn, 
in Austrian Silesia* Gregor Johann Mendel, Abbot of the 
Augastinian Order, patiently experimenting with the 
hybridisation of plants,had oome near to discorering the 
stcret of the differentiation of species. The results of 
his labours, now seen to be momentous, were overlooked in 
the general triumph of the Darwinian interpretation. Hidden 
for thirty years,in the monastery records, they were finally 
brou^it to light in the year 1900.
By crossing two pure strains of the edible pea,a tall 
and a dwarf variety, Mendel was able to show that the 
offspring of these pure strains, v*ien permitted to self- 
pollinate, proceeded in a definitely calculable ratio, 
along the now well known lines of "Mendelian Inheritance." 
The results of Mendel's work are established in the principle 
of segregation, and the theory of unit characters. That is to 
say, in development, the particles of the germ-plasm, which 
art credited with being the bearers of the characters to be 
inherited, do not fuse, but retain their integrity as units, 
with the result that such characters, instead of resulting 
in a 'blended inheritance 1 or 'fusion of characters 1 , are 
passed on as units or wholes. The tall and the dwarf 
peas in Mendel's experiments did not give rise to mediums, 
but only tails and dwarfs. A cross might show characters 
which belong to both parents, or to either parent, but
characters vtfiich are inherited are received in their 
entirety, or not at all. "Underlying the whole conception, 
is the intuition that sets of related characters are 
determined "by the germ-elements, the most prominent of 
these characters "being noticed "by the observer.'
De Vries;
Side by side with this discovery of
Mendel's work ttame the announcement of the mutation theory 
"by De Vries, a Dutch naturalist. Darwin assumed that 
species evolved by the slow selection of favorable variations 
in a field of minute fortuitous variations. De Vries now 
maintained that 'species originated suddenly, through the 
occasional appearance of definite discontinuous forms, 
independent of the Darwinian variations', these new 
departures being transmitted to offspring. His studies 
of the evening primrose had convinced De Vries that there 
were two kinds of variations to be distinguished, the small 
indefinite differences between individuals,'fluctuations', 
and the definite changes which seem to appear suddenly, 
'mutations', these being also heritable. In the mutations 
thrown off by the evening primrose, De Vries had caught 
evolution in the very act.
The conjunction of Mendel ism and Mutationism, 
following hard on the triumph of Weismannisn seemed to mean 
the complete submergence of the Lamarckiari factor. It now 
appeared to be proved that the 'mvironment played little
or no part in evolution. T»7eismann had insisted that 
the character of the individual was determined wholly 
"by the make-up of the fertilised egg-, hence variability 
of character was restricted to the narrow confines of the 
original deposit of inheritance donated "by the parent 
organisms. Mendel had demonstrated the rigidity of the 
laws of inheritance and De Vries had shown how evolution 
occurred. The consequences for human values seemed 
disastrous.
The Chromosome Theory.
If anything else were needed to bind the bonds 
of affinity betY/een the conclusions of 'Jeismann and De 
Vries and Mendel, it came with the elaboration of the 
chromosome theory. latient observation of the minute movements
i. De Vries like V7eismann, reduced the elementary properties 
of organisms to material particles or'pangens 1 . The 
diversity of organisms was due to the great variety of 
possible combinations of the
For a very cogent criticism of this molecular trend 
in biological interpretation, see the chapter on 
'Misuse of Abstraction 1 in The Interpretation of 
Development Cc Heredity. Russell. London 193Q.
of the cell led to an abandonment of the 'gem-plasm 1 
and pointed to the conclusion that in fertilisation the 
mating chromosomes contain the physical units or 'factors' 
or 'genes' which explain Mendelian inheritance. "Sutton... 
showed that the formulas of Mendelian heredity generally(as 
then known) could "be applied without alteration alike to 
the hypothetical'factors' or 'genes' and to the chromosomes,
ani that the combinations, segregations, and recombinations
i 
of the former are paralleled by those of the latter."
»
Hence the Mendelian laws of inheritance found 
their material basis in the assumed'actual'physical entities 
in the chromosomes.
i. E.B.Wilsons The Cell in Development & Heredity, Hew York.
3rd ed. 1925. p.926.ff.
Crew F.A.E. defines the gene as ra particular state of 
organisation of the chromatin at a particular point 
along the length of a particular chromosome. It is 
a particular area or locus of the chromosome in a 
particular state. One particular condition of this 
chromatin can be replaced by others and with each 
change another gene appears." Nature Nov.19.1927.p.733
i 
T.H.Morgan and his pupils,enthusiastically experimenting
with the conveniently mutating fruit-fly,'Drosophila 1 , soon 
established the facts of T linkage' f showing that certain 
inherited factors were coupled together, entering a hybrid 
together and leaving it together. Side by side with the work 
of Morgan on 'Drosophila 1 , go the equally important experiments
i
of Mrs Sexton,of Plymouth, on a species of crustacean whose 
first mutation was recorded in 1913.
The final elaboration of the theory of the gene 
is clearly stated by Julian S. Huxley. "The hereditary 
constitution of at least all higher organisms consists of a 
number of units-factors, or genes-,each of which may exist in 
a number of forms -allelomorphs; these genes exist in definite 
proportions, and are arranged in a definite order; the whole 
gene-complex is divided up among the separate chromosomes,
whioh in Drosophila have been shown to correspond to the
2 
linkage-groups established by genetic experiments."
It seemed then that the problem of heredity had
3 
finally been solved, and on a mechanistic basis.
1. T.H.Morgan. The Theory of the Gene. New Haven. 1926.
2. Hature. Dec. 25th 1926. p.903.
3. T.H.Morgan. Critique of Theory of Evolution.p.101 
(but Morgan does not claim that the mechanism of the 
chromosomes explains the origin of the genes or how 
they influence development. )
Oritioism of The Mechanistic Movement in Biology*
It would be extremely interest ing, and we "believe, 
highly instructive,to trace in minute detail all the 
ramifications of this molecular trend in the science of 
biology,which started out so bravely with the 'life-wholes' 
of Aristotle,and culminated in the 1 genes 1 of 'Drosophila 1 . 
How did so radical a change of view become possible?
We note,only in passing, two significant factors in 
the process-the establishing of a mechanistic view of the 
universe in the seventeenth century,as the result of the 
researches of Kepler, Galileo and Newton, supplemented by the 
philosophy of Descartes-and the exploitation of the microscope.
A mechanistic universe inevitably led to a mechanistic 
conception of the organism. The life-wholes became machines, 
whose actions were dependent upon their structure. The invention 
of the microscope made the analysis of the structure itself 
possible,and f the mind,full of the great microscopic discoveries 
of the time, was carried away by its own inertia..outrunning 
the instrument,first dreamed of and then believed in the
existence of structures too minute to be revealed by the
i 
available lenses."
Hot even the biologist can escape the universal 
tendency of the human mind to go beyond the seen to the 
unseen for an interpretation of the empirical facts of life.
This attempt at the quantitative analysis of the 
germ-plasm is more or less analogous to the progressive 
reduction of 'matter' to molecules. Underlying both movements
i* o.f Wheeler W.M.'Caspar Priedrich Wolff and the Theoria
Generationis' Boston 1899 p.270ff
for an acute analysis of 'mind types' and the kind of 
interpretation to which they are drawn;
there is the assumption that the respective substrata of
i
biology and physics are capable of reduction to atomicity
in units whose occurrence and combination may be predicted 
on a mathematical basis*
But physics finds itself baulked by the problem of
2 
quanta from asserting predictability in connection with the
atom or the electron. The same element of indeterminism and 
indirection applies to predictability of the Mendelian 
character of the individual. Statistically we may predict 
averages,in either case, with a fair degree of probability, 
but life is more than statistics,and individuals more than 
probable averages.
If we are at all statistically impressed, the possible 
number of combinations open to the mating sets of twenty- 
four human chromosomes is enormous. Even on a strictly 
statistical basis there is little room for a rigid doctrine 
of biologic el necessity. Actually,the individual is unique* 
Nature never duplicates.
It is admitted now that t} ere are plenty of cases where 
the Mendelian formula does not apply, or where it has to be
supplemented by additional hypotheses. For instance"in certain
3 vases of the Lepidoptera,the law of alternate inheritance*
1."The genes are purely hypothetical unite-fictions invented 
to account for the very complex hereditary behaviour of 
mutant characters in Drosophila* As such they have a certain 
interpretative and heuristic value,provided their purely 
conceptual and hypothetical character is clearly borne in 
mind". Russell* Interptet.of Devel. & Hered.p.62
2. Eddingfton. The Nature of the Physical World, p.294
3. Eaven C.B. The Creator Spirit, p.54
could not be reconciled with results. A statistical survey 
of a long series of experiments with peas showed that while 
Mendelian JODTJIJ proportions were in many cases'close approximat­ 
ions to the tru1&, there was a noticeable and constant error; 
and this taken together with the admitted exceptions compelled
the belief that though* a useful guide to the farmer, the
i.
theory is inadequate completely to explain all the facts"
But a more discriminating criticism of the
Mendelian mechanism rises out of the modern hesitancy to accept 
anything less than the principle of v&ioleness as a norm of 
interpretation. Weismannism is rejected for its artificial 
segmentation of the vital components of life. It is also 
legitimately urged against Mendelism that it violates the 
principle of functional unity. This difficulty was clearly 
envisaged by Johannsen, the originator of the term'gene' when 
he declared, "We are far from the ideal of enthusiastic 
Mendelians, viz, the possibility of dissolving genotypes into 
relatively small units, be they called gen-s,allelomorphs,
factors, or something else. Personally I believe in a great
2 
central'something' as yet not divisible into separate factors"
Present day biology, with its trend towards
functional synthesis despairs more and more of ever being able 
to cage this central 1 something' in schematic categories.
1. Journal of Genetics. Vol.Zlll pp255-331.
2. Russell. The Interpretation of Development & Heredity.p.64
The strict interpretation of the gene theory 
farther violates the principle of vfaoleness when it acts
upon the assumption that the influence of environment is
i 
nullified in heredity. This assumption is the inevitable
consequence of 'piece-mealing' the organism,forget ting that 
organism and environment are inseparable. A survey of inter­ 
national opinion recently showed that environment must be
2 
regarded as "at least co-equal with heredity 1,' in its
contribution to development.
Interpretation of the gene,however is changing. 
It seems now that "the effect of a gene depends not only 
upon environmental conditions ,but also,and particularly,
upon the other genes with, \vhich it is associated in the
3 
hereditary constitution of the individual." The Aristotelian
interpretation through life-wholes is on the way towards 
rehabilitation.
The chromosome theory has been carefully examined 
by Wilson,who concludes, "the egg is a reaction system"., "the 
whole germinal complex is directly involved in the production
of every character ".."the organism as a whole is always
4 
involved."
1."it looks at first sight,as if a physical object,with its 
process of inheritance from itself, were independent of the 
environment. But such a conclusion is not justified." 
Whitehead. Science & the Modern World, p.159
2. Quart. Rev. of Biol. Sep. 1930 Vol.v. No.3.
3. Crew. Nature. Nov. 19. 1927. p.733
4. The Cell in Develop. & Heredity, p. 976. 3rd ed. 1925.
The practical effiaacy of the Mendelian formula 
is of course not denied. Our point is simply this,that in its 
analysis of character and human values,Christian theory is 
bound by its method of interpretation to insist upon wholeness 
Whenever the eternal values have suffered eclipse,this has 
been the direct result of an emasculated interpretation of 
the facts of life. For Christianity,no fact is finally 
explained except against the background of cosmic experience.
The Mutation Tfr&ory. importance of Principle of Interpretation.
The question of mutations remains to be
considered. De Vries has shown that "in mutation the parent 
plant held to its type all through,but might give rise again 
in a discontinuous manner to various kinds of new forms, 
differing qualitatively from it,whioh were more or less fit
to survive than the parent form,and if fit,remained true to
i 
their type." From these transmitted mutations.it was held
that new species came into being,in contrast with the slow 
evolution assumed by Darwin.
Now the fact of mutation itself is not to be 
denied. Many biologists, however, while admitting the
i. The Spiritual Interpretation of Nature. J.Y.Simpscn.p.152
facts,hesitate to attribute to mutation such an all important 
function in evolution as the origin of species,claimed "by de 
Vries. Others again frankly maintain that mutations are a 
symptom of disease rather than a normal type^and as such 
disclaim them. MacBride supports the 'pathological 1 
interpretation^and quotes with approval Tornier's experiment 
with Chinese goldfish.
Tornier discovered that the artificially bred 
grotesque varieties of goldfish were the result of deliberate 
exposure of the developing embryo,by the breeders, to 
insanitary conditions, lack of oxygen, etc. This resulted 
in a 'weakening of the germ plasm', together with a tendency 
for that weakening to be localised in a particular part of 
the germ; hence the consequent'pathological 1 mutation with 
respect to the tail, eye, fin, etc of the goldfish. On the 
strength of this, MacBride concludes , 'This strikes a deadly 
blow at the mutation hypothesis....it is true that many of 
them are useful to man,but from the viewpoint of the animal, 
pathological monstrosities". ..... ."If mutations are the out­ 
come and visible signs of an inner germ weakening,they can 
have played no part whatever in evolution, for in wild nature 
they would at once have been eliminated by natural selection1.1
i« Evolution in the Light of Modern Knowledge, p.232. 
(This experiment is rigidly criticised by Cunningham 
in Modern Biology, p.84-96. )
This eeoma to us too sweeping a genaralisat- 
ipn to "be based upon an admitted experiment in pathology. 
From abnormal conditions one may look for abnormal results. 
But it is scarcely legitimate to reason back from abnormal 
to normal without recognising the hiatus. Moreover it over- 
looks the possibility that mutation may be either effect or 
cause. It seems to be just as well established that 
in many cases mutations are adaptive. Indeed they would 
require to exhibit some measure of adaptation if they are to 
serve any biological function at all; a non-adaptive mutation 
may well be described as a'monstrosity f , and if it appears 
in one or two individuals only, it has little chance of 
being'fixed 1 by natural selection as a valuable racial 
characteristic. On the other hand, however, 'particular 
mutations seemmto appear, not as an isolated phenomenon, but
as a whole crop of similar mutations in many individuals at
i 
one period in the history of a species."
We are not disposed to push too far an
issue that is controversial, and which claims the attention 
of the expert; but we feel safe in claiming that biology has 
now been compelled to recognise that in the fact of mutation 
the emergence of the new is literally a 'vital issue 1 . This 
we suggest is the really important contribution of the 
mutation theory, and as we have suggested, the details might
i. McDougall.W. Modern Materialm £ Emergent Evolution p.152,
well be left to the experts.
This principle of the emergence of the new is 
of profound significance for the Christian doctrine of human 
worth. In its early stages, Darwinism seemed to have signed 
the death warrant of man's hopes, setting upon him the stamp 
and seal of a rigid natural inheritance from which there was 
no possibility of "breaking. Today the watchword of biology 
is that 'becoming involves a creative advance into novelty 1 . 
The tendency towards newness of life is inherent in the very 
groundplan of things. J.A.Thomson has no hesitation in 
assigning this creative function to the germ^cell itself. 
"The gerra^cell is a complex potential organism; it has a 
capacity which may be primary, of reorganising itself,of 
making experiments in salf expression..the fertilised 9gg 
is not a bag of items, but a viable unity, a new creature,
and the problem of the distinctly new is insoluble apart
i 
from the psychical."
We suggest then that a mutation is fruitfully 
considered as the biological expression of the organism's 
inherent ability to reorientate. Out of the vital traffic 
with its environment certain increments of experience are 
accumulated. These may expend themselves in the usual way, 
through the ordinary channels of discharge. But the releasing
i J. A. Thomson. ^hat is Man. p.137.
stimulus may emerge in some critioal situation,sensed by 
the organism througi its appropriate mechanism as a 
survival problem calling for speedy solution. To meet 
this problem the organism mutates.
Mutation has been likened to a cow in a
fenced field, free to jump about within the limits of its 
strictly defined inheritance quota. But we have discarded 
the theory of the germ-plasm against which such a criticism 
might legitimately be directed, preserving only the valuable 
principle that psychic integration involves the ability to 
re-orientate and appear as a new creation in the presence of 
crisis. We have seen cows leap to considerable advantage 
when occasion demanded. Nature in general likewise leaps 
to good advantape under the appropriate circumstances. 
We venture the hypothesis that some such leap ahead 
occurred in the line of evolutionary development which 
has culminated in man. The organism carries along on 
its normal plane of development until some such time as 
its accumulated experience demands fuller expression on 
a higher level. New needs are continually emerging in the 
dynamic life situation, these being both internally and 
externally conditioned. Stimulated both by inner urge and 
outer attraction, the ieap is made. If it has been made to 
good advantage, the organism flourishes and perpetuates its
new departure. Every leap,of course, is attended by 
a certain risk. Without the element of hasard, necessary 
for real fareedom, there could in our opinion have been 
no genuine evolution at all. All we are ooncerned to 
emphasise at this stage in our argument is that the 
ability to leap is a real factor in the developing life- 
process. As such we shall maintain that it has potent 
value for the Christian doctrine of human worth.
To recognise the power of mutation is not to 
be antagonistic to the Lamarckian emphasis upon the 
contribution of the environment to development. For us, 
the very reverse is the case; each is complementary to 
the other. So far indeed is mutation from ruling out 
environmental influence, or even the inheritance of 
acquired characters, that mutation itself "may be
regarded as promoted or actually determined by the
fi 
external conditions; in fact acquired."
We have already noted Crew's statement that 
"the effect of a gene depends upon environmental conditions"
i. Bower. Botany of the Living Plant, p.472.
9. Significant Present-Day Trends in Biology.
We have already considered the Wardian 
psychology with its insistence upon the subjective factor
in evolutionary development. This is but one phase of a
i
dual between vitalism and mechanism that has lasted for•
three hundred years. Descartes undertook to explain the 
world and its contents in terms of mechanistic and mathematiC' 
al laws, although outside his world he set God, and inside 
the human machine he set a soul. In 1748 De la Mettrie's 
"Man a Machine" added fuel to the fire. It was anonymously 
criticised in the same year by "Man more than a Machine". 
By the end of the 18th century vitalism was again in the 
ascendant.
The reaction of the 19th century,stimulated by
was 
the physiology of Glaude Bernard,reinforced by the researches
into the composition of the cell which resulted in the 
physico-chemical theory of Schwann in 1839. Supported by 
the Darwinian hypothesis, this reaction found its extreme 
prophet in Haeckel . For the time being the faith of Lamarck 
and the other early vitalists was submerged; but it was 
literally too vital to perish.
i. c.f Joseph Needham.'Man a JSachine ' London 1928. 
details the story of the conflict.
Whitehead. A.N. Science & the Modern World, contains 
an excellent survey of the wide issues involved. 
The Journal of Philosophy. Vol. XV gives a good 
bibliografcy
We shall consider now some present-day 
trends in "biological theory which in our opinion are 
significant for the Jhristian doctrine of human worth. 
The general direction of these trends is towards a 
thoroughgoing rejection of the mechanistic schema. It 
is seen now to "be hopelessly inadequate to explain the 
organism. For our purpose we select as significant the 
Vitalism typified "by Driesch, the Psycho-Biology of 
Russell, and the Emergent Evolution of Lloyd Morgan.
Hans Driesoh. Th« Philosophy of Organism & Wholeness
The earlier vitalists were content to assume 
that the activities of the organism were motivated by 
& vaguely conceived kind of 'vital force 1 . The vitalism 
of Driesch differs from such theories by its faith in the 
efficacy of a reality in living creatures which does not 
operate in purely physical terms. McDougall, a strong 
vitalist, dissociates himself from Driesch on the grAund 
that this non-physical, non-mechanical factor in vital 
activity is part of the organism, not a something that
4
acts upon it.
Driesch interprets his position in "The
I, 
Science & Philosophy of the Organism" i . W. Boux,
in 1888 recounted an experiment on frogs' ergs. Having
i. The Gifford Lectures for 1907-8. 2 vols.
destroyed with a hot needle one of the first daughter- 
cells he discovered that the surviving cell developed 
into a half embryo. Three years later, Drieshh repeated 
the experiment, with sea urchin eggs,and was surprised 
to find that a miniature whole embryo, not a half,was 
formed out of the remaining cell. Further experiments 
led Driesch to the conclusion that'wholeness' was somehow 
or other involved in the nature of the developing organism4 
there was a something directing the development of the 
embryo. This something he called 'entelechy', adopting 
the expressive Aristotelian term. The entelechy is a 
'factor in nature which works teleologically 1 . If we press 
Driesch too hard for an explanation of the entelechy we
find that 'entelechies are not energies, not forces, not
* i 
intensities,and not constants,but-enteleohies"
To all intents and purposes,accepting a 
mechanistic category as a method for analysis,Driesch 
recognised the T extensive manifoldness of physico-chemical 
processes'. He insisted however,that in addition to these,
there is within the prganism an 'intensive manifoldness'
g 
which displays the 'psychoid faculties of knowing and willing"
This is the'entelechy 1 . Descartes offered his age a machine 
world with a great God outside it. Driesch seems to offer us
the organism as a little machine with a miniature god inside 
it. It ia this suspicion that the 'entelechy 1 is extrinsic to
i. Vol.1, p.225 2. vol.2. pp 137ff
the organism which weighs down Driesch's philosophy with 
all the implications of the older vitalism. To accept 
entelechy is to forego autonomy.
We are inclined to agree with Mac Bride that 
the'entelechy' hypothesis of Driesch is 'merely materialism 
plus an unintelligible regulating entity." For the'entelechy ' 
which is seemingly endowed with all the psychic capacity of 
'perceiving,liking, judging willing 1 is after all not psychic 
but merelyfcpychoid'; that is to say, its'psychic' concepts
are to be thought of only in a 'metaphorical' or 'pictorial'
i 
fashion.
To an entity which is described as'psychoid' 
yet without being'psychic' we must repeat the words of 
Shakespeare,' t Is something, nothing 1 •
Driesch's doctrine of the'entelechy 1 , in the 
eyos of most modern biologists is an unsuccessful attempt 
to narrow the gulf between mecHanisin and vital ism.* From the 
standpoint of scientific method nothing is gained by the 
insertion of an extrinsic agency into the series of mecfcanical 
processes." Yet the work of Driesch is not without its 
permanent and constructive contribution • His experimental 
demonstration of the unity of the organism-as opposed to its 
fragmentism-is a valuable confirmation of that functional
i. vol.2, pp. 139 ff.
'ilholeness 1 which religion has always more or less intuitively 
affirmed as a valuable element in personality. Later research 
by Boveri showed that normal development was dependant upon 
the integrity of the cell nucleus, and the nuclei of the eggs 
used by Driesch had been preserve* intact . But this did not 
vitiate the valuable contribution of Driesch, namely that
the action of the living organism as a whole is at the back
i 
of all development.
The word "entelechy" is but another addition to a 
long list of attempts made by science to describe 
in analytical terras a process which religion 
intuitively affirms, namely that life manifests 
purpose as well as xsi± development.
i Wilson The Cell in Development & Heredity, p.1115
Psteohobiology.
To escape the defects of vit ili srn,many
"biologists today are attracted to a theory of interacting 
body and mind in which the initiative is taken by the psychic 
factor, and the orgahism is considered always from the stand- 
point of a functioning whole. Typical of this school in
Britain is the psycho*biology of E.S.Bussell, who has expounded
i 
his views in several important works.
Vitalism as such is rejected. The efficacy of 
mechanism in the physical realm is allowed, but it is denied 
that either the physical or the mechanical can explain the 
whole organism. To distinguish his theory from 'vitalism', 
Bussell adopts the term 'hormic' from a treatise on Education 
by T.P.Uunn. The fhorme ' is'the fundamental striving that 
constitutes the inner reality of life'.
Psycho-biology claims affinity with both Ward 
and Haldane. From the former it takes as a starting point 
that 'gsychology is the science of individual experiences, ; 
understanding by experience not merely nor primarily,cognition, i
2 \
but also and above all conative activity or behaviour" , and 
that 'facts, however ascertained, must to have a psychological
import,be regarded as having a place in,or as being a constit-
3 
uent &f someone's experience" • With Haldane it agrees that
1. Form and Function. 1916.
Psychobiology. Proc. Arist. Soc. 1922-3 pp.141-56 (p.76-85) 
Relations between Biology & Psych. Arist. Soc. supp.vol. 1923 
The Study of Living Things. London 1924. (p,163ff 
The Interpretation of Development & Heredity. Oxford.1930
2. Psychological Principles Cambridge 1918. p.27
3. do. p.28
"the liTing creature is really alive and full of molecular
activity; it is the expression of the direction and velocities
i 
which this activity takes." Hence"the organismal method...
accepts the fact of unity..it regards the organism not as 
purely material, in the sense of he ing merely a structural
configuration, nor as a "body plus a soul or entelechy,hut as a
2 
unity sui generis." "The organism is essentially a continuing
unity...its activities have a certain unifiedness and wholeness
3 
which are irreducible to processes of a lower order."
A viewpoint similar to that of Bissell has been
4
reached by W.E. Bitter, who subjects the 'elemental 1 or fragmen­ 
ted conception of the organism to a scathing criticism, 
finally arriving at a doctrine of the organism in which it is 
taken f alive and whole 1 . This'aliveaess and wholeness 1 is the 
primary unit of interpretation of biological organisms. The 
various notions of 'living substance 1 are scouted with the 
conclusion that "all the living substance that has existed on
this earth or anywhere else has existed through and in and
5 
because of individual living beings."
Prom Hitter,Russell acknowledges taking over the 
term 'organismal" to designate his own theory.
1. Haldane J.S. Organism & Environment. New Haven.1917. p.66
2. fiassell.B.S. The Interpret, of Develop. & Heredity, p.190
3. do do. p.173
4. Hitter W.B. The Unity of the Organism.Bos ton.1919.2 vols.
5. do do vol.l. p.115.
Russell builds on the premise of a meaningful
-'.  ' '*-, ,.' '.
experience from the beginning of life up."The study of behaviour 
is inseparable from the problem of meaning..the function of
perception is to make the organism aware of changes in environ-
i 
ment and this implies a comparison of past and present" "The
line of attack consists in starting out from the facts of 
immediate experience-unifiedness of personality, undividedness 
of the preception-response relation-and arguing that some
measure at least of such essentially psychological unity must
2 
pervade all the activities of living things." Belief in the
meaning aspect of primitive experience is confirmed by the 
experiments of Kepner and Edwards,who were able to show that
the amoeba responded in different fashion to different stimuli, 
their conclusion being that the organism responds not to the 
stimulus as such but to the stimulus as meaning somethingVWhat
we need(to) postulate for our new biology" is "some real ground
3 
for the objective purposiveness of living things" "Wherever
1.The Study of Living Things, p.65
2.The Interpretation of Development & Heredity.p.178
3. do. p.170 t
Russell refers to a striking example of prospective reference 1 
in cell cleavage,quoted by Wilson The Cell in Develop- 
ment & Heredity.p.1005, where the specific forms of 
cleavage cannot be understood without reference to the 
end formation.
'one can thus go over every detail of the cleavage,and 
knowing the fate of the cells,can explain all the 
irregularities and peculiarities displayed" 
'The egg is not merely a cell dividing as best it may" 
'It is 'a builder which lays one stone sqeens here, 
another there,each of which is placed with reference 
to future development 1
c.f The Interp. of Dev. & Her. p.170 footnote.
perception onters.be it even in rudimentary form,a psyoho-biolog-
i 
ical interpretation is called for" . In other words, "biology
is always preceded byl and hyphenated 7/ith psychology.
Lloyd Morgan holds this to "be merely'a
speculative jump into mataphysics 1 . Russell quotes Drever's 
testimony that Essentially the primary tissues of experience
ought to be regarded as composed of meanings rather than as
2 
presentations or impressions" It is interesting to note that
Hussell and Drever are both supported at this point by the 
findings of the 'gestal$' psychology. Zoffka states that'some 
degree of articulation must be present in the original responses 
for without this there would be complete chaos,in which none of 
the other properties could exist... we find at the beginning in 
our most elementary reactions, even at the level of reflexes and 
instincts..unitary articulate meaningful wholes, to which we 
aPply the name of 'gestalt'configuration*, 'pattern 1 .Develop- 
ment starts not with chaos or a multitude of mental elements
without meaning,but with structures thowever primitive their
3 
character may be." This same conception of 'superbiological
levels in which meaning contents become significant" is the
4 
central idea of Spr anger's'Types of Lien.'
It is through this meaningful perception
that life becomes individualised and separated out from the
5
environing flux"______ 
i. Int. of Dev. & Her. p. 191"*" 2. Instinct in Man. 1917. p.131.
3. Psychologies of 1925. p.141.
4. Tr. of 5th German ed.(Pigors) 1928. preface.
5. The study of Living Things, p.59.
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J. S* Haldan«.
A "brief digression will serve to show tjie place of
Haldane as a 'cross-over man 1 between the physical and the 
psycho-biological interpretations of organism.
Haldane definitely rejects the machine interpretation. 
"The activities of a living organism are not the outcome of
its structure ;really the structure is the expression of its
i 
normal activity." The living organism regulates its own
working and responds uniquely by adaptation of function to 
meet alterations in environment,provided this is not too 
sudden or tec great. "To cope with tlie unusual, .there is a 
strengthening or compensatory reaction accompanied by a 
corresponding structure change tthich may remain after the 
disturbance has disappeared; and through all the changes the 
organism retains its identity."
Concerning man,Haldane states,"although man is a 
per son, and ncr a mere organism, we cannct trace personality 
througiout all or nearly all of \iiat we observe in man. To 
interpret these details as best we can, we have to fall back 
on the conception of life in the biological sense;just as tn
details of what we observe in connection with living organisms
3 
we have to fall back on physical and ohemiaal interpretations?
It is at this point we believe that the two schools of 
psycho -biology" and emergent evolution bifurcate. Hussell 
carries the psychological interpretation right back to the
1. Organism & Environment, p. 90 ff.
2. ibid. p. 115
earliest manifestations of organic life. Morgan prefers 
to say that in the early stages it is impossible to 
distinguish the psychological from the "biological aspect. 
He grants the existence of the psychic factor "ex hypothesi", 
otherwise, as he declares, it could not develop later; "but 
since it manifests in the earliest stages of life no 
"prospective reference" he would rather not 'read in 1 the 
psychological story.
We have already noted Russell's quotation 
of n a striking case of prospective reference".
Emergent Evolution*
The concept of emergent evolution is interpreted in
•
Lloyd Morgan's Gifford Lectures for 1922. "Evolution" is 
the name given to "the comprehensive plan of sequence in all
natural events. But 'the orderly sequence,historically viewed,
2 
appears to present farom time to time something genuinely newl'
It ie this insistence upon the genuinely new which is the 
vital note in Morgan's theory.
Morgan identifies his 'emergents' with Wundt's 'creativa
3
resultants', and elaborates a pyramidieal scheme of evolution 
broad-"based upon the ground plan of an immanent divine activity, 
in the course of which the various new levels of life'emerge 1 • 
It is to be noted that "from the strictly emergent point of 
view any notion of a so-called 'alien influx into nature 1 is 
barred? And "if we acknowledge divine activity-of which for my 
constructive philosophy-emergent evolution is the expression- 
it is conceived as omnipresent, and manifested in every one of
the multitudinous entities within the pyramid. God,if in any,
4 
is in all, without distinction of entities."
1. Emergent Evolution. London 1923. 
c.f also. Life,Mind & Spirit. 1926.
Biology, in Evol. in Light of Hod. Knowledge. 
A Concept of the Organism,Emergent & Resultant,
Arist. Soc.Proc. 1926-7. pp.144-76 
Modern Churchman. Vol.xiv. No.5-6-7. Sept. 1924. 
for brief criticism of various theories of emergence,see 
also McDougall. Modern Materialism & Emergent Evolution 
pp.232.ff
2. Emer. Evol. p.l. 3. p.4. 4. p.13.
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Emergent evolution offers us a oomprehensire schema 
intended to diagrammise the processes of development from 
primitive space -time to deity. It starts with a universe 
consisting of an undefined physical precursor of matter, a 
ground plan of what Alexander in "Space Time & Deity" was 
able to arrive at "by a process of abstracting from reality 
all that had hitherto emerged-short of the sheer annihilation 
of experience. Prom this greund plan of 'pure motions 1 or 
'point instants' in 'fluent relation', matter emerged. From 
then till now the development of the universe has manifested 
itself as a progressive series of significant and increasingly 
complex organisations of these primary relations of matter. 
In the course of development seven major levels of emergence 
are to be discerned. These emergent levels, from lower to
higher, that is higher in the sense of involving a relatedness
i 
could not appear on a lower level, are roughly to "be
recognised in vfaat we distinguish as atoms, mole cules, solids, 
life, mind, re as on and spirit. These stages, though distinct, are 
strictly continuous within the whole process.
At each new level qualitative differences appear in 
the evolving process; the existing "world-stuffs" combine in 
hitherto unavailable "relatedness" and a new substance, which 
is not merely the aggregate of the former constituents of
i. Bmer. Bvol. p,16«
evolution, but something wholly unforeseen before the actual 
occasion of its occurrence,now emerges. The uniqueness of 
these forward steps is the emergence of the qualitatively new, 
and this 'new 1 , while directly the resultant of a re-organisat­ 
ion of already existent matter, is not a predictable resultant. 
In the re-organisation of matter there is a creative factor 
which is not discoverable in a mere aggregate. This creative 
factor in "relatedness" is the essence of emergence and "this
advent of novelty", .is "loyally to be accepted, .without
i 
invoking any extra-natural power-foroe-entelechy-God."
To take an illustration. When atoms of oxygen and 
hydrogen 'relate 1 in a certain appropriate synthesis, a 
molecule of water emerges. It is assumed in emergent evolution 
that the qualities which constitute water'qua'water are 
latent in the atoms which 'related 1 to make possible the 
emergence of water on the molecular level. But these qualities, 
though latent, can never become actual on the lower level of 
atoms of hydrogen and oxygen,in their pure or insignificantly 
related state. The emergent synthesis into molecular water 
takes place only when the appropriate atomic relatedness 
occurs. There is 'no alien influx into nature'.
Hence the implications of vitalism are avoided.
i-g- Emergent Evolution, p.2.
A?
The critical step in the process is,of course,the 
emergence of life. "A critical review of physioo-chemi&al 
processes as they occur in integral entities increasingly 
favours the concept of step-like advance with a sudden 
appearance of new characters. Hence ..there arises at some 
stagt a substantial difference which still justifies a 
ralid distinction between the liTing and the lifeless. But
it is a distinction that has arisen within one natural order
i 
of events."
Life, then, is simply the peculiar properties and qualities 
which emerged on that particular level of development. Some 
favorable concourse of atome came to "be, combining in a 
hitherto unattained degree of meaningful complexity, the 
already existing physico-chemical processes, and as a result 
life 'emerged". On the emergent hypothesis no other explanat­ 
ion is possible, since prior to the appearance of life, 
no "filing but inorganic complexities had emerged, and it is 
rigorously insisted that there is no "ab extra" contribution. 
These prior elements of evolution had latent within them the 
possibilities of life. They were,so to speak, the sleeping 
beauties of emergent evolution, awaiting the kiss of creative 
relatedness to wake them into life.
At this primitive level of 'life 1 , Morgan insists that 
there is no evidence of conscious guidance,or 'prospective 
reference 1 . The amoeba,that is, may be alive, but to
i. Brolut. in the Light of Modern Knowledge, p.114.
assign to it any cognitive reference is simply to commit 
the'pathetic 'fallacy of reading our own psychic properties 
into the situation. "Mind", as such, is a lOrter emergence 
than 'life 1 , and there are intervening steps,such as 
'sentience' and'oognit ion' . Eventually the level of 'spirit' 
is achieved,and in certain human beings the specific
spiritual values emerge.
Contributions of thesg trends to the Christian value of man
It would seem then,that in these present
day trends of biological interpretation we have suggestive 
material for a rehabilitation of the Christian doctrine of 
human worth. Yet it must also be recognised that between 
the schools of psychobiolosr and emergent evolution there 
are important points of difference which need to be consider­ 
ed.
Psyoho-biology maintains that life has
meaning from the very beginning. Emergent evolution insists 
that at the 'life' level there is no indication of ! mind'. 
Morgan concedes that of any organism 'two stories can always 
be told, the biological aiai the psychological", but asserts 
that at the mere 'life 1 level the psychological story must 
be kept out of print, since all signs of 'prospective reference 
are a/bsent. He grants that 'mind 1 must be there 'ex hypothesi, 
but merely in latent form for the actual to develop out of. 
As merely latent,however,it can have played no part in the 
evolutionary advance. 'Life 1 as such is without the guidance 
of 'mind. '
Ruseell sponsors the autonomy of the simplest
organism to select or reject meaningful features from its
ti* environment, asw sees in development an inherent ability to
subordinate within* the category of meaning these deep seated 
'hormio' tendencies which constitute the drive of the life 
of the organism. Moreover, if the organism is minus organs 
to respond to significant features in its environment he 
holds that of its own initiative it may develop organs in 
response to its need, either from already existent means, or
by the production of entirely new organs from undifferentiat-
i 
ed living substance.
In all vital events he sees the underlying 
and fundamental relationship of adaptation and regulation; 
he quotes the evidence of Starling that 'even in hormonic 
activity, "cells have the power to take up or reject specific 
substances according to their needs; and that the integration
and regulation of metabolic activities is the work of the
2 
internal environment itself." This regulative ability
of the cells is also perceived by Wood Jones as ' oytoclesis ' ; 
"the call which can be exerted by one group of cells to
another group, a call to them to change and to organise in
3 
such a way that a unified whole is developed."
1. The Study of Living Things, p.85
2. ibid. p.123.
3. The Matrix of the Mind. 1929. p.35.
In the doctrine of emergent evolution this spontaneity 
of the individual is smothered,we "believe, by the 
supervention of divine control. It is not that Morgan 
offers us an f atomic T individual. As a matter of fact,he 
expressly warns us that the living organism is not just 
one step higher than uranium."It is not a member of the
atomic series-it is a natural entity with "biological and
i 
not only abiological properties; it is a living thing."
Our difficulty here is rather that in the emergent 
hypo the sis, individuality seems submerged rather than 
emerged, All things live and move and have their being 
in God,but in a manner which tends to evaporate their 
autonomy. "Individual spirits",we read,"are the items of 
stuff that constitute the spiritual community,and the 
efficient presence of God is its Spiritual Substance in 
indivisible unity..in the chord of Whose richer 
personality our limited personalities are subordinate
notes. For the essential feature of personality is2 
substantial unity in its richest expression,"
Again, Morgan declares "for better or for worse I 
acknowledge God as the Nisus through Whose activity
emergents emerge,and the whole course of evolution is
3 
directed."
"Emergent evolution from bottom to top is ultimately 
dependent on an acknowledged directive activity."
1. Bvol. in the Light of Mod. Knowl. p.112
2. Modern Churchman vol.xiv. Sept. 1924. p.293
3. Emergent Evol. p.36.
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In his ansriety to flee the mechanists and the 
vitalists, Morgan has fallen between the two of them. The 
emphasis upon the divine efficacy in evolutionary 
development has undercut the part played by the organism 
itself in selecting and responding to unique features in 
its environment. In avoiding the occasionalism of Deism 
Morgan has tumbled into the lap of a sort of biological 
Pantheism. It is the divine activity alone which gives 
the determinate plan of events, and "it is to be
conceived as omnipresent and manifested in every one of
i 
its multitudinous entities."
Lest we seem to have misrepresented Morgan, 
we offer one more quotation in which he explains his 
concept of emergent evolution. "The emphasis falls on 
the belief that spiritual agency is one and indivisible- 
operating always and everywhere-manifested in life and 
mind,yes,but also in the evolutionary foundations from 
which first life and then mind have emerged. It receives 
phenomenal expression in all that is susceptible of 
naturalistic interpretation. All that we call natural
is due to one agency *ithin, one coherent plan, and
2 
has spiritual significance in God."
i* Emer. Evol. p.13.
2. Modern Churchman. p,292,
But eten if ,in our opinion at any rate,Morgan over- 
shadows creaturely spontaneity with the background of this 
all-pervasive divine directing, his insistence on the reality 
of the genuinely new,and his full approval of a principle of 
evolutionary 'discontinuity 1 is a valuable support for 
Christian theory. "The emergent step,though it may seem more
or less saltatory,is best regarded as a qualitative change of
i 
direction,or critical turning point in the course of events."
This is a plain confession in biological terms of 
a principle which Christianity has always held to be vital for 
its valuation of man,namely that,when confronted by crisis,in 
the light of significant accumulated experience, the individual 
may re-orientate himself,by making a 'qualitative change of 
direction.'
As we have already intimated,we intend to maintain 
that such a process has been one of the main facts in the 
development of human beings from the standpoint of organic 
evolution. It is possible for humanity to be organically 
and historically related to other evolutionary types,lower 
in the scale of 'relatedness', yet while retaining historic 
continuity to manifest at the same time a qualitative 
discontinuity through the emergence of the distinctively 
human characteristics. Emergent evolution has made it very 
olear that continuity of historic development is not in any 
way inconsistent with new starts all along the line of
i« Ezner. Evol. p.5.
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development, "It is my belief that in the broad domain of 
nature,from bottom to top, natural leaps are many-so many
that I have ventured on ocoasion to speak of the advance
i 
of nature as fundamentally jumpy"
From the contributions of these present day 
trends in biological interpretation, Driesoh's emphasis 
upon wholeness, Russell's argument for the spontaneity of 
the organism with respect to its selected environment,and 
Morgan's principle of creative emergence,it should be 
possible to harmonise the essential features in Lamarckianism 
amd Mutationism. More than any other,perhaps, it is Haldane 
who has paved the way in biology for the modern recognition 
of the part played by the environment, now generally admitted 
to be coequal witii heredity. Organism and environment are 
neither antagonistic nor iaolable; their complementariness 
evokes dynamic activities in each without wrecking the 
autonomy of either. Something is given, and something is at 
the same time reoeived-or rejected. On the higher level, 
where spiritual personality interacts with a spiritual 
environment, the same relationship of giving and receiving 
is maintained. There is also the same opportunity for 
creative emergence. Christianity is inclined to believe that 
the richer side of the relationship is the divine gift that 
prompts the human response, resulting in the'emergent step, 
a qualitative change of direction,or critical turning point 
in the course of events."
i. Evol. in Light of Mod. Knowl.f>J£l
SECTION TWO
/'C
The Transcendent Factor in the Advance 
i. The Upward Qlimb. from Irotoplasm to Personality.
Evolution is provisionally understood as a 
continuous natlral process of change in a definite 
direction,in Tafcich all the existing forms of life are 
considered to be related by descent to the simpler forms 
of long ago. As such it has proved a generalisation extremely 
fruitful for the understanding of nature and the universe. 
Generally speaking there has always been a taoit recognition 
among naturalists of what we might call the broadly directive 
factor in evolution. In other words,the evolutionary 
hypothesis is not only a scientific generalisation;it is at 
the same time a profound value judgment upon life. Cur 
intention is now to examine this valuable element in 
evolution. We believe it can be shown to have importance 
for the Christian doctrine of human worth.
The procession of life upon the earth,insofar 
as it can de deduced from a comparison of the various groups 
of existing animals is intelligibly interpreted as an advancing 
series from the simplest to the most complex,or as we would 
prefer to say,from the lowest to the highest. In the lowest 
form of organism-and no matter how far we descend in the scale 
of living things, the explanatory concept is always organism- 
life manifests itself in the presence of, and through the medium 
of minute 'specks of Jelly-like substance' in which the main 
function of nourishment is multiplication. At the opposite end
//s
of the series stands man,mastering his surroundings, through, 
his greatly developed "brain. "Beginning by living to eat, 
the series soon advances towards eating to live. Then oomes 
the reign of flesh,with ji?.st enough nerve to make the muscles 
effective for moving and grasping. Finally the brain end of 
the nerve begins to preponderate, so that the animal no 
longer responds listlessly to its surroundings but improves
first in instinct, then in reason, and eventually attains
i 
supreme intellectual control."
The record of the rocks is no less
impressive. After men had come to realise that fossils were 
not to be regarded as tricks played by the Almighty to test 
their orthodoxy,it became very obvious to the discerning eye, 
that spread over tremendous intervals of geologic time there 
had been an orderly arrival of the various great groups of 
life, their order of appearance strikingly correlated with the 
increase of brain development. In other words the trend of 
evolution has been in the direction of progressive development 
of the instrument of self-determination.
To read this story of the upward climb
of life is to be impressed by one vital fact, the extraordinary 
power of selection and adaptation displayed by the developing 
organism. Living fa ings have wrestled with their surroundings 
as Jacob wrestled with the stranger at Peniel,refusing to let
i. Creation by Evolution. p.!24.ff
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them go until thty had won a "blessing from the struggle. 
For our immediate purpose, the noteworthy fact of evolution 
is that nature has produced organisms capable of reacting 
to their environment with a freedom and variety of response 
which transoe-nds the strictly biological categories of 
explanation. The end-pro duo t of the evolutionary process 
to date is man-at the very least a psycho-biological organism, 
which while rooted ant grounded in the process that has 
nourished him, is nevertheless capable of looking back over 
his history and evaluating his own development; at the highest, 
a spiritual personality who has reason to believe that the 
environment which sustains him is energised by some kind of 
life that answers to his own spiritual outreach. Vfoile he is 
in the world, he is also not of it.
It is fully admitted that the history of man 
is continuous with pre-existing forms of life whioh go right 
back to the beginnings of organic existence, possibly even 
beyond that. On the other hand, it is just as strongly 
maintained that this continuity, while real, is at the same 
time punctuated all along the series by the outcropping of new 
qualitative differences. These outcroppings, without disrupting 
the continuity of the sequence of evolution,nevertheless 
compel the recognition of a psychic factor at work wilhin 
the series whose final resultant is spiritual personality.
Ltt it be understood at once that these qualitative 
differences are not to be regarded as Different degrees 
of spiritual influx 1 poured into the process by some 
extrinsic 'deux ex maohina 1 . This would implicate us in a 
dualism whioh we do not care to sponsor, since it would 
undermine the objective validity of the values which we
§
hope to establish. Man is undoubtedly organi* to the 
processes of nature,and his discovered values may not 
legitimately be divorced from the universe that has nursed 
him. The valuable element is in life itself. Each stage of 
the process with all that it contains must find its 
explanation within the universe,and not outside it. __
Our assumption is that this universe, in spite 
of its many mysteries, furnishes a "beneficent milieu 
within which each organism enters into an interlocking 
relationship with its specialised environment. Out of 
this relationship there emerge those qualitative 
distinct ions of life whine give meaning to evolution.
We submit,then,that the procession of life has advanced 
not so much in a straight line of gradual uniform ascent,as 
by a series of incremental lifts, or experiential crises,which
have usually been "greater in their implication than in the
i 
actual moment" of their occurrence. Nature has
risen to the heights of spiritual personality by a certain 
i« J.Y.Simpson. The Spiritual Interpretation of Nature.p.110.
amount of indirection,involving processes whose end results
Ptt4*t 4*''
could not always be BBOHMoan. To make evolution intelligible
it must be viewed in the light of the whole, as a creative 
functioning of life. The developing organism must be credited 
with the ability to meet and surmount new conditions of 
existence,inventing for itself,in cooperation with its 
environment,genuinely new responses,when these are not already 
part of its inherited stock-in-trade.
In other words, the biological study of man is 
incomplete with the inclusion of the psychic factor. The 
basic category of interpretation is organismal creativity 
in cooperation with a dynamic environment. Life starts out as 
a biological experiment,but it ends as a spiritual experience.
The argutoents for evolution,deduced from
comparative anatomy and geology,are strikingly sustained by 
the facts of embryology. Genealogical trees were growing long 
before Darwin proved that fancy was fact. Johann Friedrich 
MeckeK 1781 -1863) laid the foundation of the belief that the 
higher animals in the course of their development show a 
regular unfolding of the 'echelle des etres 1 . Antonio Serres 
(1786-1868) gave a similar interpretation of the phases of
embryonic development. This Meckel-Serres law of recapitulation,
i 
despite the cogent criticism of observers like Von Baer,
i."it is self evident that while each step in development is 
only rendered possible by the preceding stage,the whole course 
of development is nevertheless ruled and guided by the essent­ 
ial nature of the future organism-and any one state is not the 
sole and absolute conditioning factor of the future. It is not 
the 'matter* in its mere arrangement but the essential nature 
of the -orocreating organism that rules the development of the 
offspring."
quoted. Hussell. mterp. of Devel .
Hered. p. 35,
was finally summed up epigrammatically by Haeckel in the 
dictum that 'ontogeny is the short and rapid form of 
phylogeny 1 . Popularly this was taken to mean literally that 
in the course of development every animal climbs its own 
ancestral tree. The child was father to the man, while the 
'lord of creation 1 was blood brother to the brute* Human 
'stock 1 literally reached a new low level I
Today the fact of recapitulation,once held to be 
a powerful support for the mechanistic interpretation of 
evolution,has been compelled to pay tribute instead of 
exacting it. There is no denying the fact that man has 
evolved from a line of ancestry traceable baci to the lowest 
forms of life. The main trends of his pedigree are fairly 
well established. But the human embryo is confessedly from 
first to last human and unique. "Every part of the human 
body passes through an extensive series of developmental
changes", but "not one of these copies a form seen in any
i 
living animal." The human embryo is characterised by new
features which guarantee its uniqueness,and these features
2 
influence the whole course of future development.
The new branch has,so to speak, changed the 
character of the whole evolutionary tree.
1. Keith. Nature cxii. p. 26 7
2. Keith. Human Embryology & Morphology, p.35
We have already referred to the work of Roux and 
Harrison and Speman. These workers have shown conclusively 
that two distinct stages are manifested in embryonic development. 
The first includes the directly inherited deposit,and it is 
passed through in the absence of function. But during the 
second stage of development,the sheer inheritance deposit 
comes under the controlling influence of the organism's 
 function 1 ,and the 'differentiation of the organs laid down 
in the first sta^e' is directly controlled and re-orientated 
by the exercise of the specific functions of the organism 
itself.
In other words, the phases distinguished in recapitulation 
are simply milestones on the highway of life, laid down at the 
biological cross roads, witnesses to strategic points in the 
organism 1 s triumphant march towards the freedom of the spirit.
It would seem that no strictly defined boundary can 
be set up between biology and psychology. Life,whatever else 
it proves to be, is at the least psycho-biological. How far 
back into the biological realm may the psychological factor 
be carried? Here we meet with disagreement among the 
experimenters. Morgan, we have seen, prefers to keep the 
psychological out of the biological in the primitive stages 
of life. He weakens his case consider ably, by admitting that 
the potentiality of mind is latent,to serve as a basis for
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future emergence;but he denies that "prospective reference" 
oan have played any Bart in the earliest stages of evolution.
Our own position is that the latent possibilities of mind 
must be present in primitive forms, in a very real sense,not 
merely f ex hypothesi 1 . Otherwise we are forced to concede that 
in the later stages the new element is surreptitiously smuggled 
into the series by a ' tour-de-force 1 which violates the 
autonomy of the developing organism.
This t for us,is one of the weak spots in emergent evolution. 
The concept of emergence is apt to become a synonym for'miracle 1 
if the separation between biology and psychology is made 
absolute. On the evidence submitted by Jennings,Bussell, 
McDougall.et al, we are not guilty of the pathetic fallacy 
when we maintain that in the lowest forms of life,even in 
unicellular protozoa,there is some rudimentary or primitive 
analogue of what at later stages we easily identify as an 
active psychic integration.
This primitive analogue cannot of course be equated with 
consciousness; the'memory 1 of the amoeba is scarcely human 
memory. Our point is that from protoplasm to personality, the 
living organism is unintelligible apart from the psychic unity 
which characterises it as as integrated life-whole.
The form cannot be understood apart from the function. 
The function, in its turn, is meaningless when considered 
apart from the presence of the psychic integration which 
expresses itself in autonomy, and absorbs vitalising elements 
from the environment. If this be granted,and we believe the
facts demand it,then the sublime motif of evolution is a well 
attested record of progress in self-determination towards that 
liberated self*consciousness whose climax is spiritual 
personality*
Biological opinion is generally agreed today that 
animal life originated,and passed the early stages of its 
evolutionary history,in the warm shallow waters skirting the 
shore,where survival conditions were at their best,giving 
ready access to such essentials as food,oxygen,water. Thus 
the brilliant guess of Anaximander-made twenty five centuries 
ago-is strikingly vindicated.
It is assumed that the pressure of over-population in 
these warm shallows would compel such of these primitive 
marine forms as could adapt themselves to altering conditions, 
to migrate either seawards,or landwards. Hence in due course, 
from these ancient tidal waters,'nurseries of new types 1 ,there 
emerged from some generalised form the distinct types of fishes 
and land animals.. "Some primitive creature,with external gills, 
developing in these warm marginal zones,gave rise to the two 
contrasted types that spread in the one case seawards,and in 
the o the r c ase 1andwar ds "
These diverging migrations meant the necessary 
development of significant new adaptations. Not the least 
impressive of these,in the case of the landward moving animals, 
was the achievment of a new method of breathing. T7e are forced
to infer that some primitive "but venturesome member of these 
early typesjdriven possibly by a need for more food,or seek­ 
ing further supplies of 0x7gen",managed to wriggle out of the 
muddy waters,in this act becoming a pioneer in the new art of 
land living.
That this is not entirely fanciful is confirmed by a 
study of the still existing mud-fishes inhabiting rivers which 
dry up in the summer. These creatures,burying themselves in 
the mud,are able to survive periods of drought by a development 
of the swimming bladder,which during the critical period 
discharges the function of a lung. The ancestral type of the 
existing mud-fishes was prevalent in the Devonian and Silurian 
ages.
The achievement of'dual-control 1 is also preserved in 
the 'blenny 1 or 'shanny 1 . Coming up with the tide,this little 
fish is often stranded-literally a fish out of water-but so 
long as its gills are moist the blenny is safe,even for twenty 
four hours at a time.
The landward 'match 1 meant new adaptations of the limbs 
of the ancestral animals* "The fore-paddles began to be bent 
at the future wrists and elbows; the hind paddles bent in 
the opposite direction, at the future knees and ankles. The 
fan-shaped bony rods of the paddles broke into segments,to 
give rise to the finger and toe bones. Thus man,in common 
with other vertebrates, has inherited the basic pattern of
hie five fingered hands and five toed feet from the earliest
i 
land living vertebrates." We shall see later on that this
i. Creation by Evolution, p.279-80
seemingly simple fact is worth a very great deal to man.
This upward climb, starting out so bravely from 
the warm waters of Palaeozoic time,continued steadily 
throughout the now familiar series of fish,frog,lizard, 
bird and mammal. Significant above everything else^ln the 
ascent is the progressive increase in the comparative size 
of the forebrain. Correlated with geological succession we 
find the impressive fact of cumulative enlargement of the 
organ which permits highest expression of the fuller and the 
more abundant life.
Biologists hitherto have hesitated to recognise 
the 'pretentious claims of orthogenesis. f To confess 
purposive trends in evolution was be branded as non-scientific, 
This hesitancy is not so marked today,for facts have their 
own way of compelling assent.
An excellent case in point is the development of 
the modern specialised horse from its diminutive ancestral 
representative /'Eohippus "• Originally one foot high, four- 
toed in front and three-toed behind, the graded series of 
developmental changes leading to the present type of horse 
have been beautifully demonstrated in hundreds of fossil 
collections* It seems impossible to doubt any longer 
that this development has been characterised throughout 
by a definite trend towards richer relationship with the 
environment. Pervading all the various changes of form and 
function there has been the adaptive power of the living
creature,namely the psychic unity.
We are reminded too that Nature shows evidence 
of definite trends towards health and beauty. It would seem 
that "in any one line of evolutionary change, especially of 
those regions of the body which do not show specialisation,
development proceeds apace,as if from the first to last
i 
devoted to the production of a definite final structure."
Equally significant too, as we shall see later on, is the 
warning that an animal group once committed to a specialisation 
cannot revert again to a primitive condition in that particular 
feature.
The most impressive record of orthogenetic
evolution is the vertebrate series that culminates in man.The 
sustained trend has been towards autonomy of the organism, 
seen in the increasing efficiency of its inner responses, and 
its freedom and variety of action in the presence of emergency. 
Moreover this progressive advance in efficiency of self-determin­ 
ation bears unique witness to the fact that the race is not 
always to the swift,nor the spoil to the strong. Celsus,in 
early Christian times, taunted Origen with the jibe that if the 
frogs could have a god he would take the form of one of them­ 
selves. But if twentieth century man could reverse the flow of 
time and have the privilege of visualising the amazing flora 
and fauna of Paleozoic and Mesozoie days,and were asked to
1. c.f. In the group of the titanotheres,certain rudimentary 
structures were preserved long before thty could possibly 
have had any survival value. After many generations of 
progressive development these structures were suffiaiently 
perfected to be of decisive aid in the struggle for existence.
single out the future controller of nature he would never 
hage selected the puny ancestral mammalian proto-type of 
man. It would seem incredible that the future of evolution
lay with the'little marsupial mammal diligently striving to
i 
avoid becoming a saurian meal." Yet such was to prove the
case.
The destiny of mankind was in the balance in these 
far off days. The primitive proto-maminal stood at the cross­ 
roads: around him his saurian competitors for survival were 
wasting their substance in the riotous life of the flesh, 
investing the life possibilities in quantity instead of 
quality; sacrificing plasticity of mental development for 
sluggishness ±t% of bodily enlargement. Specialising in 
armour-plated externals, they signed their own death warrant, 
trading their birthright for brawn and muscle.
"Refusing the way of over-specialisation in bodily 
externals,as it had avoided the burden of a double life in 
amphibian existence ; preferring the adventures of the new 
land life with its novelty and opportunity", surrendering 
weight for wit, the proto-mamrnal preserved its primitive 
plasticity, thereby ensuring its autonony, growing in wisdom 
if not in stature.
The upward climb was accompanied by many genuine 
advances. The winning of warm-bioodedness was a significant
i. J.Y.Simpson. Spiritual Interpretation of Nature, p.136-7
gain,making for increased efficiency of life, and a helpful 
independence of the outer temperature. It afforded a very 
valuable measure of preparedness to cope with unexpected 
environmental crises.
There were other critical steps in the ascent which 
led more and more in the direction of preparation for the 
future 'mind 1 life. The retention of the egg,for instance, 
ensured the advance into true maternity. The prolongation of 
the infancy period made for longer and safeguarded brain 
eduoability. These were all clear gain to the manward headed 
stock in the race towards final victory.
Every advance in the development that was leading 
towards man was made at a critical stage in the experience of 
the growing creature,and at some cost. The progressive 
individual must always choose between present possession and 
future possibility. We purchase our freedom at a great price. 
Life is a faith venture however we look at it.
The sluggish types,whose motto was 'safety first 1 , 
either perished in the struggle or fell behind in the race. 
The future is always with those who lay aside every weight, 
and run with patience the race that is set before them, 
pressing forward towards the mark of their high calling. The 
drama of the upward climb towards man is at once a revelation 
of life's possibilities, and a witness to the might of the
invisible power whose presence makes for righteousness.
Significance, of Form, fc function—B=———Ag the result of nia evolutionary researches,
Darwin concluded that "we must acknowledge that man, with all
his noble qualities, .sympathy., benevolence, .godlike intellect.. 
still bears in his bodily frame the indelible stamp of his 
lowly origin". Huxley.no less profoundly disturbed than his 
great master, was driven to declare,"! know of no study which is 
so saddening as that of the evolution of humanity as it is set 
forth in the annals of history,. Man is a brute, only more 
intelligent than the other brutes" Prom these premises, it was 
but another step in the argument to assert that civilisation
was such that he "would gladly welcome a kindly comet to sweep
i 
the T&ole affair away."
The honest man will refuse to hold fast to his faith 
in human values merely for the pragmatic efficacy of inspiring 
hope in those who accept it. He would rather, like Huxley himself, 
"sit down before facts as a little child". On the other hand, 
facts are notorious bullies, and the man who values wisdom as 
well as intellectual honesty will refuse to be browbeaten by 
'mere facts'. It seems difficult to dodge the truth that the 
belief that man is little more than a sophisticated brute, has 
taken its toll of human dignity. It is a sobering fact to be 
reckoned with, that the hasty undervaluation of human worth, 
arising out of the earlier evolutionary conclusions, is one of 
the major factors in the modern scepticism of the dignity of 
human life. We are not concerned to elaborate this point, 
believing it to be self evident to discerning eyes.
The extreme effect of such scepticism towards life,
i. Bury. The Idea of Progress, p.344-5.
upon man's imagination is illustrated in a penetrating
analysis of the modern mood b;/ one of the keenest of
^k j_*,, '• 
critics. The waMMagvy* of this writer, after a survey
of life, is summed up as follows, "Leaving the future to 
those who have fai 1h in it, we may survey our world..and
permit ourselves to exclaim..
Hail, horror,hail infernal worldl
And thou profoundest hell, receive thy new possessor.
Ours is a lost cause, and there is no place for us in the
•
natural universe."
Nevertheless, he still prefers to die as a man than 
to live as an animal. 
Structural Resemblance & Kinship. Convergent Evolution
In our opinion, the argument from analogy to 
identity has been seriously stretched in the matter of 
the interpretation of man's evolutionary history. More 
particularly, this is the logical outcome of a trend in 
biological method which is steadily giving way before the 
recognition of the functional nature of the organism. From 
Aristotle to Linnaeus(1707-78), the classification of organic 
life was made on the basis of the principle that similarity of 
structure involved a close degree of relationship. TTith the 
advent of Darwinism the stag* was set for an interpretation of 
evolution along the lines of the Linnaean classification. The 
results have been disastrous for the conception of human worth. 
The argument from structural resemblance to kinship, to the 
exclusion of the more subtle distinctions involved in function
i. The Modern Temper. J.l.Krutch. London 1930 p.248
still makes its appeal to some biologists, "but it has serious 
limitations. From the point of vie7/ of structure, an animal 
may be a complex of its basic inheritance and its adaptation 
of habitus, but 'one fundamental structural difference begot
of heritage outweighs many structural resemblances begot of
i 
habitus."
To argue dogmatically from structural resemblance 
to kinship without taking cogniBance of the force of convergent 
adaptation and its power to produce superficial likenesses in 
unrelated forms is seriously to strain the argument. Keith 
states that his conception of the rapidity and manner of man's 
evolution has been altered in recen£ years by the law of
'uniform or collateral evolution 1 which has a "wider significance
2 
than I had formerly believed."
The la?/ is clearly enunciated by Wood Jones."Identical 
correlated adaptations might be manifested in different animals 
which,having no intimate relation with each other,are subjected 
to the same range of environmental conditions, .these might 
chance to be trivial,or they might be extensive; they might 
possibly be conceived as being so complete as to produce two 
specialised animals which attain a considerable degree of
superficia-1 identity,and which yet arose from two utterly
3 
different stocks."
1. Wood Jones. Ancestry of Man. 1923. p.10-11.
2. Keith Sir A. The Antiquity of Man, 1925. vol.l.r.-ref. to
2nd ed. p.xv
3. Wood Jones. Man's Place among the Mammals, p.31.
Wille;/. A.'Convergence in Evolution 1 illustrates 
the wide application of this lav;.
jPh« Peyohlo Synthesis Preparatory for Emergence of Man.
There is no unanimity of opinion as to the identity 
of the proto-mammal whose line of rievelopment eventuated in 
man. Elliot SmiUi traces the human stook "bask through the lemurs. 
Wood Jones favours the idea of a stock represented by'tarsius! 
The distinction as we shall see later on involves a great deal 
more than a difference. It is agreed that at some eta~e of 
evolutionary history an extremely primitive mammal took to tree 
life-a small land grubbing animal-facile of limb- and underwent 
an evolutionary phase among the branches. Tftiat caused this 
critical step to be taken we oannot say, but it was a stare in 
the upward climb fraught with significance for f man in the making 1
As a land grubber, this protomammal had nosed its 
way through life, the sense of smell being its chief manner of 
experiencing and the snout being the organ definitely specialised 
for discrimination. '"The most primitive cerebral cortex is an 
olfactory cortex.
One direct result of the clinb into the trees was 
t&e setting free of the forelimbs to become organs of outreach; 
they developed the power to grasp while the hind limbs became 
organs of support. Henceforth the animal with feeed forelimb 
could develop the habit of carrying food to the mouth with the 
'hand 1 instead of having to take it directly with the mouth. This 
in turn involved another 'departure 1 , the disappearance of the 
snout region, the emergence of the 'hand' making more and more 
unnecessary the use of protruding lips and teeth for grasping 
food.
This recession of the snout area was correlated with one 
of the major triumphs of evolution, the attainment of 
stereoptican vision. The MumjufuuiU shifting of the eyes 
from the side to the front of the face permitted bifocal 
attention to "be "brought to bear upon objects. This power 
of concentrated visual attention was greatly enhanced by
the "enormously increased power of turning the head from
*
side to side," which went with the shortening of the
snout region. Hence sound and sight could now be correlated
in the same movement, making for a great increase of efficiency.
Note now the striking synthesis which takes place.The 
snout successfully out of the wa#,and the hand liberated, 
the latter takes over the function of touching an$ testing 
in addition to grasping-functions which formerly belonged 
to the olfactory organ-and performs the work more efficiently. 
For the freed hand becomes a sensitive instrument. In 
conjunction with the enhanced power of vision,objects which 
were formerly tested by smell could be taken up,examined, 
and the impressions gained from other sense organs criticised.
The result of ttiis is seen in the growth of the organ 
of perception. As the animal grew in wisdom,it felt the 
need of some place to store up the new impressions it was 
gathering. Hence the "neopallium", the "birthright of the 
proto-mammal' started to grow. The olfactory parts of the 
brain began to lose their importance,almost to the point of 
atrophy in the primates. Their usefulness was limited by the
life in the trees. "In man the sense of smell is one of the
i 
minor factors in his vfaole physiological economy."
l ' wood Jonas. Arboreal Man. p.165.
In the creature which took to the trees, the primitive 
form of hind-limb-longer than-forclimb prevailed,"making it 
erect and bipedal in poise and progression". This condition 
is still retained in primitive "Tarsius", as it is also in 
man. The anthropoids have specialised in the direction of 
forelimb-longer-than-hind-limb.
On this fact,Wood Jones bases an argument that man never 
passed througfc an anthropoid stage of evolution at all. If he 
did,"he must have converted the primitive mammalian "leg-longer- 
than-arm condition into an anlfaropoid arm-longer-than-leg-
condition" and subsequently reverted to the human leg-longer-
i 
than arm, of today. As a result, Wood Jones concludes
that man's progenitor branched off from the primate phylum 
before the pithecoid specialisations were stereotyped among 
its members.
For our purpose,the important fact of the arboreal 
stage in evolutionary history,is that the proto-human stock 
took full advantage of the temporary tree life without
developing the specialisations into which the anthropoids
1+ 
were snared. 5fe«y never became so over dependent upon
brachiating life among the branches as to lose the possibility 
of "true orthograde bipedal progress" when the descent from 
the trees was made. If proto-man climbed up,he walked down, 
and he has stayed on his feet ever since.
i. Man's Place among the Mammals, p.312.
Retention of Primitive Unspecialised Features in Man,
"An unspecialised society oan survive through important 
changes in its environment..it can take on different functions 
in respect to a changing environment..by reason of flexibility 
of structural pattern it can adapt that special pattern to its 
circumstances of the moment..thus the problem of nature is the 
production of societies which are 'structured 1 with a high 
complexity,and..at the same time 'unspecialised 1 ..In this way 
intensity is mated with survival."
This statement applies with striking appropriateness to 
the case of man himself. For one of the chief claims man can 
make to uniqueness-bi ©logically speaking-is the fact that 
throughout his evolutionary career he has followed the law 
of successful minimum specialisation. In a very real sense, 
man is the summation of all that has gone before him, a 
living embodiment of the eternal in the temporal, yet in spite 
of his amazing incorporation of what has prededed him in time,
Tftmatnfj
man has curiousfyaniqueneoe in his minimum of specialisation. 
In this very fact lies his great capacity and potentiality 
for progress in the direction of the more abundant life.
Many of the great animal groups have owed their extinction 
to the folly of overspecialisation. Fossil records show,for 
instance,that annihilation has often been preceded by 
excessive growth. Irrelevant complexity indicates faulty 
integration of the life of the organism. Man in this respect 
bears about in his body interesting evidence of his uniqueness. 
When Darwin said that man "still bears in his bodily frame the
i. Whitahead. Process & Reality, p.140
the indelible stamp of his lowly origin 1 he mi$it have used 
the statement to exalt man rather than to debase him.
Prof. Elliot Smith has shown that structur­ 
ally man retains many primitive unspecialised forms,thereby 
securing for himself and his progeny the original plasticity 
of life,with the possibility of future development that goes 
with it. The hand of man is a good oase in point. 'Thile other 
types took to habits that made then} specialise in hoofs and 
claws and flippers,man kept his hand-and in doing so he 
literally kept his head. "The human hand is a strangely, 
almost shockingly primitive survival...cultivated as a grasp?
ing organ..it eetained and perfected the opposable thumb..man
i 
has retained in his hand a'universal organ 1 ". It was this
retention of primitive plasticity of function correlated with 
the advance into large brainedness so lacking in the other 
mammals that singled its owner out as a'marked'man.
Again 'the arrangement of the bones and 
muscles in the huijian arm is the retention of a condition so
primitive that it is matched...by types situated in the
2 
vertebrate stock right at the point of mammalian divergence."
Neitrer will the shoe pinch Waen we try it
3 
on the human foot. "Man has a true foot", says Boule"an organ
for support". The foot is the organ whose structure 'definitely
4 
severs him from all other existing primates" There is full
i.Wood Jones. Arboreal Man.p.73 2. ibid p.46. 
S.Boule M. Fossil Man. p.77 fy. do. p.73.
opposability in the feet of apes. "It may be said quite
dogmatically that opposability of the big toe never occurs
i 
in any measure in any (human) race whatever." The foot
of the anthropoid is an organ of prehension; the foot of man 
is an organ of support. The combination of two hands and 
two feet has proved a tower of strength to the raanward-headed 
stock, so that Osborne can say,"the better we understand the 
human anatomy and mechanism,both of the hand and foot,and
the more we learn of the ancestors of man, the less close
2 
appears our relationship to the great a nthropoids."
The same story is continued in the human teeth. 
Man's teeth are survivals of the original condition which
was the starting point of all the various types of mammalian
3 
teeth."He is extraordinarily primitive in regard to his teeth."
To sum the matter up, when we consider man 
structurally, we are considering an organism whose boast it 
may well be that he is as nearly "animal-in-general" as it 
is possible to be. With primitive simplicity goes enhanced 
plasticity, and latent possibility. Truly it is not yet 
manifest what we shall be.
1. Wood Jones. Man's Place among the Mammals, p.314
2. Osborne H.F. Man Rises to Parnassus, p. 181.
3. Klaatsch. The Evolution & Progress of Mankind, p.54.
ght Irtparation of the"Mind-Lift"«
Let us consider now the distinctive feature of the 
whole evolutionary process, the amazing- development of the 
tig "brain, which constitutes the primary reason for the 
emergence and the ascent of man. Careful examination of 
the human head has shovi/n a development of the skull bones 
through ten well marked structural stages,"from the fish
upwards• " But "each new level is punctuated by th^e
i 
inoorporation of some characteristic gain."
Starting with a preponderance of olfactory brain 
representa/tion the uprising proto-mammalian stock took every 
possible opportunity of developing the 'neopallium',conserving 
the gains of experience for the future good of the race, 
relying less and less upon the earth-bound sense of smell, 
and increasingly more upon the organ whose presence represents 
the physiological concomitant of a unified consciousness.
It seems that 'nature tried innumerable experiments
2 
with the new type of brain." Some types used their freedom
to specialise, in tree life, or in acquatic life. Religiously 
stated, the wage of sin is death. Biologically, the result of 
specialisation is stereotyping. Man belongs to an order of 
life 7/hich was . teadily specialising in vitality, in the 
direction of increased brain power, and in gregariousness.
The upward climb v/as aided by the synthesis of all 
these factors,working in cooperation with the increasing 
"brain. Sight had replaced smell and stimulated venturesome
iir Quarterly Rev. of Biology. Vol.2. lTo.2. Gregory V/.K.
2. Elliot Smith. Essays on the Evolution of I.'an. 1924.ed.p.28
ouriousity; the emancipated for el imb, gaining skill and 
precision through a sensitivity born of richer experience 
furthered a more appreciative understanding; of the outside 
world. This wider understanding had its effect in foster­ 
ing control of appetites and instincts,laying the foundat­ 
ion for an infinite distinction between the truly human and 
the truly animal. Add to this the vital fact that the 
developing brain of the protomammal was able to function 
through organs that had preserved their primitive plasticity 
and we see one of the main reasons why out of its weakness 
the stock of man was made strong.
Elliot Smith points out that 'no structure
found in the brain of the ape is lacking in the human brain; 
and on the other hand the human brain reveals no formation
of any sort that is n6t present in the brain of the gorilla
i 
or the chimpanzee" Keith also reminds us that 'the difference
it is true is only quantitave.but the importance of the •
2 
difference cannot be exaggerated"
We would suggest that any interpretation
of life must take wholeness as its fundamental explanatory 
concept. It is the whole man we are concerned with in the 
last analysis. Man was bound to prove his worth in the upward 
struggle because he was the only creature fitted with the
1. Essays.
2. Concerning Man's Origin. 1923.p.26.
requisite composition of "brain and plasticity to take full 
advantages of all the cooperation afforded "by the possibilities 
offered in hand and eye.
"The human "brain is remarkable in that its 
growth is so long continued. Moreover its prolonged growth 
is especially conspiclous in those regions in which the
•
eseentially human characteristics are represented." This 
condition is directly correlated with the prolongation of 
the human infancy periodjwhich permits a period of develop­ 
ment sheltered from premature responsibilities. The anthropoid 
brain comes to a standstill at a relatively early stage of 
development, the brain of the monkey earlier still. It takes 
the human brain two years to reach the stage of development 
which the anthropoid has had to attain at birth. It takes 
man twenty years to approach physical maturity; mental 
maturity comes at a much later age. This extension of safe 
infancy has given the human brain opportunity to develop in 
a way denied to other animals. Creatures which have to enter 
upon the life struggle quickly require to be well endowed at 
birth; but the high speed endowment is purchased at the price 
of stereotyped capacity and too rapid maturity.
Here then is a clue to the apparently
intelligent actions of trained animals which so often puszle 
people. Journalistic literature has hypnotised the popular
^^•••••^^•••^^•••^•••^•••••••••^^••••••^^^•^•^•^•••••^^•^••••••••••••••MHMMMH^ - - •""•»- • - ' *
i.Man's Place among the Mammals, p.340
imagination with instances of animal behaviour based implicitly 
on the assumption that the anthropoids are simply a sort of 
younger brother s ta^e to the human. Animal experiments have 
seemed to fortify this conclusion. But it is obvious now that 
any glimmerings of apish intelligence are merely the last 
flicker of a lost possibility, not a nascent faculty which 
will presently become human. The use of sticks to fish for 
bananas placed beyond reach is scarcely a fair premise to 
argue for 'intelligence' as we understand it. Rather than 
run the risk,however,of appearing to be biassed, we will let 
the expert speak for himself."If in testing the reactions, 
mental processes and social behaviour of the anthropoids, the 
observer is unmi fully aware that he is making test of phylo- 
genetically senile animals,specialised altogether away from 
human characteris tics,all is well with his conclusions;but 
they can never be of a very far reaching nature; but if he is 
under the impression that he is investigating an incipient 
human s tage, through 7/hich man has passed,and which may therefore 
be expected to throw seme light upon the development of human 
character is tics, he is likely to be led, and to lead, astray. 
The findings derived from a specialised and senile end-product 
of a phylogenetic line must not be accepted as being equivalent
to those derived from a primitive and plastic early member of
i
a related stock."
i. Wood Jones. Man's Place Among the Mammals, p.354-5.
The verdict of Tilney confirms this judgment. "It 
does not seem sufficient to linger among the modern apes
in search for our ancestors. These animals belong to families
i 
totally divergent from man." He concludes that attention
should he directed not to these simians,"but rather to the 
generalised manmalian stock which preceded both apes and
man.
Wood Jones; Argument for Non-Anthropoid Svolution of Man 
TEis leads us to consider an interesting trend in
evolutionary interpretation. It has not been received without
2 
criticism,but evolutionary categories are in a fluent condition
at present, making dogmatism impossible.
In 1919, Prof. Wood Jones issued what were hailed as 
n remarkable speculations", in a brochure called "The Problem 
of Man's Ancestry". He excluded all the apes and monkeys 
from man's ancestry,and derived the human family directly 
from "a tarsius-like animal". The theory was strongly 
criticised at the time. In 1929,however,Wood Jones returned
3
to the charge with a new publication in which he advanced a 
very impressive elaboration of his first thesis,with abundant 
anatomical analysis. He takes the step of uniting the lemurs 
with the tree shrews,and dismisses them from the company of 
the monkeys and apes,in the face of Elliot Smith's judgment 
that "the facts that establish the right of the lemurs to be 
regarded as primates are no less definite than those that
1. F.E.Tilney. The Brain from Ape to Man. 1928.p.1043
2. Nature, vol. 125. No.3140. Jan.4.1930
3. Man's Place among the Mammals. 1939.
make the whale a mammal." Wood Jones argues that such 
monkey like developments as the lemurs have attained are 
due to the fact of convergence,which Elliot Smith in 1920 
criticised as 'a fashioaable and overworked doctrine', but 
which nevertheless Sir Arthut Keith in 1925 was inclined to 
treat with increasing respect.
Wood Jones maintains that'the protohuman 
stock separated from the stem of the primates before the 
definite pithecoid specialisations had become stereotyped., 
from a tarsioid form that had not developed the specialisat­ 
ions seen in the living tarsiers.. that there had been a 
develoment from this primitive tarsioid stage in the general
ft
direction of a primitive gibbon that had not achieved any 
definite pithecoid specialisations, .possibly at the pro- 
pliopithecus s tage. .small,active,agile,. .legs longer than 
arms..already erect..moving in bipedal fashion among the 
branches, .anatomically prepared for terrestrial bipedal life., 
possessed of crania already enlarged..jaws small,with no
specialised enlargement or sexual differentiation of the
i 
teeth..and moderately enlarged eyes."
In other words .according to Wood Jones,
man never passed througfc an anthropoid stage of evolution 
at all. His remote ancestors,newly emerged from some tarsioid 
stock,cons titute a'progresrive 1 as opposed to a'conservative '
i. Man's Place Among the Mammals, p.356-9
group which broke clean away from the rest of the primate 
stem.probably during some period of "phylogenetic rioting", 
such as is displayed in the Siwalik remains,and then developed 
along the lines of its own manward headed trend. Tht non-human 
proto-types were sidetracked into their respective pithecoid 
specialisations.
Hence no existing anthropoid can have been the ancestral 
type of man. Pithecoid specialisation has advanced too far. 
This however is generally admitted. On the other hand,man 
himself could not have arises from a common anthropoid stem. 
If he did, then it would seem that in his particular case we 
have to assume a major infringement of the law of irreversibil- 
ity of structure not known elsewhere. For a group,once 
oonmitted to a specialisation cannot revert again to a 
primitive condition in that particular feature. Man,starting 
out with the original primitive leg-longer-than-arm pattern, 
would require to be assumed as having adopted the anthropoid 
arm-longer- than-1eg condition, and then afterwards to have 
reverted back again to the present human and original leg- 
longer-than-arm.
The alternative is what has been stated above, that 
man did not arise from anthropoid stock at all, but branched 
off from the main stem of life before the pithecoid 
specialisations set in. This would afford a reasonable 
explanation for the retention of primitive features in man, 
and their modification in whole or in part by the monkeys 
and the anthropoids.
/to
>. There still of course remain the likenesses to "be 
accounted for. Here Wood Jones invokes the aid of convergent 
evolution, involving "not a wholesale parallelism in 
unoorrelated and non-adaptive features" but " a limited 
homoeomorphy of purely adaptive features such as are common to 
animals that being once arboreal, have become more or less 
terrestrial; that are more or less upright in structure f and
*
more or less bulky in their general build."
The general conclusion* of Wood Jones seems to be borne 
out by Osborne. "The anthropoids constitute a separate branch
of the great division of the pr imates. .totally disconnected
2 
from the human family from its earliest infancy."
The findings deduced from the facts of comparative 
anatomy are held t o be compatible with the serological 
reactions of the blood of mm and the anthropoids, Popular 
imagination pictures a genuine'blood relationship 1 between 
the two stocks. What is shown is that "while the serological 
differences between man and the lower monkeys appear to be no 
greater than those between the anthropoid apes and the lower 
monkeys,these findings confirm the opinion that the anthropoid 
apes do not rank in the same genealogical tree between the 
lower monkeys and man." These have all come from a common 
stock,but the pro to-hum an emergence occurred in time to avoid
1. Man's Place among the Mammals, p.329.
2. H.P.Osborne Evolution & Religion in Education. 1926.p.136
the stereotyping specialisations of the monkeys and the apes. 
:••' The final assessment of this 'evolutionary heresy' 
lies of course with those competent to deal with the technical 
anatomical evidence. It is admitted,however, that f man is the 
ultimate product of that line of ancestry which was never 
compelled to turn aside and adopt protective specialisation
either of structure or of mode of life,which would be fatal
i 
to his plasticity and power of further development."
The different groups,after their divergence, were 
exposed to conditions which in the ma|n were responsible for 
their fortunes-or their fates. We suggest that the real cause 
of the divergence of the rnanward headed stock was the presence 
of a potent urge towards the achievement of the richer life 
whose promise and possibility was latent in the stock. We might 
well leave this issue in the hands of Elliot Smith,who suggests 
that evolution reached a stage where "the more venturesome 
members of the group-stimulated perhaps by some local failure 
of the customary food,or maybe led forth by a curiosity bred 
of the growing realisation of the possibilities of the 
unknown world beyond the trees,which had hitherto been their 
home, we impelled to seek new sources of food and new
surroundings on hill and plain,where they could obtain the
2 
sustenance they needed."
1. Elliot Smith.Essays. p.35
2. ibid. p.40
This urge to venture forth into the new country, at 
the call of the unseen , has increased in intensity as man has 
oome to know his world better. We are reminded of another stage 
in human history when a similar urge was responded to. "Get 
thee out of thy country, and from thy kindred, .unto a land that
I will shew thee. And I will make of thee a great nation, and I
i 
will bless thee and make thy name great."
"The less venturesome group, either more favorably
situated, or attuned to their surroundings, living in a land of
2 
plenty, were free from this glorious unrest-and remained apes."
The manward headed stock, impelled by the impetus of 
its owi forward looking nature, was persuaded to 'forego the 
cash in hand 1 , carried along by that insistent restlessness 
and discontent, which at its highest can declare, "Thou hast made 
us for Thyself , and our hearts are restless until they find 
their rest in Thee."
Interpretation of tht ppyara _chzch , i t seems fc us\ TTas been the upward climb
towards man. When we come to evaluate this record, we confess to 
an opinion which others may not share, but which we are bound 
nevertheless to express. From first to last, the trend of 
evolution admits of but one interpretation, namely, that in the 
developing organic life there has been a genuine psychic function 
at work;and nothing short of continual reliance upon this
1. Gen. 12. vl-2
2. Elliot Smith. Essays, p.40,
psychio factor could have proved the salvation of the organism 
at the various critical levels of experience through which it 
emerged.
The upward olimb,from the first generalised marine 
forms in the warm shallows of geologic time.through the various 
orders and successions of life,has "been accomplished only by 
a striking avoidance of the cul-de-sacs of specialisation. 
Only by keeping to the straight and narrow path of its destiny, 
and by selecting,in cooperation with its environment,those 
enriching features which fostered its integrity,has the organism 
arrived at the goal of distinctively human personality.
When the great life groups were diverging broadly 
along the lines of specialisation and stagnation,the manward 
stock ran a strai^it race, laying aside those things that 
might easily have beset it, pressing forwards to the mark of 
its high calling. Out of weakness, the feeble forerunner of 
the higher life has been made strong, preserved ffom the 
pitfalls of premature specialisation by meaningful contact 
with a creative environment. The spirit of God has always 
been striving with man. He has been,as Augustine declares, 
"at the helm, though very secretly."
The glory and the worth of man lies not in his 
externals. Physically considered,man is weak and faint compared 
with most of his fellow travellers. But his feet are planted 
firmly on the highway of the spirit that leads to truth and life. 
What we shall hereafter be is hid from mortal eyes.
!• Confessions of St. Augustine Bk.4. xiv. 23.
2 The Factor of Discontinuity in Human Evolution,
In our survey of the upward elimb we have taken it as 
a basic fact that there is traceable all through the 
evolutionary series a very real continuity. The pedigree of 
man is well rooted in the ground plan of the developing 
system of nature,and its ramifications are inseparable from 
the ordtr therein manifested. We have endeavoured to show 
that the 'natural element' in man's inheritance is 
inexplicable apart from the presence of an integrating 
psychic factor,which has unified his progressive experience 
and sustained the developing organism as every stage of its 
growth. This psychic factor is finally responsible for 
sublimating biological experiment into spiritual experience. 
At the same time we have insisted that this continuity 
in the evolutionary series is strikingly enriched throughout 
its course by the outcropping of higher developmental levels 
which betoken the reality of qualitative differences within 
the series. These testify neither to 'breaks' in the thread 
of evolution, nor to 'spiritual influx' poured into the 
process from without, but to the fact that at certain critical 
periods of growth the organism,cooperating with its environment, 
uses the summed up experience of the past as a spring-board 
for leaping ahead in its race towards the final goal.
C&rganie evolution has moments of advance when it 
marches witfr seven-league boots.
Darwin "based his main thesis on the fact of small 
chance variations,indefinite in number. On the evidence of 
today we must recognise variation as a very definite thing. 
What De Vries termed the mutation factor, while not the sole 
method of evolution,has nevertheless played a greater part 
in development than "biology has "been willing to concede. 
Continuity is noWseen to "be consistent with significant 
crises in the history of the organism, cor related with new 
departures in form and function.
Reviewing the 'Grigin of Species' in I860, Huxley 
suggested that 'Darwin's position might have "been stronger 
than it is if he had not embarrassed himself with the 
aphorism,'natur a non facit sal turn 1 ." He went on to say, "we 
"believe that nature does jump now and tfeen." It is our 
opinion that this mutational or emergent element in evolution 
must receive fuller recognition as the facts of life come 
to be more fully appreciated.
Admittedly we are ignorant of the real causes of 
mutation, and we must be willing to be guided by whatever the 
fa/cts turn out to be. It might well be, as seems to be the 
case, that change, structurally or otherwise, is correlated 
with certain behaviour of the gene-content. Morgan sponsors 
the concept ion,derived from his'bottle-raised-banana-fed f fly 
tha/t change of structure corresponds wi th f and is due to a
ohange in one particular portion of a chromosome. At the 
same time he rules out the effect of any external stimulus 
or condition.
But the organism is never at any time in its career 
anything less than an integrated organ!am,no matter how far 
back its history may "be telescoped, and it functions always 
on the level of organic wholeness,not abstracted f geneness' 
Changes within the gene cannot be isolated from the total 
functional unity which characterises the complete individual, 
though they may quite well be a necessary physiological 
concomitant or mode of expression instrumental to the 
organiaa's re-orientation. The germ-cell, with its contents, 
is inseparable from that restless experimental urge which 
inspires the upward striving life. It is in fact itself a 
complete organise, with the primary capacity of making 
experiments in self expression, ! not a bag of items,but a
viable unily.'
i 
B.R.Gates frankly realises the difficulty of
accounting for mutations on a purely biological basis. His
suggestion is valuable,namely that we have forgotten that
the organism is alive. He draws an analogy between the climbing
organism and aH Alpine climber,swinging himself on to a
ledge which is to be used as a new starting point in the
upward climb. The language is admittedly picturesque,but it
i. The Mutation Fector in Evolution.
serves to give point to our own suggestion that mutational 
change is fruitfully regarded as organismal reorientation, 
instigated "by the pressure of accumulated experiences within 
the organism^to cope with environmental crises. We have seen 
Lloyd Morgan defining the fact of emergence in these words, 
"the emergent step, though it may seem more or less saltatory.
is "best regarded as a qualitative change of direction,or
i 
critical turning point in the course of events". This we
believe expresses the valuable element in mutation, the 
power of the organism ±B as a whole to make a new alignment 
of its direction/the re by achieving survival value in a 
critical situation. The continuity of the process is not 
disrupted, but it is charged with new meaning by the fresh 
departure.
We propose then to submit our evidence
for the claim that on this basis the origin of man himself 
is intelligibly regarded as a mutational departure. In so 
doing we are aware that we ere challenging evolutionary 
orthodoxy. Our defence is simply that the existing facts 
seem to us to be more reasonably explained than in any 
other way.
i. Emer. Evol. p.5,
3 f Anthropoid Fossil Belies.and their Interpretation*
Popular opinion,impressed by the broad generalisat­ 
ions of evolutionary theory, is uncritically based upon the 
supposition that between man ana the rest of the primate 
stem there exists a well graded series of fossil connections, 
establishing an unbroken continuity, comparable to the fine 
series in the horse pedigree. Actually,the record of fossil 
primates is extremely fragmentary, affording no warrant for 
the deduction that there is a simple bridging of the immense 
gap between even the most primitive forms of man and the 
most advanced of the anthropoid apes. "It must be confessed" 
says Boule,"that palaeontology has not yet revealed any 
indisputable transitional form,any material proof of a
hereditary connection between the a/pe-form and the human
i 
form". Of the anthropoid fossils "there are from all
geological periods,only a few score jaws and teeth, together
2 
with a single femur and humurus", available for study.
For instance,"Pa^eosimia",the Upper Miocene 
fossil from India is represented by a single upper molar 
tooth. "Propliopithecus", the earliest ape so far discovered, 
found in Egypt and dated back to the early Tertiary period, 
is represented by a mandible with teeth. "Dryopith ecus", the 
1 oak-ape 1 of the Middle Tertiary period, considered by many 
to be closer to the common stem of the apes and man than any 
other fossil ape, is represented by a few jaws,an arm and a 
thigh bone.'Australo-pithecus', the famous'big-brained baby'
1.Fossil Man. p.90.
2.Man's Place among the Mammals. p.285
from South Africa-of uncertain date-is evidenced by the
•
facial part of a skull.
We of course claim no technical ability to 
appreciate the detailed worth of fossil relics. In such 
a case only the expert may speak with decision. Let us hear 
then what he has to say. "In order to appreciate the nature
of a fossil animal, and to assign it its taut place..mere
2 
fragments of bone are not enougi." We ourselves would
further suggest that the criterion of interpretation can be 
nothing less that the whole organism itself, more especially 
when we remember the significance of convergent evolution. 
The reminder is farther required in the light of what Elliot 
SmiUi has to say; "In the evolution of man, the growth of the 
brain preceded the transformation of the face and body.The 
cerebral cortex acquired functions distinctive of the human
status at a time when the organism as a whole still retained
3 
many simian characters."
A singular illustration of the danger which is 
attendant upon generalisation from anythir^g less than the whole
organism is seen in the case of the now notorious "Hespero-
4 
pithecus." It was announced in I/lay 1922, that a fossil
1. for complete list c.f . Man's Place among the Mammals, p.285
2. Boule Fossil Man. p.91.
3. The Significance of the Peking Man. 1931. p.5.
4. Science vol.LV. p.463-5.
anthropoid of the Pliocene period had been discovered in 
North America. A new genus was invented to receive it, 
"Hesperopithecus Haroldoooki". The evidence submitted in
support of this generalisation was a 'single water-worn
i 
tocth 1 . Five years later, the expert who identified the
tcoth retracted his opinion. The 'upper molar of the extinct 
primate 1 degenerated into the 'upper pre-molar of an extinct 
genus related to the modern peccaries'. It is but fair to 
state that most cf the experts protested at the time against
ô •
the rashness of the generalisation,but it prevailed nevertheless
It seems reasonable to us to suspect that a 
stud£ of si-.oh fragments as teeth, portions of jaws .skulls, 
isolated bones, etc, would be profoundly modified by the 
knowledge of the creature as a living organism. When fall 
?/eight is given to the facts of physiological convergence, 
the danger of faulty generalisation is very much increased.
Certainly there is no evidence of direct gradation 
from anthropoid to human.
1. Science. Dec. 1927. Vol.LXVI Ho.1720 p.579-81.
2. In the light of this criticism,all the more credit is 
due to the courage of Dr. David son Black for a similar 
generalisation which proved successful in the case of 
the Peking Llan. But the criticism still stands. Dr Black 
had collateral evidence to support his generalisation.
4. !&• Antiquity of Man*
At what stage of the evolutionary development then 
may we look for the appearance of man. The time schema 
now "becomes important, for discoveries in the antiquity of 
man naturally stimulated anthropologist and geologist to 
translate this antiquity into terms of years. The reading 
of the geological hour glass has not proved a simple task. 
Just how complicated the problem is,may be understood by a
•
perusal of Arthur Holmes 1 excellent treatise.
A roughly accurate chronology has been furnished 
through the mutually corroborative work of V/right in 
America,and De Geer in Sweden. During the Pleistocene 
period,the physical conditions in North America and Europe 
generally coincided. Glaciers,originating from three main 
sources, covered the whole of Canada and the north of the 
United States of America, with an ice sheet ranging from 
12QO-3000 metres thick. By measuring the cut-back on certain 
of the American waterfalls-taking their origin to be contempor­ 
aneous with the melting of the ice-cap, \7right reached an 
average figure which led him to set the birth of these falls- 
and consequently the close of the glacial period-at 
approximately ten "thousand years ago.
Baron de Geer made sn exhaustive study of the 
sediments laid down in Southern Sweden during the retreat of 
the last continental glacial of Scandinavia. "Every spring and 
summer, as the ice thawed, a great deal of sand and clay was
i. The A^e of the 3arth. London 1928.
set free and carried away in. suspension "by the numerous 
streams that flowed from the melting ice. The coarser 
material,on reaching the sea, settled down at once,"but the 
finest particles remained in suspension much longer. Then 
came the autumn and winter and the freezing of the streams. 
No further supply of sediment was received,and the load of 
fine mud slowly settled to the bottom,forming a film of clay, 
sharply distinguished from the coarser of sand below. The 
following year the ice again melted, and the front of the 
glacier retreated. Again two well marked seasonal layers 
were deposited. As the process continued year after year, 
the area ofl deposit moved northwards with the ice,and the
annual twin bands of sediment thus became superimposed upon
i 
one another like wedge shaped tiles on a roof."
These annual clay deposits indicated to the 
geologist what the annual rings on a tree indicate to the 
botanist, a method of measuring the passage of time. De Geer's 
work gave results closely approximating those of Bright, and 
they are generally accepted as exact over the limited period 
of evolutionary M.me involved. Hence it has been possible to
date with fair precision the various stages of human cultures
whose/
succession has been established.
i. Holmes. The Age of the Sarth. p.42
The corroborative findings of geology and palaeontology 
dispel any doubt that man existed in the pre-Glacial period. 
In 1909, J.Reid Moir, by his discovery of the rostro-carinate 
or 'beak-keeled 1 flints at Ipswich, made reasonably certain 
the existence of flint and fire-workers in the Pliocene reriod. 
Supported from the first by Sir Ray Lancaster, Moir's discoveries 
were not acknowledged by other workers. Time however,seems to 
tell in his favour. Osborne.once sceptical, now accepts Keid's 
conclusions. Boule is not convinced that the flints were 
not produced naturally. Keith, in accepting the evidence, 
declares,"we fehall now have to concede tha t e volutionary 
changes have moulded man during the Pleistocene period at a 
much more rapid pace than we have hitherto conceived possible." 
Osborne predicted the future discovery of 'large brained man 1 
in the Pliocene period, and Keith concludes his "Antiquity of 
Man " with these words. "There is not a single fact known to
me which makes the existence of a human form in the Miocene
i 
period an impossibility." Boule, while holding that the
evidence is not yet to hand, supports this declaration. "I 
am convinced that a being already in possession of the main 
physical, if not even psychical attributes of man muat have
existed somewhere during the Pliocene, and perhaps during
2 
the Miocene period."
i. vol.2, p.734. 2. Fossil Lan. p.45Q
N.B. Vulliamy and H.Warren are still sceptical about the 
rostro-carinates. o.f Man. Jan. 1929.
/ff
5t Tht Argument for Human Origin as a Mutational Departure.
This increasing tendency to antedate the 
antiquity of man as man is significant. For the further 
back he goes as man the more abrupt must have been his 
emergence from the protohuman stock. In this fact we 
see suggestive evidence for his mutational origin.
fthen then did man first appear on the 
scene as man? Nobody can say for certain. But it is 
generally agreed that suddenly, without any indication 
whence he came,or who were his ancestors, there appeared 
in Europe a type of man whose remains are now relatively 
well evidenced, and whose place in the human culture 
succession, though not in the human pedigree, is definitely 
established-Neanderthal Man. Neanderthal Man was succeeded 
and displaced by Homo Sapiens. But time succession did not 
involve evolutionary continuity, for although Homo Sapiens 
came after Homo Neanderthalensis he did not derive from him. 
Tith the appearance of Homo Sapiens, evolutionary history 
made one of its most significant forward leaps. This,as 
Elliot Smith points out is the truly significant incident in 
the history of man,not the break between the Palaeolithic 
and the Neolithic ages,but "when the more nimble^witted
Homo-Sapiens replaced the inferior type of Homo-Neanderthal-
i 
ensis", at the commencement of the Aurignacian period.
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i. Essays.p.94-5
The Cro-Magnons.
Most remarkable of these earliest representatives of 
modern man were the Cro-Magnons. Living some twenty five 
thousand years ago, they have left striking evidence of, •
their ancestry in the animal decorated walls of their 
caverns. Their manner of burial testifies that the hope 
which sprins eternal was not missing in them. The critical 
psychologist may see in their beautiful paintings but one 
more evidence of primitive sympathetic magic. We prefer to 
interpret this ancient artistry as man's first groping up 
the altar stairs to God.
In many respects they were the most perfect race 
physiaally of which we have any knowledge. Their men 
averaged over six feet in height-the skeleton^ of one old man 
is six feet four and a half inches. The womeia also were 
slightly afoove the average of today, The skull was very 
large, indicating a cranial capacity of about 1590 c.c. That 
of the modern European is about 1480oc.
It is seriously questioned if there has been any 
physical evolution since the first appearance of homo-sapiens. 
Indeed evolutionary theory is more and more inclined to 
recognise what Keith has called "the high antiquity of the
modern type of man, the extraordinary and unexpected conservancy
2 
of the type." This marked stability of the human species
is one of the recent significant generalisations of 
anthropology. Its significance is evident when we realise
1. c.f Baldwin Brown. The Art of the Cave Dweller. 
Luquet. The Art & Belifeien of Fossil Man.
2. Keith; The Antiquity of Man. vol.i. p. 265.
that if we were to omit the Neanderthal skull type ,together 
with a few fossil relics-none of which is allowed a 4&**et 
place in the direct ancestry of man-then the extreme differences 
"between the oldest fossil men and modern man are relatively 
oomm ensure able with the extremes exhibited by living races
today. 
Noandtrthal Man*
Neanderthal man, the predecessor in time but
not the ancestor in pedigree, of modern man, disappeared as 
abruptly as he came. Speculation as to his place in the 
pedigree of man has been interesting. The first thought that 
he might be a 'foundling 1 , an individual: monstrosity, was 
dispelled by the discovery of numerous skeletons. The great 
size of the skull, wi 1h an estimated volume of 1625 cc, the 
enormous bar across the eye region, the huge but chinless 
jaw,and the very low flattened head sloping back to the crown 
mark him out as an experiment rather than a freak of nature; 
but an experiment nevertheless doomed to extinction with the 
emergence of true man.
Neanderthal man passed through the crises of 
the interglacial period and was driven by the rigours of the 
ice age to adopt an almost exclusive cave habitat. It has been 
suggested that he might then represent a degenerate species 
of man, his physical peculiarities conditioned by overspecialis- 
ation in a kind of life that has been known to produce 
degeneracy in other forms. Others again, impressed by the
'*/
ameliorating conditions of civilisation, which,by succouring 
the weakly specimens of humanity hagfeprotected them against 
the weeding out of natural selection, have thrown out the 
suggestion that th* gegeneracy is not in Neanderthal man but 
in modern man himself. On this basis the appearance of the 
big brain in primitive forms would find a possible explanation.
Bpinion,however, is generally agreed in this, 
that Neanderthal man belongs to some other species than homo-
sapiens. A separate and peculiar species, associated exclusively
i 
with the Mousttrian type of culture, physically a sort of
"neer-do-well", he disappeared as abruptly as he came. "No
modern ethnological group can be considered a descendant of
2 
Neanderthal man." Big brained-ness, never at any time
an infallible indication of genius, was in his case not 
conjoined with the qualitative factors necessary for survival. 
"His small pre-frental region is sufficient reason for his 
failure in the competition wi 1h the rest of mankind". A 
humanoid cul-de-sac, nature in him refused to stand up and 
say,"behold a man."
1. The fact that to date tjiere is no evidence of art in the 
Mousterian eulture is one more confirmation of the 
significant'break 'be twe en Mousterian and Aurignacian cultures.
2. Boule ; Fossil Man. p.245.
3. Elliot Smith. Essays, p.41.
Beyond Neanderthal man, the story of huijan 
antiquity is tut fragmentarily suggested by a few brittle 
and fossilised pages which have managed to survive the 
passing of the years. 'v7e proceed now to turn back some of 
these significant pages in the book of eternity, to see if 
they will yield us any thing of value for our conception of 
the worth of man.
Pithecanthropus*
In 1891, there were discovered in Java,
certain fragmentary remains round the interpretation of which 
scientific disagreement still moves. In more remote times, 
when the prophet cs£ Ezekiel stood contemplating the valley of
dry bones, he was asked "Son of man, can tr-ese bones live?"
i 
Ezekiel replied, "0 Lord God thouknowest". One feels inclined
to repeat the words of Ezekiel in connection with the bones 
of 'pithecanthropus' , for they certainly have lived! The 
various interpretations suggested from time to time furnish 
excellent evidence for a study in the degree of subjectivity 
involved in fact finding. The circumstances surrounding the 
finding of the remains ha^had much to do with the conflict­ 
ing classifications. The relics consist of a skull-cap, a 
femur and two teeth. One of the teeth was discovered in Sept. 
1891; the skull-cap was unearthed about a month later, a yard
away from the tooth; a year later, the legbone was discovered 
50 feet away from the skull; later on a second tooth T.vas 
i. Ezekiel. 37; 3. " """
/Sf
discovered fifteen feet from the skull. It was a long time 
before their discoverer, Dr Dubois, consented to release 
these valuable fragments for international expert examination. 
It is not yet agreed that they all belong to the same creature.
In the largest anthropoids, cranial capacity rarely 
exceeds 600 cc. In normal man, it seldom falls below lOOOo.c. 
The cranial capacity pf "Pithecanthropus" is estimated at 855 cc, 
The average European is 1480 cc. The fernur of "Pithecanthropus" 
is about double the weight of the femur of a modern man of 
corresponding size, and it betokens an upright posture for 
the original. Gregory has declared the teeth to be definitely 
simian.
The find has proved a rare "bag-o 1 bones". The 
discoverer claimed for "Pithecanthropus" the rank of a direct 
missing link between man and the apes, regarding it as a 
direct ancestor of man. Boule considered the remains to be 
those of a giant ape, related to the gibbons, a conclusion 
supported by Smith Woodward, who suggested that man himself
lived in Java, contemporaneous with "Pithecanthropus 11 ! the
i 
latter being a "gigantic and precocious gibbon". Osborne
believes "we have finally determined that it probably 
represents a condition of arrested mental development, but 
thst it belongs to the family of man and not to the ape family., 
a dawn-roan rather than an ape-man." This is typical of the 
attitude of Osborne who is moving more and more away from 
the "myth of our ape-ancestr y".
1. Elliot Smith. Essays, p. 59
2. Boule Fossil Man. p. 108.
Elliot Smith classified the skull of "Pithecanthropus" 
as belonging to the "earliest known member of the human 
family". This assessment may require to be modified in 
connection with the more recent discoveries of "Sinanthropus". 
Elliot Smith is also interested in the fact that the 
endocranial cast of "Pithecanthropus" reveals "a special 
erpansion"of that area in the temporal region of the brain 
associated with the distinctively human faculty of speech. 
This, to quote the words of the famous anthropologist, can 
hare only one meaning, "there was a sudden expansion of the
acoustic territory for the appreciation of some sort of
i 
speech." This, to us is an interesting conclusion,
suggesting further evidence of the presence of the mutational 
development of the humanward characteristics. We have no way 
of estimating what degree of abruptness ought to be read into 
the words of the anthropologist, but frequent analogous 
expressions throughout his "Essays", suggest that he is 
strongly impressed by this sudden emergence, preparatory for 
the human faculty of speech. "Pithecanthropus" however 
cannot be regarded as a possible "jumping off" place for 
later true man since a direct place in the line of human 
ancestry is not conceded to him. He might prove to be merely
"a degenerate descendant of a more primitive weaponless form,
2 
such as 'sinanthropus' seems to be."
i. Essays, p. 150. 2 Significance of the Peking Man. p. 6
Heidelberg Man.
The Heidelberg man, named from the jaw 
fragment found at Mauer,in Germany, in 1908, dates back 
to the dawn of the Quaternary period, that is, before the 
time of Aurignaoian man. The heavy jaw lacks the chin 
development typical of true man. The teeth, if isolated
from the jaw, mi$it be attributed to a man "not differing
i 
in any important character from certain races of homo sapiens."
The form of the dental arches, according to Keith, are 
prophetic of Neanderthal man, not modern man. In consensus 
with the general opinion, Keith rules out both Heidelberg and 
Neanderthal man from the direct line of modern descent, 
suggesting that the teeth of Heidelberg man indicate a 
"specialisation for rough herbivorous diet", a "departure from 
tht trend towards homo-sapiens", possibly towards Neanderthal 
man. Boule concludes that the creation of a special genus
o cL
for both Heidelberg man and Neanderthal man is in order* He 
significantly adds that "unilateral series appear to us more 
and more rare".
Eoanthropus: iriltdown man
Fresh stir was raised in 1912, by the discovery 
of the Dawn-Man, Eoanthropus, at Piltdown in Sussex. It 
seemed that at last there had been unearthed a genuine form 
intermediate between man and the anthropoids. Unfortunately, 
dogmatic pronouncement and exact reconstruction is precluded 
the fragmented condition of the skull. Only parts of it
*• Fossil Man . p.447. 2. ibid. p.448.
were recovered,and the fragmentary remains of Piltdown man 
wwre scattered, as in the case of the Javan relics,some yards 
apart. The first reconstructions of the relics T oonsisting of 
3 teeth, a few fragments of skull bones and a portion of jaw 
which was unattached to the skull T made Piltdown man into a 
very apft-like creature. Later reconstructions,varying about 
the missing important parts of the brain case,have moved 
between a form extremely like modern man and the opposite 
exteeme of anthropoid form. The general trend however has 
been towards the human.
The unattached jaw is simian in character.
Boule held that'it is still permissible to suppose that the 
Piltdown skull and lower jaw may have belonged to tv/o different 
creatures", although he is not dogmatic on this point. Osborne, 
swayed by the discovery of later fragments in 1915,admits the 
affinity of the jaw and skull fragments. The molar teeth are 
declared to be definitely human. In 1928, at the Chou Kou Tien 
cave near Peking, there were discovered mandibles with an ape­ 
like conformation of the chin region, associated with fragments 
of human brain cases of 'sinanthropus 1 • These mandibles are 
generally, though not generioally, related to the Piltdown jaw 
and on the reasonable assumption that the 'sinanthropus 1 
ffagments belong together,it is legitimate to infer that the 
Piltdown jaw and skull likewise belong together.
Estima/tes of the brain capacity of Piltdown 
man have varied all the way ffom 1070 to 1500 according to 
the bias of the reconstructor. It has been finally placed at 
124C by Elliot Smith. The skull itself is now held to be 
much too like that of modern man for the title of Dawn-Man to 
be anything more than a 'convenient label'. Piltdown man is 
not in any sense a link between man and the anthropoids.Keith 
has concluded that he is 'little if any the inferior of the 
modern "Australian'—whose estimated cranial capacity is 1250*£<
Rhode si an Man.
The Broken Hill Mine in Ifoodesia yielded
valuable tribute in 1921. No very certain date is yet assigned 
to Rhodesian man, the remains being improperly mineralised 
owing to the presence of certain salts and lead, and to the 
fact that that the geological associations of other local finds 
are not yet definitely established.
The Ehcdesian skull is very striking, with
the enormously developed eye ridges of the primitive type, and 
in addition a greatly enlarged face region. This fossil skull 
exhibits affinities with Neanderthal man, but according to 
Keith, Hhodesian man is on the whole much closer to the modern 
type, branching off from the main stem at a later date than 
the Neanderthal stock. His estimated cranial capacity is 1280. 
But his divergences from modern man are too great to admit him
//f
as a fortrunner, Tht 1 skeletal excrescences 1 manifested in
the heavy eye ricfges and the specialised enlarged face betray
i 
the owner as one of a race which has run its course.
Ehodeeian man is admittedly but another humanoid cul-de-sac 
who gave rise to no higher stock. The way of the specialist 
is hard.
Sinanthropus.
Within the last few years,most important discoveries 
in connection with fossil man have been made in China,near 
Peking. The discovery is the climax of a long systematic 
search,spread over many years by international experts. The 
finding of two teeth,in material excavated from the now famous 
Chou £ou Tien cave, some years prior to the main discovery, 
prepared the way for it. The evidence converged upon the 
conclusion that in Eastern Asia, towards the close of the 
Tertiary period,or the beginning of the Quaternary,there 
existed either man or a closely allied anthropoid type. This 
would coincide with Pithecanthropus in Java,and Piltdown man 
in southern England. A little later , Heidelberg man would be 
in the vicinity of Mauer in Germany.
Further discoveries of teeth and mandibles and 
fragments of brain cases were overshadowed by the great 
discovery of December 1929-an uncrushed and almost complete skull. 
This was supplemented the following July by the reconstruction
i« Science Progress. Vol.xvi. p.576.
//s
of a partial skull from fragments discovered , thus affording 
valuable data for comparison. The first skull is possibly that 
of a male, the latter that of a female, "both being of the age 
corresponding to a modern eig&teen year old.
Professor Elliot Smith, whom the writer was
privileged to hear lecture on this discovery, after the famous 
anthropologist's return from'a period of ancestor-v/orship' in 
China, regards the find as "the most significant and 
illuminating relic of primitive man ever discovered." The 
unorushed brain case permits deductions feee from the doubt 
which naturally gathers around;'reconstructions' • 
, The skull of 'Sinanthropus 1 is interesting in 
its affinities as well as in its uniqueness. With 'Pithecanthrop­ 
us 1 it sha-res the extremely heavy eye ridges belonging to the 
very primitive type. With'Pi It down man' i* shares an extremely
thick cranium,whose presence in primitive fbrms is still a
us
puzzle to the anthropologist. On the other hand, "Pitheoanthrop- 
has a relatively thin skull, while in 'Piltdown man' the heavy 
eye-ridges are missing. In addition, the Peking skull exhibits ; 
features unknown to these other two, such as the 'peculiar 
form of the ma-s to id region of the temporal bone." The year 
before the finding of the complete skull, portions of two lower 
jaws,and brain ffagments, were found. The chin region of the jaws 
is held to resemble gene rally-though not generic ally-the ape-like
condition in Piltdown man. Davidson Black has shown that 
'the condyloid fossa for articulation with the mandible 
presents a very close resemblance to the condition found 
in modern man, in size,depth and direction 1 . Ehodesian and 
Neanderthal man have attained marked divergence in this 
respect,
The conjunction of ape-like jaw and human brain 
does not of course vitiate the essentially humanoid character 
of 'Sinanthropus'. Indeed Elliot Smith hails the 'Man of Sin 1 , 
as one more c-orroboration of the fact that 'in the evolution 
of man the growth of the brain preceded the transformation of 
the face and body. The cerebral cortex acquired functions
distinctive of the human status at a time when the organism
i 
as a whole still retained many simiajji characters."
From its general skull controur, "Sinanthropus" is 
tentatively regarded as intermediate between 'Pithecanthropus' 
and Piltdown man, but more primitive and generalised than either 
of them. But it is humanoid, not anthropoid, and this 'most 
significant relic of primitive man' shares that degree of 
large brainedness which separates even the most primitive 
humanoid form from the most highly developed anthropoid.
i. Significance of the Peking Man. p.5-
Factors Suggesting Mutational Origin of Man*
Such in brief are the main facts concerning 
man's origins, to be gleaned from the dusty pages of pre­ 
history. TVhen we come to assess their significance for our 
conception of human worth we find a very interesting situation 
In the first place, it must be confessed that thearfTossil 
witnesses to man's history in the evolutionary series are 
extremely fragmentary, one might almost say precariously so, 
and of course barred by the very limitations of their 
fragmentary nature from dogmatising as to the quality of the 
total life character of the creatures whose remains they 
are. When everything that must be allowed has been allowed 
to human expertness in reading the signs of the times, it 
must also be remembered that isolated teeth -aid jaws and 
skulls, highly significant though they may be to the 
anthropologist,are not infallible guides to the interpretat­ 
ion of the kind of life that once functioned in these earthly 
mansions; more so is this to be remembered when we ponder 
the full implications of Elliot Smith's caution that the 
cerebral cortex acquired its distinctively human functions 
in advance of the appearance of the human form in face and 
body. This is anthropology's latest testimony to the 
intuition of religion in its assessment of man's worth, that 
the body is more than meat and the life more than raiment.
/I
It has also been driven home with increasing emphasis that 
the antiquity of man as man goes back very much farther than 
was previously thought possible. We have seen Keith close his 
survey of evolutionary history with the statement that "there 
is not a single fact known to me which makes the existence of 
a human form in the Miocene period an impossibility",and 
Osborne predict the ftiture discovery of'big-brained Pliocene 
man. Bach new discovery compels the anthropologist to turn 
back the hands of the geological time-piece. Man as man is 
incredibly ancient.
Here then is food for thought. The more we go back into 
the evolutionary history of man as man, the further he goes 
back into geologic time. How thd farther he goes back, the 
more compelling looms up the thought of his abrupt emergence 
in the evolutionsry series-and the type has manifested to 
, date a remarkable stability.
True man appears suddenly down the corridors of time, 
distinct from and unique among the humanoid forms whose 
respective specialisations have canalised their human 
potentialities into the rut of annihilation or degeneration. 
When he appears, he is as distinctly human as he is today. 
The tendency to antedate his emergence strengthens the idea 
of his mutational origin
Let us swiftly survey the course. Anthropology is 
unanimous in recognising an extremely early separation of 
the primitive types which moved in the one case apewards
and in the other ease human wards. There is no cross-over
i 
creature. Keith places the separation in pre-Miocene times.
Dr. Pilgrim has shown that during the Miocene period the 
Asiatic anthropoids were diverging in all directions,including 
"sivapithecus" and "dryopithecus". But "the Miocene anthropoid
apes offer us no form which can serve as a probable human
£ 
ancestor." We have also noted Wood Jones 1 resolute argument
for a complete rejection of the anthropoids from the human 
pedigree.
Sir Ray Lancaster has pointed out that in Miocene 
times-when the significant manward departure may have been 
established-the re was a great increase of brain in several 
other mamrals, such as the elephants. Nature was evidently 
being stimulated-by what environmental pressure we cannot now 
say-to experiment with the "tendency to big-brainedness" ;she 
was even then pregnant with the potency of future man,but her 
tine of delivery was not yet fully come.
Keith has said that"the ancestors of the big-brained 
races of fossil man need not necessarily have had a big-brained
coirmon ancestor; all we need to suppose is that in the stock
3 
there was a tendency towards big-brainedness»" We suggest then
that the records of fossil man are cul-de-sac types,abortions in
i. Antiquity of Man. p.733 2. ibid p.730 
3. ibid, vol.i. p.xvii.
nature's labour to give birth to true man. For the most part, 
they failed to establish themselves,being sidetracked into 
various specialisations,at the cost of extinction. Yet side­ 
tracks though they be,these abortive types share with true man 
a common denominator,found in big-brainedness, the characteris­ 
tic par excellence of the hu$anward stock f which was seeking 
expression and finally achieved in homo sapiens* The leap into 
big-brainedness is the mutation which seals man's break with 
his sub-human progenitors.
Recent discoveries of such forms as the Bo scop, 
ffadjak and Talgai types,point to the fact that at some early 
stage in the evolutionary development of man,there was a period 
wh en the stock was "phylogenetically rioting", diverging-might 
we suggest mutating-in many directions, most of the resultant 
types failing to establish themselves. "It is by no means 
essential to consider that every known type of early man
represents a stage in the evolution of man as we know him
i 
today."
What degree of abruptness may be read into these 
divergences remains to be seen, but nature is full of paradoxes, 
surprising us by the swiftness of her leaps as well as by the 
slow piling up of infinitesimally small differences.
Uature can leap when she has to. Elliot Smith 
point* out that after the negro had separated from the main
i. Man's Place among the Mammals, p.362.
stem of the human family the amount of pigment in the skin
»
underwent a 'sudden 1 and very marked reduction. We have 
already noted his interest in the 'sudden expansion'of the 
acoustio territory for the appreciation of speech in 
'Pithecanthropus'. Even the anthropologist is impressed "by 
the swiftness of some of nature's moves.
The tempo of evolutionary development is
plentifully staccatoed with critical moments when the smooth 
flowing rhythm of leisurely advance is quickened into newness 
of life. It was the belief of W.H.It.Rivers that there was 
a sudden leap forward at the "birth of intelligence. Instinct 
and intelligence were held to connected with separate parts
of the "brain, and at some definite period, intelligence
2 
suddenly appeared, and was grafted on to instinct. Romanes
stressed the same abrupt emergence, "a critical moment when 
the soul first detaches itself from the nutrient body of its
parent perceptions,and wakes up in the new world of a
3 
consciously individual existence."
1. Essays, p. 24
2. G.B.Dibblee in "Instinct & Intuition" gives an interesting 
account of the work of Rivers.
3. Mental Evolution in llan. p.208.
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Professor John Dewey, who has completely assimilated
the philosophy of evolution in his educational work, builds 
upon the thesis that thinking takes its departure from 
specific conflicts in experience which occasion perplexity 
and doubt. Ideas, meanings, and conceptions are merely 
instruments to an active organisation of the given environ­ 
ment. The train is primarily an organ of "behaviour; reason 
"begins not so much with premises as wilh problems,and is 
successful insofar as it disposes of the problem. Bergson 
also maintained that reason was an adaptive organ developed 
'ad hoc' for the convenient handling of environmental situat­ 
ions, an instrument for coping wi th reality.
Our own suggestion is tfcat the 'inherent tendency 
to big brainedness 1 which finally eventuated in man was 
spurred into speed at some critical moment in evolutionary 
development. The relatively swift geological changes in 
early times would play their part in providing penetrating 
environmental problems for the developing life. If we are 
compelled to be specific,suggestions of such environmental 
perplexity are not wanting in the disturbing conditions that 
prevailed in the oncoming ice age. The life surge in nature 
and creature,threatened with annihilation in the problem of
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1. Dewey's philosophy is test accessible in the following. 
Creative Intelligence. 1917. 
Reconstruction in Philosophy.1920 
Human Nature and Conduct 1922.
"Essays in Experimental Logic'1916 gives a good statement 
of the'instrumental' view of mind,
of a new environme nt,was obliged to make a swift and new 
alignment of its forces. The slow piling up of chance 
variations would nojfc "be of much avail for ensuring survival 
of the kind of life that was being preserved in the proto- 
huraan s took. Preserving the primitive plasticity of the 
biological drive-and this original plasticity in early times 
would be enhanced over present day conditions so that mutation 
on a larger scale is quite conceivable- urged on by the 
inherent tendency towards higher survival, the ancestor of 
man literally rose to the occasion, discovered in the stress 
of the situation a successful adaptation, and man was born. 
His ability to cope speedily with difficulties on a higher 
level than the strictly biological guaranteed his fitness to 
survive. His anthropid contemporaries, lacking that specific 
inherent psychic integration which has singled cut man for 
distinction,specialised along other lines, or perished. Man's 
humanoid prototypes, competitors it might be in the struggle 
for existence, are grim witnesses to nature's determination 
to save at all costs her valuable progeny. But they are seen 
now for what they are, abortive experimental efforts to give 
birth at all costs to the lab our ings of the 'big-brained 1 
tendency; or they may be baxckward surges of a mutant type 
not yet sufficiently rooted and grounded in the biological 
situation. "After many experimental types of the human family
'7?
had occupied the world for thousands of years,the genus 
homo emerged,and in course of time gave birth to several 
species. Eventually one of the species attained exceptional
skill and intelligence and acquired the cunning and wit to
i 
surpass all its fellows and to supplant them completely".
After many miscarriages,nature could stand 
up and say "eooe homo sapiensi "
We have never seen any correlation worked 
out between the survival ages of the various hurnanoid 
fossils and their respective positions in the evolutionary 
scale. It would not be surprising to find that there was a 
progressive increase of age span from bottom to top. 
Significantly enough the remains of the most generalised 
type yet discovered,'sinanthropus', correspond to a modern 
18a year olft pair. In the same cave there were also 
discovered a brain fragment judged from its thinness to 
represent that of a child. Why should 'sinanthropus 1 have 
perished at such an early stage of life? ^7as the upward 
surging life of man unable in the first experimental output 
to combine longevity with swift new adaptation? The anthropoicj 
reaches its brain maturity in a mere two years; the humanoids 
extended the time span increasingly-life e spurts out of a 
hose under increasing pressure-until in homo sapiens it 
reached its destined expression. Eventually when sufficient
i. Elliot Smith jlBJBxy*. Hum an History, p.68
progress had "been made towards longevity, a new criterion of 
survival emerged. Extension was overlaid with intensity.nature
made a new leap from the physical over into the spiritual.
Pis continuity3S In seeking to ground the nature of man as a 
flaturt*
strictly new departure on mutational "basis-and thus to discover 
even in his origins evidence of his worth-we are not doing 
violence to a method of development which is seen more and more 
to have a significant place in the whole economy of nature,
"It is my "belief" declares Lloyd Morgan,"that 
in the "broad domain of nature, from "bottom to top, natural leaps
are many, so many that I have ventured on occasion to speak of
i 
the advance of nature as fundamentally jumpy." Again,"what is
essential to the idea of evolution is upward passage,by 
progressive steps-some times very little s teps-sometimes "big 
jumps-along definite recognisable lines of advance,with contin­ 
uity of progress from lower to higher. And of evolution in this
sense there is evidence in molecules, in organisms,and in social
2 
institutions."
It is one of the modern mysteries of physics
that an eleetron,which is swinging round a nucleus in a definite 
orbit and in a perfestly uniform manner, may suffer a sudden jump 
from that orbit to another, emit a quantum of energy,and then 
pursue its new orbit once more wi th complete uniformity. We are 
reminded also by Whitehead that 'it is well to remember that the
1. Evolution in the Light cf Modern Knowledge, p.108.
2. Creation by Evolution. p.343.
modern quantum theory, .is only the latest of a well marked 
character of nature." The basal surge of life seems to be of 
such a kind that we oannot be sure that any new product of a 
developing series will not express itself in characters of 
which its antecedents give no sign. And the new characters 
are just those which give meaning and significance to the 
whole antecedent development.
A familiar illustration of ' jumpiness ' is the emergence
of th* new qualities in the case of the chemical compound H 0,
2 
in which hydrogen and oxygen combine under certain conditions,
and in certain proportions to form a liquid emergent,water,this 
emergent exhibiting very different properties from those of 
either of its gaseous components.
Water in its turn, maintains its specific nature as 
water inside the temperature series between freezing and boiling, 
But as soon as these critical stages are reached,again a new 
alignment takes place,in the resultant ice or steam,these again 
being charaoterised by qualitative differences which could not 
bt deduced before they had actually emerged.
The characteristic behaviour of the new whole is not 
derivable from the most complete knowledge of the behaviour of 
its components,taken separately or in other combinations. 
Knowledge,for instance,of the properties of sodium or chlorine, 
by themselves or of any of their respective compounds,will not
reveal the properties which emerge with common salt. The new 
phenomenon must emerge as itself before it can be fully 
evaluated. The emergence may have to be taken as an 
unanalysable datum of experience, but its significance can be 
estimated only in terms of the forward movement cf life,and in 
terms of its own distinctive wholeness and originality, not in 
terms of antecedents*
Hence, just as we recognise in physics and in chemistry 
the presence of 'incremental lifts' where alterations of 
quantity suddenly involve alterations in quality, so too with 
living organisms the persistent'overcharging' of experience- 
in which the vitalising features of environment play their own 
part-may lead to sudden qualitative changes. It is significant 
for our thesis that this is the case in the development of the 
nervous system. "T7e see a succession of steps,rathiar than a 
gradual advance, and at each step a fundamental change suddenly 
appears. mutation-like in its character • .each step is a new
phase in organisation, but not necessarily a change in the kind
i 
of materials involved."
It would seem then,as if all along the ascent 
of life, the continuity hitherto demanded by science and 
philosophy were broken by sudden leaps into newness of life.
"Continuity of process, and the emergence cf real di inferences-
2 
these are the twin aspects of the cosmic process."
1. G.H.farker. in "The Evolution of Man" Lull et al. p.102
2. Pringle-Pattison The Idea of God. p.103.
To sum up then,our belief is that an analogous
i 
condition may Toe argued to explain man himself, for whose
emergence on a mutational "basis we have contended. We are 
not vitiating the principle of continuity in maintaining 
that development has "beon made creatively progressive by 
new and abrupt starts from time to time, and in further 
claiming that each new departure carries within its own 
genius the norm of its own interpretation.
It is fully agreed that the line of man's pedigree 
goes far baok into the distant dimness of antiquity, 
traversing it may be the common stem of primitive life. But 
it is also maintained that the worth of a man is not 
analysable into the so-called brute factors of his inheritance.
With the new synthesis which established itself as 
man-a synthesis in which the mental functioning pushed ahead 
of the bodily medium-came the cross over into the new 
possibilities of the fuller and more abundant life. The 
essence of the new synthesis was self-consciousness, in some 
degree of articulatene ss. In this core of self-consciousness 
was buried the potent seed of the moral conscience, unique 
in man,but requiring to be progressively expanded and nourished 
through the new opportunity afforded by communal intercourse.
Arising out of stress and struggle and perplexity, 
accompanying the self -consciousness which emerged in the 
struggle for biological survival, it is but 'natural' that 
the moral consciousness itself should necessarily be developed 
through conflict and crisis.
'77
In our opinion, the spontaneity of the organism is not 
violated "by the presence of a mutational element, which to 
some,suggests that a sort of biological necessity has been 
imposed into the scheme of things. In all experience there 
is necessity as well as freedom, an element of givenness 
within which the organism retains its autonomy of expression 
and aotion. Somehow, behind all evolutionary development 
there must be the strictly eternal, the objective background 
in cooperation with which all things are made new.
fieligious experience,in judging the worth of a man, 
makes full confession of this objective background when it 
declares that in God man lives and moves and has his being. 
Every feature of experience includes more than its local 
expression; every event is an actuality by reason of its 
affinity with The Event^every moment has dynamic time 
significance because of its ultimate inseparability from 
the Sternal.
The appearance of the genuinely new is i-tesi-f a sign 
that the heart of the developing process of nature is itself 
pulsating with life. The human organism is in touch with 
a God of the living, not a God of the dead. It accepts from 
the process as well as contributes towards it, and within 
the wider sphere of God's environing,it develops its creaturely 
freedom. The summum bonurn of survival fitness is the expenditure 
of the maximum of freedom and efficiency in relation to the 
divine necessity, operating in and throu^i the social milieu.
SECTION THREE
1. Evolutionary Psychology and Human Values*
Our investigation of evolutionary origins has furnished 
us with a valuable principle of interpretation,namely that each 
new departure,and more particularly the new departure which 
eventuated in the distinctly human, carries within itself the 
key to the riddle of its own nature.
Pope was right when he declared that "the proper study 
of mankind is man". Anthropology is an indispensible propaedeutic 
to perspective, "but history must always cooperate with psychology, 
sine* the creative resultants of time's forward match are living 
organisms functioning as active life-wholes,constantly in touch 
with a dynamic environment.
We hope to arrive at the conclusion that even psychology 
has to be supplemented by richer categories where the worth of 
man is concerned. We proceed therefore,to an examination of 
the implications of evolutionary psychology for the Christian 
doctrine of human worth.
Modern psychology strikes its roots deep into the period 
of enlightenment which mar&s the emergence of the spirit of man 
from the intellectual thraldom of mediaevalism.The subservience 
of life,marked by humility, and allegiance to external authority, 
coupled with a conviction of the unimportance of the present 
moment,gave way to a sense of the worth and dignity of 
human life, and a recognition of man's independence.
In every realm of experience, institutionalism surrendered 
to individualism; 'natural rights' were exploited to the 
limit and human reason became the final court of apreal. 
Bacon* To Francis Bacon this forward movement owes 
much of its initial impulse. His reaction against the 
speculative methods of classical inquiry impelled him to 
the method of objective induction. Protagoras had long 
before claimed that man was the measure of all things ;Bacon 
now retorted that on the contrary 'all the perceptions,both 
of the senses and the mind,bear reference to man, and not to 
the universe, and the human mind resembles those uneven mirrors 
which impart their own properties to different ob jects. • .and
•
distort and disfigure them." Obviously then,before man 
could aspire to the truth that would set him free there was 
required a tearing down of these 'idols' of the mind which 
keep men from discovering the truth; inquiry must begin with 
impressions and not with fantasies.
To this expurgation of the human intellect 
the Hovum G»rgan0m was dedicated. The method of objective 
induction, intended to set science free from the idolatry of 
anthropomorphism, was initiated; it seems not unfair to say 
that the most far reaching result of the new method was that 
beginning of the overvaluation of method and undervaluation 
of personality v/hich is running itself to seed in the present
day.
Kov. Org. i. 41. " """"
Look* •
In philosophy it was Descartes who initiated the
rationalism which declared that truth was to "be known only 
"by its clearness and distinctness. In psychology it was John 
Looke who applied the inductive tests and methods of Bacon. 
In Looke's 'Essay on Human Understanding 1 , reason for the 
first time in modern thought turned round and had a ^ood look 
at itself. The result of Hi is self-criticism was not very 
complimentary,
For long it had "been considered as axiomatic in 
religious thinking that the mind of man at birth was endowed 
with innate ideas of right and wrong, of God and immortality, 
which ante-dated all experience. Locke,however, in his review 
of rea-son,maintained that "there is nothing in the mind which 
was not first in the senses". Far from the mind being endowed 
with innate ideas which guaranteed its integrity, it is at 
"birth nothing more than a "tabula rasa", a clean slate, on 7/hich 
sense experience writes its messages; eventually memory is born 
of sensation, and ideas of memory.
For religion, the startling conclusion of the Lockian 
psychology seemed to be that only material things could affect 
the senses; hence knowledge is ultimately sensation. If sensations 
are the substance of thought, then apparently matter is the stuff 
of mind. That is to say, we are confronted by the interesting 
circumstance of modern psychologising taking its rise in a 
theory of knowledge which endeavoured to part company
with the psyche it started out to investigate.'
Berkeley hastened to rescue religious values
1£.
^Tom this materialistic impasse, by declaring triumphantly that 
matter itself existed only as a form of mind. But the Irish 
Bishop Berkeley fell a logical prey to the Scotch sceptic Hume, 
who ingested Berkeley's'mind' just as effectively as Berkeley 
had a/ssimilated Locke's'matter.' When Hume was through,neither 
matter nor mind was left; all we have is separate ideas and 
memories and feelings, their'unity' accounted for on the 
principle of 'association of ideas'. There is no observable 
soul behind the processes of thought.
* It is scarcely to be wondered that some wit 
summed up the debate with the bon-rnot, 'no matter,never mind." 
gant. Kant, startled out of his'dogmatic slumber' by 
this attack op the integrity of the human reason,challenged this 
psychology in the opening sentences of his 'Critique of Pure
Reason'. "Exp erie nee (sense') is by no means the only field to
i 
which our understanding can be confined." To the Humian
assertion that 'what we call mind is nothing but a heap or 
collection of different perceptions,united together by certain 
relations,and supposedly,though falsely endowed with a perfect 
simplicity and identity", he opposed the contention that the 
mind of man is neither a passive wax on which sensation writes 
its whimsical will, nor a mere abstract name for a series of
1. Mflller's trans. Iritrc. p.i.
2. Treatise. Bk. i. pt.iv. Green & Grose ed. p.495.
mental states; the mind is an active organ which moulds and 
coordinates sensations into ideas,and transforms the chaotic 
manifold of experience into the ordered unity of thought. 
Sensations have unity with reference to the self vfoich unifies 
them in accordance with the categories of understanding. Locke 
was wrond in holding that there was nothing in the mind which 
was not first of all in the senses. Leibnitz spoke the truth 
1*1 en he fcd.ded, 'nothing but the intellect itself'.Per 'percepts 
without concepts are blind 1 and it is the 'understanding 7/hich 
makes nature. f
Hume might well have smiled however,had he been 
able to see the final result of Kant's analysis of pure reason. 
For all the world and the nature we can know according to 
Kant's reason resolve into phenomenal appearance only, not 
the real thing. Moreover vfoen reason tries to spread its wings 
and essay a flight into reality, it becomes entangled in the 
web of the antinomies,and falls back helpless. Kant had saved 
the mind of man, but had sacrificed the reality of his world, 
the reality of God, and the reality of freedom and immortality. 
Reason could never affirm these realities.
Kant's escape from this apparent scepticism of 
pure reason lay in confirming through the practical reason 
the innate moral convictions of truths which could not be 
rationally apyr eh ended : in the a priori absolute moral sense
and the autonomy of the categorical imperative we have a 
foundation of faith which cannot be overthrown.
Kant's refutation of the Hurnian scepticism was 
boomerang-like in its effect. His phenomenology of nature 
gave hostages to the agnosticism which worked itself out 
through Comte and Spencer. Yet there was a much more serious 
consequence of the claim that the real world of nature was 
not necessarily connected with mind or understanding. It 
"became the fashion in science to treat nature in a thorough­ 
going'objective 1 way, ruling out of court any 'intelligent' 
interpretation of what might seem at first sight to be 
teleological adaptations in nature. Nature became a vast 
machine rather than a living organism: hence it was logical 
to rule out creaturely striving as a scientific category.
I7e have already noted the vindication of creaturely 
agency through the philosophy of James Ward. I7e are content 
to leave to other branches of present.day science the 
rehabilitation of nature in terms of what can be construed 
only as some analogue of immaniental mind and spirit.
Behind the reasoning from Descartes to Kant there 
lay the assumption of a 'finished world as an independent fact, 
and an equally independent knower 1 . On this basis it was 
possible to preserve a certain integrity for human values in
spite of whatever interpretation was set upon the natural 
world. Human values were not necessarily grounded in natural 
values. Man and nature had only a nodding acquaintance,not a 
real kinship.
But the developmental psychology was steadily 
gaining ground, leading to the inescapable conclusion that 
man was organic to the whole process of life, not an 'ab extra' 
insertion into it. Kant had argued strongly for the moral 
uniqueness of the human spirit. Yet in 1798, in his 'Anthropology/ 
he had suggested the possible animal origin of man, arguing,- 
after the fashion of Anaximander- that if the human infant 
had cried as loudly in primitive times as it did at present, 
it could never have survived the attraction of wild "beasts; 
hence man must at one time have "been different from his present 
condition. "How nature brought about such a development, .we know 
not..this suggests, .whether the present period of history, .may 
not be followed by a third,when an orarig-outan or a chir.roanzee 
would develop the organs which serve for walking,touching, 
speaking, into the articulated structure of a human being,with 
a central organ for the use of understanding, and gradually 
advance under the training of social institutions."
This hypothetical reasoning into the 
future, to avoid the implications of a direct statement is
but one more indication that the eighteenth century was 
scarcely ready for a direct statement as to the evolutionary
origin of man.
g Evolution Rtlattd to Human Yalu«s»
—""""'"——————All restraint,hOWeVef , was thrown aside half a
century later. By the middle of the nineteenth century,in 1858, 
the papers of Darwin and Wallace were read "before the Linnaean 
Society. The following year, the theological framework crashed 
undwr the pressure of the 'Origin of Species'. Evolutionary 
psychology suggested irresistibly that the theory of an a 
priori innate moral sense in man had to give way before a 
concept of duty which V7as simply a social deposit in the 
individual. Conscience was acquired, not implanted; the 
moral self was not a creation by divine fiat but the latest 
product of a leisurely evolution. Man,at the last, was simply 
a 'sophisticated brute 1 .
The work of Darwin and Wallace convinced thought­ 
ful people that there had been a gradual evolution of animal 
forms. Spencer had already advanced a philosophy which 
included the evolution of mind. Wallace refused to go to this 
conclusion. His reasons for differing with Darwin here are 
still worth considering in any discussion of the evolution 
of the mind.
What was not seen at the time was that the
fundamental problem to be reckoned with was not the fact that 
the human mind and personality had a genetic history,but that
/s?
the processes of evolution were such as to be able to 
eventuate in man's moral and religious personality.Man's 
affinity with nature, as we see it now, need not lower the 
dignity of man; what it ought to do is to compel us to 
evaluate more profoundly the process that has produced him. 
The end result of evolutionary interpretation is not a 
naturalised spirit but a spiritualised nature.
Christian thinking still refuses in some
quarters to give complete recognition to the fact of man's 
organic relationship to the developing process of creative 
evolution. Behind the hesitancy there seems to be a fear 
that such recognition would dull the lustre of man by 
equating his religious personality with the life of the brute. 
Actually the final identification of the iwo natures had been 
made long before the nineteenth century. "Men are no better 
than beasts; man's fate is a beast's fate... the same breath
is in them all..both are bound for the same end; both sprang
i 
from the dust and tc the dust they both return."
One way out of the dilemma is to mate such a 
separation between history and value as will permit validity 
in the one without prejudice to the conclusions of the other. 
This is to seek the religious worth of personality in a 
sphere which dangerously abandons the realm of fact. Hitschl, 
more than any other, in modern times, has drawn the sharp line
i. Bccles. 4; 18ff .(Mof fatt )
of opposition between 'theoretic' and 'theological' knowledge, 
thereby preserving the soul at the expense of the "body. For our 
own part, the absolute divorcement of science and religion can 
have but one ending, intellectual suicide and attenuated moral 
subjectivism. It is no longer possible to interpret factual 
experience apart from value experience, and vice versa; to do 
so is to shut God out of the kingdom of man, and man out of the
Kingdom of God. "The Christian who thinks cannot keep God in
i 
his soul and leave him out of his world."
On the other hand,it would be equally false,in our
opinion, to surrender human values to science, whether it be
2 biology, or a-nthropolcgy or psychology.
The only course open to a religious interpretation 
of personality, when it finds itself thus assailed, is to 
welcome facts whenever and wherever these are forth-coming,to
\
evaluate these facts critically in the li$it of the general 
accumulation of experience, and then to go beyond the related 
facts to their cosmic meaning. It is we believe of supreme 
importance that Christian philosophy should recognise man's 
organic affiliation with the whole of nature; the facts warrant 
no other conclusion; but facts have meaning; the analysis of 
our organically grounded personality reveals such highly unique 
and significant qualities in the 'child of nature 1 that we 
are compelled to go back and take a more discriminating look
i* Sorley. Moral Values & the Idea of God. p.472. 
2. The relation between scientific and religious experience 
is dealt with under Heim's Perspective Figure.
at the mother of such a ohild. In the ligh t of man's moral 
status,natare herself becomes spiritually significant as the 
fertile medium eternally pregnant with the potency of giving 
birth to, aid nourishing religious personality. For can is 
at once in nature and yet above it; we are in the world and 
yet not of it, bone of its bone and flesh of its flesh, yet 
bonn of the spirit. In the last analysis man can say naturally
to his earth mother what Jesus could say profoundly to llary,
i. 
"Woman, what have you to do with me."
i. John. 2;4.(Moffatt)
The Uniqueness of Man* Psychic, not Physical.
It was Schopenhauer who opened the eyes of psychologists 
to the omnipresent force of animal instinct in human life-a 
conception which we shall have to examine at a later stage. 
Someone has said that the conception of man as above all a 
thinking animal consciously adapting means to rationally 
chosen ends,"fell sick with Rousseau, took to its bed with 
Kant, and died with Schoperhauer." But it was Huxley who drove 
the logic of evolutionary psychology to its illogical 
conclusion,^ en he declared pessimistically,"man is merely
a brute, only more intelligent than the other brutes."
i 
Let us look carefully then at this animal-human affinity
which in the eyes of many has tended to prick the bubble of 
human conceit.
It is obvious that man's true worth and his claim to 
superiority over his animal congeners cannot lie in his physical 
being. Of all creatures, man is one of the least well adapted 
physically to cope with his natural surroundings. Viewed merely 
as the product of a natural line of evolution, man is a misfit 
in the world. As Anaximander and Kant have pointed out,his very 
helplessness in infancy would limit his survival possibilities 
in the struggle for life. He has had to overcome this physical 
handicap by an ever increasing reliance upon and cooperation 
with his mental and spiritual qualities,combined with the 
symbiotic sociability which makes him unique in the animal 
kingdom.
i. Darwin in "Descent of Man" 1871 held "there is no funfamental 
difference between man and the higher mammals in their mental 
faculties."
Examination of tha fl Aninal-Hain»iigSelationship in Psychology.
This ability of man, to surmount the
handicaps of his physio M limit at ions, and to conquer his 
environment, is not the least mark of his distinctive worth. 
History reveals man as the only animal successful in 
adaptation to its environment which has confirmed its place 
and established its dominion by imposing upon natural life 
an artificial life. Man is the only animal to invent and 
develop the use of tools, thereby ensuring his ability to 
rise superior to the conditions of his natural estate.From 
the use of mechanical tools he has progressed to the use of 
spiritual instruments,developing his own mental imaginings 
and creations. In some cases ha lias even externalised his own 
intuitions to the extent of bowing down before them,either 
in superstition,or in genuine fellowship with the object of 
his adoration; he has become astronomer, philosopher,artist, 
poet, genius,prophet, saint. Finally he has overcome the 
will to live by his willingness even to die for some of his 
intuitions,and has thereby superimposed upon the survival 
of the fittest the higher hypothesis that the life which is 
life indeed might be gained through loss.
It is this inherent urge within man to
become,and not to be, that erases the mark of the beast from 
humanity and sets upon it the seal of divine sonship. Elliot- 
Smith states that f apes are probably just as well equipped
as we are to see,"but they lack the fuller cerebral
i.equipment to interpret the meaning of vfaat they see"
Surely the equation of the animal and
the human is negated in this very obvious fact. The mind 
of the'mere animal' interprets its experience simply in 
the connection of events through perceptive association 
of ideas; animal minds never reason "back to cause and 
effect; hence ba/Ulked expectation in the animal expends 
itself in a temporary sense of felt discomfort, not in 
a cosmic disharmony such as compelled Augustine to declare,
rt Thou hast mack us for Hferyself, and our hearts are restless
2. 
till they find their rest in Thee. n
The mind of the animal is concerned 
almost wholly vith a day^to^day and a hand-to-mouth 
existence; the distinctive feature ofsthe mind of man is 
that in his passion for life and existence man has 
succeeded in enjoying the communion and fellowship of 
that extrahuman environment with which he has discovered 
himself to "be involved. This,no other animal has ever 
attempted to do.
It is this restlessness of outreach,this 
sense of constantly moving towards and being drawn towards 
some meaningful end as yet hidde^ from him, this drawing
1. Human History, p. 44.
2. Confessions, bk.l. l.i.
out from the storehouse of his spiritual possibilities the 
treasures of his latent life, which marks man off completely 
from the animal. The 'divine discontent'"belongs only to man.
"The foxes have holes,and the birds of the air have nests,
i but the son of man hath not where to lay his head."
%
As a matter of simple psychological fact, our 
notions of animal mentality are precariously artificial. 
Whan we are dealing with mental processes,there can be but 
one norm of interpretation, our own human experience. No 
other is possible. Consequently,while it may be helpful to 
explain certain behaviour of the higher animals by analogy 
with human behaviour,it should be reraemberad that it is not 
a valid procedure to reverse the process and interpret the
human by the animal.
Antecedents & Consequents.
If in the evolutionary series we could be sure that
we are dealing with a simple progressively continuous sequence, 
it might be logically correct to predict end-results from a 
knowledge of early or middle terms. But the whole issue lies 
in this very fact,that in evolution we have no evidence of 
such simple sequence. As A.E.Taylor has pointed out, given 
the first three terms of a series, say, 1, 3, 9, the
i. Matt. 8; 20.
average person,when asked for the fourth term in the series 
would unhesitatingly reply,27. But the fourth term in the
series may have teen 25; for the questioner may have had in
n-1 
mind the series of which the general term is I* (n-1).2
n-1 i. 
and not 3
It is such a situation,we submit, which confronts 
us when we attempt to evaluate human vcrth in terms of the 
evolutionary process. The series is not simple continuity, 
but continuity interpenetrated with significant qualitative 
distinctions. If it were at all possible to symbolise the 
process of evolution in algebraic terms, the formula would have 
to be of the nature 2+ 2-5. Continuity is a misleading notion 
when interpreted to signify that all the data of experience 
is reducible to the 'dead level of a single type 1 . Christian 
theory must reject as false the conception of nature which 
merges man in the sub-human antecedents which comprised his 
background of emergence, for the reason that origins and out­ 
comes cannot be equated.
Time succession is no guarantee of necessary 
causal relationship. To have come after is not necessarily 
to have developed out of, even if it does admit time 
relationship. "The true nature of antecedents is onihy 
learned by reference to the consequents which follow,
i. Taylor. A..3. The FaiuL of a Moralist, vol.i. p.170.
or in other words,the true nature of the cause only "becomes
apparent in the effect...hence the futility of all attempts
i 
to explain human life in terms of the merely animal."
Man,whatever else he may be, is a new synthesis of 
the life surge ;the ground plan of his genetic affiliations has 
been dissolved and racombined, and the resultant synthesis has 
been achieved not only by means of resident forces,but by 
reciprocity with the creative factor which guarantees his 
uniqueness in the evolutionary series. Our essentially human 
characteristics are explainable only in terms of brotherhood, 
enriched by that spiritual bond which unites humanity to the 
reality at the heart of the universe. Only of man may it be
said that he lives and moves and has his being in God.
The Pynamio_Time Factor in Human.Qonsciousntss"" " In hiddiscussion of ln.9 g6iiu.l.UBly human attributes,
Elliot Smith points out that man's behaviour is dominated by 
the effects of his own personal experience and the reactions
of his social heritage, that is, the accumulated knowledge
2 
and traditions of the society in which he lives. Elsewhere
he has reminded us that there is no structure in the human 
brain which is not represented in the brain of the anthropdd. 
But the temporal consciousness necessary for distinctively 
human functioning is not represented physiologically in 
the anthropoid brain."They cannot acquire the vast store
1. Pringle-Pattison. Man's Place in the Cosmos, p.12.
2. Human History. p.35.ff.
of complex memories which we have at our command, to 
compare and interpret the ftiller significance of visual 
experience. Only the human "brain is endowed with the aptitude
for making this poseible-jby its almost unlimited powers
i 
of recording sensory experiences and feelings"
This again constitutes a valuable clue to 
the worth of religious personality. It seems to be 
established that ani al experience moves on the plane of 
associated ideas; mere perceptions,impulses and instincts 
make up the animal's world. In other words, the animal 
past is a dead past; the human past is dynamic; habit holds 
the animal;tradition holds and at the same time inspires 
the human. It is this creative time factor v/hich serves to 
widen the breach between animal and human,and has made 
civilisation in the widest sense of the word. And in the 
development of this uniquely human value the acquisition 
of speech has played a major role;for throu$i the medium 
of speech humanity has been able to transmit its accumulated 
experiences to successive generations, a condition of 
affairs without parallel in the rest of nature.
The recognition of this creative time
factor has far reaching oonsequences. It helps,for instance, 
i. Human History p.44.
to answer the question why men,and men alone,se?k to "be 
different from what they are. Man is the only animal who 
deliberately sets about the business of re-fashioning himself 
as well as his environment. Ptr the truly human is the self- 
conscious, and self-consciousness is the basis of self-criticism. 
The ape sterilised his possible humanity and stereotyped his 
apehood when he refused the 'unearned increment'of human 
consciousness*
With the emergence of homo sapiens there was achieved 
a degree of mental integration which made self-consciousness 
possible,and implied the power of self-criticism in the light 
of the past. Hence to men,and to them only,is it given to judge 
the present in terms of the past,and more significantly,to 
evaluate both past and present with reference to the future. 
Time fdr man is of the essence of his humanity,for it guarantees 
his self-consoiousness,and this in turn is possible only 
through his consciousness of that which is 'other than self. 
Hence through and in time man reaches out to eternity.
*
This condition carries with it the essence of the Old 
Testament plea that man is made in the image of God, and the 
vindication of the New Testament statement that the Kingdom of 
God is within us. And it is this which makes belief in a real 
Incarnation possible. There is that in humanity which
(\f)tC>
enables it to "be the medium or the vehicle of the divine 
life. Ordinary space time categories are not capable of 
exhausting the content of this experience; we can only 
say that man has affinity with whatever is ultimate in 
the universal scheme of things.
To the reparoach then of Huxley, that man 
is 'only an intelligent brute 1 , we reply that we shall 
concede his pessimism provided it can be shown that other 
brutes are able to propound a theory of the eternal, or 
elaborate a doctrine of universal truth and beauty and 
goodness, or show signs of deliberately reshaping their 
lives in conformity with such an interpretation of the 
world albout them.
Remorse:
"Having "become self-conscious," says Hocking, "we
have no choice "but to see life for the good it is,and to 
be restless at the thought of exclusion from the good. To 
lose life..the quality of life.. the possibility of responding 
to what we "believe to be the best, and hence the possibility
of being with the best,is a torment to man as it is not to
i 
other creatures."
Here again, we must concede the utter separation of 
man from the brute. We may well believe it true that "the 
animals do not lie awake at night thinking about their sins." 
There is nothing more characteristic of humanity than its 
feelings of remorse and penitence. Popular psychology offers 
abundant instances of animals motivated by "human intelligence", 
even to manifesting the contrite heart I There is no reason why 
one should hesitate to admit the glimmerings of some rudimentary 
form of mind in the higher animals, but we reasonably protest 
against the fallacy of attributing sui generis rationality and 
morality to creatures whose mental functionings have been
conditioned by long association with man in domesticity.Kohler
£ 
claimed to find traces of'repentance f in his apes,but his apes
were all domesticated animals. The "shame" displayed by dogs,
when caught in an offence, is scarcely to be thought a
real test of the primitive reaction of the 'yellow dog dingo 1 .
1. Human Nature & its Hemaking. p. 143.
2. Creation by Evolution, p.306.
Domesticity introduces into the observed circumstances an 
element of secondariness and exposes the claim of animal 
'intelligence 1 to the danger of begging the question. Close 
association of animals with human beings will go a long way 
towards 'humanising 1 and 'moralising 1 an animal, making it 
something more than a primitive brute.
The 'shame' of the animal.actually, is different in 
kind,not simply in degree, from the contrition of the human 
heart. The difference is one more implication of the dynamic 
 factor in human time experience. The animal life is but an 
episode in the passage of nature. The feeling of 'shame 1 and 
'penitence'-better classified as physical discomfort-is soon 
obliterated once punishment has been inflicted. The human mind 
does not forget. In spite of our best efforts-even when a 
sincere attempt has been made at reparation-the unsatisfactory 
past continues to reassert itself regardless of the passage of 
time,its force unabated. The human experience of time has 
depth and profundity unknown elsewhere. For self-consciousness 
implies moral sensitivity, and the sensitive conscience moves 
in a multiple dimensional region. It includes retrospection, 
realisation,and anticipationjit never ceases to reproach itself. 
The physical discomfort of the animal is replaced in man by an 
acute awareness of dissatisfaction with himself as well as with 
as with his environment.
Our human consciousness of wrong and guilt is uniquely 
our own, a tribute as we shall see to our greatness as well as 
a token of our misery. It presupposes a vital affinity with 
the life-sustaining elements of the cosmos, which in our 
opinion, has been characteristic in some degree of man from the 
very beginning. Keith finds it necessary in his evolutionary 
reconstructions to hypothecate in the manward headed stock a 
"tendency to big-brainedness." It would seem reasonable that 
this hypothesis should carry its own weight and bear its own 
implications. For this is simply the anthropological correlate 
of the religious intuition that "there is a spirit in man,and 
the inspiration of the Almighty has given it understanding." 
Nor are we compelled to assume that this tendency witheld its 
active functioning until the appearance of the actual human 
form, since, as Elliot Smith has poihted out,"the cerebral 
cortex acquired functions distinctive of the human status", 
before "the transformation of the face and body. 11
Truly,while the outer man perishes, the inner man is 
renewed day by day!
"There is a tide in the affairs of men,which taken 
at the flood, leads on to fortune." Likewise, there was 
a time in the evolutionary process when the hutfan species, 
whatever its debt to its animal progenitors, responded to 
the urge of its real inner nature,and emerged on the new level 
of humanity, equipped with reason and conscience. Over the 
mark of the beast was superimposed the image of God.
Nature in giving birth to man, has provided 
in hito for her own displacement. Other creatures could 
largely "be finished "by nature,operating on the principle 
of the selection of the fittest.
It is the glory of man that.within certain 
limits, he is free to work out his own salvation. Christian 
philosophy has its own explanation as to how the species 
which became man came to achieve its religious ideas and 
practices. The reason is a double one; the human yearning for 
God and the divine attraction of man. Man has his wants, 
but man at the same time is conscious of being wanted. This 
is his greatest claim to genuine worth.
4. The Organism "Aliv« and Whol«". An Ultimata Principle.
It will "be well at this juncture to preface 
future discussion and analysis with the reminder that for 
Christian thinking,it is axiomatic that man "be interpreted 
in terms of living wholeness and nothing less than wholeness. 
No analysis of personality oan "be valid except on the 
understanding that undergirding and synthetically permeating 
the analysed components there is that integrative unity of 
living function which defies analysis, yet which alcne gives 
meaning to personality , and which abides as a functional 
unity throughout its changes and growth in time. "T>e living 
creature is fundamentally a unity. In trying to make the 'how 1 
of animal existence intelligible to our imperfect knowledge, 
w.e may have for study purposes, to separate its whole into 
part aspects and part mechanisms, but that separation is 
artificial. It is as a whole, a single entity, that the
*
animal,or for that matter the plant, is finally and 
essentially to be envisaged, "i
This new turning towards functional
wholeness,owing in large measure to the work and influence 
of J.S.Haldane.ie rapidly becoming bedrock assumption in 
biology and psychology. It represents a significant return 
to the Aristotelian conception that development is neither 
haphasard noB accidental, but that everything is guided 
towards its end from within, by its nature ynd structure, 
or 'enteleohy 1 . This 'organisrnal ' conception is fully
i. Sherrington. Presidential Address to British Assoc. 1922,
elaborated in the philosophical works of A.N.T7hitehead. 
In his 1 Science and the Modern World 1 , he states, "the 
concrete enduring entities are organisms, so that the plan 
of the whole influences the very character of the subordinate 
organisms which enter into it. In the case of an animal, the 
mental states enter into the plan of the total organism and 
thus modify the plans of the successive subordinate organisms 
until the ultimate smallest organisms such as electrons are 
reached... the eleatron blindly runs, either within or without 
the body, but it runs within the body in accordance with the
general plan of the body, and this plan includes the mental
i 
state."
Again, evolutionary theory forces upon us "a 
conception of organism as fundamental for nature. It also 
requires an underlying activity-a substantial activity - 
expressing itself in individual embodiments, and evolving 
in achievements of organism. The organism is a unit of
emergent value, a real fusion of the characters of eternal
2 
objects, emerging for its own sake."
shall avoid the pitfalls of the fallacy of 
misplaced concrtteness then, if we remember that in any 
experience there is always the central and actively 
organising ego. To quote the testimony of another writer
i. 1926. p. 116 2 ibid. p. 157
who develops the same general idea of the emergence of 'wholes 1 
in oosmio evolution, "all action of whatever kind,which happens
between mind and "body in human personality,is to he traced to
iand ultimately st/ccounted for "by the holistic personality itselfV
We shall have occasion to emphasise this again 
and again. In any activity it is always the whole self which 
functions. Uuch of the implied psychological devaluation of
human worth is traceable to the false abstraction of the parts
2 
from the whole. Goethe sums up this fallacy well;
3
To understand trie living whole, 
They start by driving out the soul< 
They count the parts,and when all's done, 
Alas the spirit bond is gone.
This activity of the 7/hole self may manifest
itself as a clash of conflicting interests and tendencies; but 
the conflict is none the less always and essentially the active 
functioning of an integrated unity,an organism maintaining its 
integration even in the face of discordance. This is but one 
more phase of the general fundamental philosophical problem 
of the one and the many. Christian psychology, 
discovering in human personality that striving towards 
higher life which transcends the strictly biological struggle
1. Smuts. Holism and Evolution. London 1926. p.272.
2. c.f. the general trend of the Behaviouristic Dsychology.
3. quoted by Sorley. Moral Values & the Idea of God. p. 245.
for existence,has found it helpful to use the metaphor of 
dichotomy in describing predominant phases of this clash 
of self interests in man, speaking familiarly of the 
opposition of the soul to the body. So Paul and others 
have apostrophised the law of the members warring against 
the law of the mind. But the metaphorical force of this 
dramatics dichotomising should not blind us to the fact 
that in all circumstances the religious personality 
operates and experiences as a whole. The conflict,when it 
exists, is always within an integrated 'me' cr 'you 1 .Hence 
the final appeal of Christianity is always to the whole man,
and the final salvation of personality can be nothing less
•
than a return of the human all to the divine love.
It is obvious too that the biological
or the psychotbiological category of organism,to which Whitehead 
asserts that the evolutionary theory drives us, is not in 
itself exhaustively explanatory of the religious person. For 
man is not the higjiest organism simply because he is the most 
complex collocation of atoms yet evolved; the hypothesis of 
incremental lifts in evolution, if it means any thing, is a 
frank admission of the unique character of the human organism. 
Biologically considered, an organism may be considered 
generally as that individualised integration of life whose 
nature it is to maintain itself, and reproduce in the face
of a varying environment its structure and activities as a 
whole. But the level of development actualised in the higher 
integration displayed through self-consciousness carries the 
life synthesis a step beyond the reaoh of strictly biological 
categories of maintenance and reproduction*
Whitehead speaks of the organism as 'a real fusion of
i 
the characters of eternal objects." It is this aspect of the
category of organism which offers the most fruitful possibilities 
for the interpretation of personality as organismal. The final 
appeal of Whitehead is to a naive experience which tells us that 
"we are within a world of colours,sounds and other sense objects, 
related in space and time to enduring objects such as stones, 
trees and human bodies* We seem ourselves elements of of this 
world in the same sense as are the other things we perceive."
It would seem then that evolutionary philosophy may 
yet furnish us with a transcendent category of organism which 
is rich enough to include within its scope the world of beauty 
and values, two aspects of experience which religion holds to 
be fundamental to the interpretation of the human organism. 
For we worship the Lord in beauty and holiness as well as in 
sincerity and in truth.
i. Science & the Modern World. 1986. p.!5S
Religiously conceived, the human organism is best 
understood as a fusion of meaningful experience; not simple 
reaction to a biological situation, but an active reconstruct- 
ion of the whole self about a perspective centre of reference 
which includes the self,but radiates beyond it. The basal 
need of genetic preservation is soon overlaid in the human 
organism with a variety of desires whose satisfactions are 
guaranteed only on personal and not biological levels. The 
biological organism is still at the mercy of nature f s whims; 
religiously, man has ventured to believe that his outreaohing 
faith is objectively grounded in response to some 'movement 
from the other side 1 .
For this adventurous feature of man's religious 
life, the biological concept of organism has no adequate 
categories of explanation*
at//
Tht Relation of Instinct & Personality,
v The psychological oritio will probably remind us at
this stage of the argument that we are passing all too easily 
into the promised land of spiritual values. I?e have scarcely 
scratched the surface of human nature,and there is much beneath 
the skin. "Scratch a Pole,and find a Tartar". So runs an old saw. 
But let modern evolutionary psychology scratch any human being 
and it uncovers a whole menagerieJ
"In all of us, even in good men, there is a latent wild
i 
beast nature, which peers out in sleep." These words might well
grace the cover of an up-to-date book on human psychology. They 
were written 2300 years ago by Plato, who in a remarkable passage 
of the'Hepublic f has anticipated nearly everything that psycho­ 
analysis has to say, including repression, sublimation, censor 
and oedipus-complex.
We are obliged then to face the problem of the 
relation of instinct to the worth of human personality. I7e 
are not concerned here with a detailed analysis of the instincts 
per se. Fo two psychologists agree upon number of description. 
Our interest lies rather in assessing the worth of the claim that 
man has inherited from his brute progenitors an instinctive 
nature which threatens to engulf all that religion claims for 
him as distinctly human,and therefore valuable.
c.f sec. 571-2.
"The human spirit has ever remained the same. 
Even when it becomes encrusted with the influences,good 
or bad, of tradition,......human nature is based upon the
same primitive instincts and emotions". So speaks the
i 
anthropologist.
"The instinctive impulses determine the ends
of all activities and supply the driving power by which
i 
all mental activities are sustained". Thus psychology.
Tansley,who quotes approvingly the above 
statement from McDougall, states that 'by far the most
important features in the structure of the mind,alike in
3. 
man and the higher animals,are the inherited instincts."
It might seem at first then that we ha-re escaped 
the Scylla of biological mechRsnism only to be wrecked upon 
Charybdis of psychological determinism.
Instinct functions in th» interests of a Self.
Our escape lies simply in an analysis of the
s 
human personality which probes deeper than even the instinct
To begin with, we remind the reader that we safeguarded our 
approach by the proviso that for the Christian evaluation 
of man,personality is a unit activity which functions at 
all times as an integrated whole. It is clear then that any
i.Elliot Smith. Essays. £.50
£.McDougall. Intro. to Social Psychology. 1914. p.44.
3.The New Psychology, p.24.
conception of man as an aggregate of instincts 'working 
"blindly or in block fashion 1 will have to be repudiated. 
If instinctive activity means anything, it must mean 
activity functioning solely in the interests of a self whose 
synthesising autonomy may be challenged by their discordanoe, 
but not vitiated. Instinct alont can supply no explanation 
of personality. It may strve as a basis of human behaviour, 
but apart from the control and guidance of the whole self.it 
becomes a mere hypothetical abstraction.
Instincts may only be interpreted psychologically. 
"Their nervous circuits include branches that run through 
the highest nerve centre. That a nervous loop passes upward 
through the higjher centres means to us that the instinct is
an element of consciousness as well as of subconsciousness;
i 
it falls within what we call a mind."
In other words,an instinct is from first to last under 
cerebral control, and after its first 'quasi-mechanical 
operation 1 is subject to modification through its bearing on 
other processes reporting at the nervous centre. To interpret 
behaviour in terms of'block 1 instinct, is akin to the atomistic 
psychology which treats of sensations and feelings as if 
these were nothing but separate elements of experience out of 
which personality could b» compounded. Instinct can exist only*
 ________ ___ ______ ___________________——————*^^——^^^^^mm^^^*^^f*^^^u**^^m*m*^^a^*mi*m*H^**^mi^**^i^^^*~^^ma^**m*^**
i. Hocking. Human Nature and its Eemaking. p.41.
for a self whose activity it is, and apart from that self
it is meaningless. "The simplest mental act involves the
i 
whole brain."
The worth of man,religiously considered,is in 
the fact that being a self-conscious personality, he can 
intelligently harness the raw material of life supplied to 
him througi his instinctive activities and raise it to higher 
than natural levels in the interests of a self whose dwelling 
place is on the earth but whose resting place is in the heavens.
The notion of instinct per se is a hypothetical 
abstraction in yet another sense. It is impossible to work our 
way back mentally to an historically primitive original human 
nature. Hor does it help much to seek the primtive instincts 
in the child. There is no such thing as an 'isolated 1 infant. 
With the first social interchange of experience, a condition 
entered into practically at birth, any initial endowment of 
original human nature must necessarily be overcast. The 'crude 
instinct 1 is a will-o'-the-wisp.
Whatever life preparation may be distinguished as 
instinctive in man, is,we suspect,minimised in his case. The 
animal, be cause of its place in the ladder of life, is called upon
i. Brain, vol. 34(xxxiv) p.191
to cope wiUi the struggle for existence at a very early 
stags of its career. Hence it must of necessity equip 
itself with a means of survival suited to its precarious 
mode of life. Lacking the tirae to learn by experience, 
and "barred from the benefits of the big brain, the animal's 
mode of response is instinctive, that is,biologically 
preservative. Instinct is a specialisation in the interest 
of a narrowed type of survival. Man has the option of a 
fuller and a more abundant life, hence in his case,who.tever 
there be of instinct is overruled by the higher ends of 
the spirit.
Suggestive physiological evidence is not 
wanting to support such a conception of instinct. "In 
animals other than man,instinct attracts attention partly 
because of the conjunction of apparently superhuman cunning 
with subhuman powers of thought; in part because of the 
remarkable bodily structures which accompany them. Man 
lacks these striking organic instruments almost entirely. 
He has no horns, wings, humps, claws, quills, tusks, shells 
or sting. His body offers no visible foothold for notable 
functions of of fence, defence or craftsmanship. He is 
relatively a smooth unmarked animal. Internally also his 
organs are undistinguished. Except that he is obviously 
neither fish nor fowl, his structure does not mark him for
this or that habitat or diet, nor for any special mastery
over any part of nature. Physically he is as nearly as
" i 
possible animal-in-general.
The contrast is significant then,between 
animal nature which is generously furnished at birth 
for instinctive intercourse with life,and human nature, 
equipped with a few primary appetites,whose functioning 
is immediately destined to be subservient to a self- 
conscious guidance.
1.Hocking. Human Nature & its Remaking, p.46
2."The functions of the central nervous system are not 
a palimpsest,vzhere a new text is written ofrer an 
earlier manuscript partly erased. The more primitive 
activities have been profoundly modified by the 
advent of the new centre^,which utilise some of the 
faculties originally possessed b;\ the older mechanism 1.' 
Sir Henry Head. Brain. Vol.xxxiv. p.191.
Instinct & Human Needs.
The real significance of instinct still remains to be 
appreciated. It is always the whole self which acts, and its 
instinctive activities operate entirely in virtue of some life 
situation which has "been evaluated as meaningful. This 'meaning 1 
quality lies at the root of all human behaviour and rescues it 
from the chaos which would otherwise characterise a medley of
instincts blindly pursuing their own ends. "The primary tissues
i 
of experience ought to be regarded as composed of meanings",
declares Drever. Later on he reminds us that"the psychologist
is concerned with the experiences which underlie instinctive
2 
behaviour."
These experiences underlying instinctive behaviour 
are the fundamental needs of the developing organism. As Ward 
has shown, life begins in a vague 'feeling continuum 1 ,within 
which there is a development of function according to the needs 
of life. The organism is never discovered as completely 
neutral or static, waiting to be stimulated into action in 
order that it might respond. From first to last the organism 
is active, and its activity is the effort to satisfy some 
specific need or needs which have challenged the organic 
activity to find satisfaction.
Instincts therefore are rightly interpreted
i. Instinct in Man. p.131. 2. ibid. p.158
interpreted only against the background of the fundamental 
needs of the developing organism. The worth of human life is 
indissolubly bound up with the right satisfaction of these 
inherent needs of the self. At all times the organism is in 
the throes of some need,and this need tends to become the 
controlling factor in its activities.
We oome out into the daylight then,when we recognise 
that instinct is to be evaluated strictly in relation to the 
need which it endeavours to satisfy. Biologically considered, 
an instinct operates for the satisfaction of some organic 
survival need, such as reproduction or preservation. 
Psychologically, an instinct functions when it satisfies the 
needs of a self. Prom the standpoint of religion, distinct but 
not separate from these other needs, an instinct normally 
functions in the interests of a self when its needs are related 
to the moral and spiritual ends of personality. In other words, 
the needs of the religious self carry it over into a region 
of the 'other than self 1 .
This sense of need and incompleteness, this striving 
for 'sufficiency 1 may be regarded as the psychological root 
of religion. Every organism is striving to complete itself. 
This urge is so strong that if any break occurs the organism 
will make the most strenuous efforts #o restore its wholeness.
It was this striving towards completeness which made such an
2 
impression upon Driesch. This urge to completeness is
1. c.f J.A.Hadfield. Psychology & Morals, for cogent 
illustrations of this principle.
2. The Science & Philosophy of the Organism, vol.1.p.225
one of the most potent forces within the human organism. When 
it is denied,either consciously or unconsciously, the baulked 
instinct is unable to satisfy its need and sinks into repression
and neurosis. A neurosis is indicative of the organism f s
i 
striving for completeness* In man this sense of need can
be satisfied only on the personal level. Personality cannot 
complete its needs in anything less than personality. Hence
' IfAf&fthe Christian religion is psychology sound when it offers us 
an ideal grounded in a Person as the only real satisfaction 
of the needs which lie at the root of our religious worth.
We are ready now to consider some of the ultimate 
needs of man which mark his humanity and set him apart from 
the rest of the animal kingdom. Man shares with the other 
creatures certain primary urges, chief among these being the 
will to live and the will to create-that is, the instincts 
of self preservation and of reproduction. Probably all the 
other instincts are modified forms of the tine fundamental need 
for sheer existence, namely the instinct of self preservation.
But the ground pattern of instinct in man is 
profounlly modified by the presence of the self-conscious 
factor, so that the urge to sheer existence becomes elevated 
into a hunger and thirst after righteousness, and the urge to 
reproduce becomes a longing for love. The assertion of the
i. o.f. Hadfield. J.A. Modern Churchman vol.xiv Sep.1924
will to live is sublimated into the prayer that not we should 
live,but Christ in us, and the'reproducer'is transformed into 
the lover. The biologioal needs in man are transfigured, and 
the transfigured needs in turn modify his instincts.
"The principal instincts of the mind normally demand 
constantly repeated satisfaction insofar as all the available
psychic energy is not absorbed in some higher integrated
i 
conation,in the service of which the instincts are harnessed."
But the worth of man lies in this very fact, that as a religious 
being, he is constantly challenged by his needs to seek the 
integration of his psychic energies in a 'higher conation 1 . 
How else is it possible to explain moral and rational behaviour 
in man except through the recognition that at the heart of
The fundamental need of man is life^at its best. 
The first necessity of the search for such a life is to 
discover a centre about which the activities of the self 
may be organised.
As Christians, we are here compelled to rest 
our case finally in a paradox, which is nevertheless a very 
profound truth. The perspective centre of life for the
i. Tansley. The Hew Psychology, p.70
religious man is at the same time within and beyond him. 
"The religious xeif consciousness...issues,like all other 
forms of spiritual life from a primal intuition of the 
self with an 'other 1 which is more than a mere'opposite'.. 
an other which responds. It cames into being with an 
interpretation of this 'other 1 and here again it does not 
differ from the remaining forms of life and spirit. It differs,, 
that in religion the affirmation of continuity and the
intuition that there is response in the Object to the needs
i 
of the self are much more thoroughgoing."
Any theory of personality which fails to 
distinguish this human need of the divine, and the divine 
response to that need has failed to reach the heart of man. 
The Christian affirmation is that no man at any time is 
outside of the divine environing. Ass a free being,he may 
refuse to cooperate with the divine,but he does not thereby 
void his humanity of the ability to replace self-eentredness 
with God-cent redness. But this affirmation of man's autonomy 
may have to be declared contingent at the last upon the
divine imperative.
Over against the needs of instinct considered 
from the standpoint of biology and psychology we set the 
higher intuition that,expressed in all religion and art and 
philosophy and in human life generally, there is a universal
i. Matthews. T7.R. God in Christian Thought & Experience.p. 17.
sense of need,expressing itself in the form of a desire 
to transcend what we presently are, the yearning for 
further attainment and completion. At its highest, this 
sense of need is a passion for harmonious integration 
with the reality that is drawing us on to completion. 
It is the lure of the Infinite that has drawn man on,
the strongly felt though dimjy understood intuition that
i 
'God is at the helm, though very secretly".
Hand in hand with this ultimate need of
experiential unity goes the necessity of having that unity 
objectified and validated in a reality which can guarantee 
the abiding worth of the creations of our religious 
consciousness. If our 'sickly talk about ideals' is nothing 
more than 'self-paintings of the yearning spirit', they are 
as inconsequential as the spun foam on the crest of the 
sea waves. Our predicament in the universe becomes at the 
last intolerable if between our human values and the 
structure of the cosmos there is no organic relationship. 
Our instinctive desires give us every guarantee of their 
own reality, and no doubt it is true that our first notion 
of value arises in conjunction with instinctive desire;but 
while man is convinced of the reality of his own desires, 
he needs also to be convinced that he himself is a real 
object of desire. It is on the staunch affirmation of his 
religious faith that he is desired that man rests all the 
abidingness of his eternal values. 
i. Augustine Confessions. Bk.iv. XIV. 23.
It is not a valid criticism of the objectivity of 
the eternal values to point out that our hu$an standards 
and our consciousness of the divine ground plan are in 
a constant condition of flux. It is the essence of the 
human spirit to change unceasingly,for the religious 
experience is vital, not static. The strength of the 
Christian interpretation of man is that he is always in 
touch with a living environment. What is generally 
overlooked is the fact that change in growth, mental or 
otherwise, is an indication of the emergence of new needs. 
Changes in human development are a hint that some inherent 
need of the self has failed to find satisfaction under the 
old regime, and the living spirit henceforth changes its 
direction. The lamarckian principle in evolution,that 
new needs induce development and function is a generalisation 
full of significance for religious philosophy and practice. 
To study the organism biologically without reference to 
its needs is to "be able to discern the face of the heavens 
without discerning the signs of the times.
Human nature is bound up with its religious 
needs. Hence the validity of the Christian doctrine of 
human worth which insists upon a recognition of the 
spiritual needs as fundamental.
i. Matt. 16. v.3.
fci, :
Tht "Religious Instinct".
May we olaira for man a religious instinct?
Alexander states categorically that 'the passion for God
i 
is no less real an appetite of our nature" than the passicn
for food. Lloyd Morgan has laboured to maintain that in 
man new constitutive moral and religious sentiments have 
emerged which are 'instinctive in the broad sense of the 
term". Pratt, in denying a specific religious instinct 
holds that'inborn tendencies and needs,when combined with
the power of thought and the will to think,are quite £ 
enough to account for some kind of religious attitude."
We hesitate to answer our o?m question in 
the affirmative,so long as instinct is construed in the 
narrow biological or psychological sense of the word. 
Everything of course will depend upon what we agree to 
call the essence of the religious consciousness.
Religion seems to have close affinity with
i
what v;e identify as the instinct of self-preservation. It 
is at least coterminous with the will to live itself. Prof. 
W.P.Paterson has suggested that this instinct be renamed 
as 'self-affirmation 1 , so that its functioning may include 
not only the preservation of the self but its 'expansion 1 
as well. This is a fertile suggestion for the interpretation 
of the primary religious experience,and might conceivably
i.Space Time & Deity, vol.ii. p.o41. 
E.Pratt. The Religious Consciousness, p.71.
be made the basis of an instinctive intuition of that
'self-together-with other-than-self relationship which
is the core of the Christian analysis of human worth.
We reject as incomplete the psychological
ana/lysis of the religious experience typified in the
i 
work of Leuba,who holds that religion is found where man
comes into relationship with a power or powers of a 
psychic nature and makes use of them . This is magic 
rather than religion. The essence of magic is coercion of 
its object.a desire to make use of; religion is rather 
obedience to its object and a willingness to be made use 
of. Leuba is dealing with a secondary condition rather 
than a primary experience. He has failed to see the need 
that lies behind the outer expression.
McDougall f s analysis is much more profound, 
seeking to grAund the beginnings of religion in the 
fundamental instincts of man. Religion for McDougall is 
compacted out of fear blended with wonder, resulting in a 
complex of awe and reverence. The core of this reverence 
is a sort of retreat and advance, a shrinking from yet an 
attraction towards, a desite to flee the mysterious and yefr 
a curious impulse to draw near to it. But all the time there 
is a fear at the heart of it. It is in the 'fear of the Lord 1 
that religion has its beginnings here.
i. Leuba. J.H. A Psychological studu of I^i^^. 1912.
t
Obviously we are not very far removed here from 
Otto's "mysterium tremendum" and the"numinous disposition" 
which he places at the heart of the religious experience. 
But it must "be confessed that we have not yet reached the 
vital core of religion. To both Otto and McDougall it might 
be suggested that there is a wonder which is not afraid, and 
a fear which is not religious. Schleiermacher profoundly 
supplements tht analysis of religion as a 'feeling of 
absolute dependence'-although we are not sure how this feeling 
should "be evaluated. We agree with him,however, in recognisin/g 
the religious impulse as an inherent constituent of the human 
consciousness,which grows and develops in normal fashion 
with the mind itself. If we unite to Schleiermacher's 
analysis a recognition of the actively cooperating as well 
as the dependent side of the religious relationship,together 
with the sense of the sublime, interpreted through Otto's 
'numinous 1 , we are not very far from genuine religion. For 
the object of religious experience is not only a 'wholly other',
it is also a'responsive other 1 . In this haunting sense of
i 
"mana"ithe taproot of god-belief'as Goe names it, lies man's
ineradicable belief that his own nature is grounded in the 
structure of the cosmos in a relation of outreach and response.
Beyond this it is impossible to penetrate. To negate 
this" is to deny ultimate human worth.
i. The Psychology of Religion, p.90.
6. Psycho -Analysis and Human Values.
Br«uer. Our disGUSsion of the plaoe and meaning of instinct
has now prepared us to evaluate another phase of the evolution­ 
ary psychology, which has significance for our theme. In 1895, 
a Viennese physician named Breuer , collaborating witii his pupil 
Sigmund Freud, published a striking series of Studies in 
Hysteria 1 , which was destined to become a landmark in 
psychological investigation. Based originally upon the 
hypnotic treatment of neurotics, the conclusion was reached 
that neurosis was the result of a repression or an inadequate 
expression of the instinctive tendencies of the individual. 
It was observed that neuroses vanished when brou^it into the 
lieht of consciousness , hence it was assumed that they must 
first have existed in the 'unconscious' in some repressed 
form, probably on account of their unpleasant associations 
for consciousness.
gr+tta. Taking this as his starting point, Freud himself 
perfected an elaborate technique of 'psycho-analysis ' .Belying 
less upon hypnotic suggestion and more upon inducing his 
patients into a state of quiescence, wher e they 7/ould themselves 
'talk their own neuroses out', and aided by his own interpretat­ 
ion of their dream symbolism, he achieved a valuable therapeutic 
method for the diagnosis and treatment of neurotics. Inevitably 
it happened that the psycho -analytic method so successful in 
the treatment of pathological cases, came to be regarded as 
valid diagnosis of all behaviour , normal as well as abnormal.
i.c.f. Miss Hinkle's introd. to Jung's "Psychology of the 
Unconscious", for a history of the movement.
The working hypothesis of the psyeho-analytia school 
is that personality is motivated "by its unconscious instinctive 
urges. Modern psychologists differ in the number of instincts 
to be recognised. Frtud has laboured to locate the source of 
all human behaviour in the one imperious and all pervasive 
instinct of sex. The 'libido 1 , the urge of the sexual tendency 
to work itself out in action, is so frequently manifested in 
child life-according to Freud,- that he assumed it to be the 
normal activity of the growing infant. In the beginning this 
'libido 1 functions auto-erotically, satisfying itself in the 
subject through breast-sucking, thumb sucking, etc. All too 
soon,however, it widens its range of interest beyond the subject 
and fastens its interest upon some external love object. Here 
enters the notorious 'oedipus-complex'. The growing boy 
exhibits a 'libidinous'attraction for the mother, and the girl 
for the father.
The upshot of the psycho-analytical interpretation is 
that the character of the adult is interpreted in terms of the 
repressed libidinous wishes of infancy, mere especially of 
the important years between one. and four. At the root of all 
neuroses, there is the 'oedipus-complex 1 in some form or 
another. Finally religion itself finds its origin here. For 
religion is now exposed as a means of escape for the self ffom 
the unbearable mental conflicts induced by the stress of our 
instinctive nature. The gods of religion are simply
1 v. ieh - f ulfillme n ts '. In par t we f ind r el e ase f r cm the 
conflict of our unrealisable libidinous wishes and desires 
"by 'unconsciously' repressing them; we also escape "by 
projecting our wishes into the outside world, thereby 
objectifying our mental strivings after unity. In the 
words of Fraud,"a large portion of the mythological 
conception of the world,wh' eh reaches far "back into the 
most modern religions,is nothing "but psychology projected 
into the outer world... the dim perception of psychio
factors and relations of the unconscious was taken as a
i 
model in the construction of a transcendent reality"
Tanslty. Following the lead of Freud and the rest of 
the Psycho-analytic school, Tansley maintains that "the
tendency to projection arises from the mind's need of
2 
harmony wi til itself and the external world." Primitive
man projected his own personality into the forces of nature, 
"At a later stage of development the process of projection 
is gradually simplified, .and we arrive at the conceptions 
of God and the Devil" i.e. the'personifications of good
and evil'.."Hence the conflict is thus represented as
3
caused ffom without" and direct responsibility is escaped. 
"Freewill is thus revealed in its true light as "an 
invention of the moralists who felt that personal ±fss±sx
responsibility must not be entirely disdained or the
3 
motive tori^it action would be destroyed."
1.Freud. Psyohopathology of Everyday Life. Sng. Tr.p.309-10
2.Tansley. The Hew Psychology. p,13o.
3. ibid. 136. 4. ibid. 136.
Finally we learn that Christianity has
projected the idea of love into God, because "the oppressed
i 
majority must have consolation", this ideal projected upon
2 
God "being "an externalisation of the mind". Religious
experience is thus finally found out as the climbing of a 
rope, the end of which the mind has itself thrown into the 
heavens, and Julian Huxley is right when he declares that
"the progress of psychology is today putting the final storey
3 
on the great edifice of naturalism." All we need to convince
ourselves of "the future of an illusion" is a course in 
abnormal psych clog?. The religious worshipper is then 
presumably sublimated into a devotee of the new psychology.
To the Freudian analysis of personality it 
is pertinent to reply that the child psychology, upon which
it bases its conclusions is not confirmed by other expert
4 
observers in this field. As a matter of fact the findings
of the experts may readily be confirmed by anyone whore makes 
a careful stucty- of child behaviour in the normal home. Jung y 
legitimately abandons Freud at this juncture. The ordinary 
growing child regards the parent in the li$it of "protector" 
rather than as "libidinous object".
1. The New Psyeholo&r. p.137.
2. ibid. p.137
3. Religion without Revelation, p.253.
4. Baldwin, Prior, James, Hocking, McDougall, Brown, Rivers 
repudiate the Freudian child psycholo^r.
This interpretation of personality in terms of 
any overweening instinct is open to all the old objections 
levelled against the 'faculty psychology'. The enthroning of 
sex,moreover, is a travesty of the plain facts of normal 
experience. The'battleof the instincts 1 is a dramatisation, 
rather than an analysis. The stage is "badly set, and the art 
is faulty,when this dramatisation omits the all important 
character of the integrating self in whose interests the 
life-play is staged. Normally the self is from first to last 
indivisible. Even in the instances of 'split 1 or'dissociated 1 
personality so ably investigated by Morton Prince, there is 
always a basic unity of the self within which the dissociations 
occur, and into which they may be re-integrated when the 
cause of the split has been removed. The inherent life unity 
of the self,under ordinary circumstances, is too strong for 
disintegration; irrelatively only a few pepple who 'break up 1 . 
The actual measure of integration achieved by any personality
will depend upon the quality of the ideal with which the
y
self has chosen to identify itself for the time being. At this 
point, Christianity challenges the highest integration of the 
self with the master motive of the fulness of stature which
was in Christ.
The Unconscious. • , . . ., . a _ .. ———————————The spear is thrust deep into the side of the
Christian valuation of man when we arefe reminded that 'the most 
fundamental activities(of the human mind) are non-rational 
and largely unconscious...........that " the power of
-s**7
e?*
conscious reasoning.,plays but a minor part even in the most 
highly developed human being..that in many cases the apparent 
importance of rational activity is seen to be illusory,forming
as it were, a mere cloak for the action of deep-seated
i 
instincts and desires." If this be true,if the power to
choose and behave rationally turns out in the end to be 
illusory,we are again in the grip of a determinism,either of 
the instincts or of the unconscious,and the worth of religious 
personality is negated.
Vfe remind ourselves again at this point of
the testimony of Hocking that the instincts are always under 
cerebral control ;"their nervous circuits include branches 
that run through the highest nervous centre, .which means that 
an instinct is an element of consciousness as well as of 
subconscious ness ; if falls within..a mind." To put it in 
other words,"the involuntary nervous system,which controls 
the unconscious bodily functions,though it possesses a 
certain degree of subsidiary independent action, is essentially 
an outflow from the cerebro-spinal system and under its 
general control."
"There is no subconscious which is out of
2 
consciousness." The rigid separation between the two is
1. The New Psychology, p. 14.
2. Hocking. The Meaning: of God in Human Experience, p.537. 
(this section of Hocking is valuable at this point) 
c.f. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, vol.ii IIos.1-2 
for a symposium on the subconscious.
is seen to be false,possibly only when we abstract the
ever-present under girding s elf-unity of ths organism. 
What is presently 1 an unconscious desire or wish 1 is distinct 
from the conscious in that the self has not yet been able 
to relate its urge to the meaning situation which will 
bring it satisfaction. The conscious desire is already aware 
of its 'to-be -attained' end and can satisfy itself in the 
attaining of it. The 'unconscious desire 1 , unable for some 
reason or other-probably painful-to become conscious, will 
maintain its demand for recognition until such time as the 
inhibition is consciously recognised and removed by the self, 
or another pathway to satisfactory expression is opened up 
through sublimation,
In any case,the real basie of religion
lies in our own conscious experience, in our awareness of 
values which determine the course of our existence. Insofar 
as we realise these values we are in touch with creative 
fa/ctors la a spiritual universe-the manifestations of God. 
"Beligious truth must be developed from knowledge acquired 
when our ordinary senses and intellectual operations are at 
their highest pitch of discipline. To move one step from this 
position towards the dark recesses of abnormal psychology is 
60 surrender finally any hope of a solid foundation for
*
religious doctrine."
i. Whitehead. Religion in the Making, pp.1' .
Elliot Smith and the"Quest for Lift".
It will be highly instructive,at this point, to 
listen again to the voiot of the anthropologist. Professor 
Elliot Smith, in his "Human History", argues most persuasively 
that the primal urge in men is a "quest for life". This life- 
quest is the recurrent motif in all the earliest literature 
of antiquity. BacX of all the ritual and folklore of primitive 
peoples there is the same problem of "how to attain mare new 
life". The deities of primitive people are wrongly interpreted
as "gods and goddesses of fertility". They are "givers of life,i 
not fertility mongers". Men seek life rather than fecundity.
These gods, as creators of mankind, are regarded as 
the source of man's life, ana their chief function is to 
preserve »™* to safeguard the life they have created. "It has 
become the fashion to scent sex in all human behaviour, .but the 
instinct of sex, even when its influence overflows the 
normal bounds of its natural functions, does not play the
same kind of role as the more fundamental and continuously3 
active instinct of self-preservation? Man is convinced
that in the affairs of sex he can shape his own behaviour, 
but in the matter of preserving life he is dealing with a 




for a moment evade, and in respect of which he needs all
the help he oan obtain. "This striving to achieve the ever-
i 
present and essential life quest is religion."
Attributed to Jehovah in the Old Testament 
is the quality that "He could cause to live and make alive 
again." He is the "fountain of life". Again, the Hebrew 
phrase which has been translated "God save the king" has as 
its more literal meaning "Long life to the king". In other 
words "grant him a new lease of life". This becomes at once 
illuminating Then we recall that "the earliest conception of 
a god was a pre-eminent human being who had died,and required
to be re-animated by mortals in order to obtain the immortality
2 
which was the distinctive attribute of his divinity". What
7 men sought in the long ago, is the same as they seek today,life.
This universal quest for life had had curious 
repercussions in the history of civilisation. We are 
more than ever convinced now that economics rests upon a 
spiritual, and not a material foundation. For when we ask 
why it is that the nations have adopted gold as the standard 
of their transactions, we discover that the rank of the gold 
is something more than the guinea stamp; the metal stands
1. Human History p.35
2. ibid. p.28
i
for something more than mere wealth. When gold first came
2 
into use it had the reputation of being a divine substance.
It was as a matter of fact identified with the gods and
3 
goddesses who controlled the giving of life. The world-wide
starches of early man for gold,to safeguard the immortality 
of the king-through whom they themselves obtained new life- 
have been among the great motivating causes of civilisation, 
The unique status of gold today is but another striking 
witness to the universal quest for life which has surged in 
the hearts of men from time immemorial.
It is to this quest for life that the Christian 
evangel makes its strongest appeal. We begin to see more 
clearly the implications of Jesus as the 'saviour of men 1 . 
The meaning of the word is rtally'giver of life 1 . Those who 
walked and talked with Him came somehow to see in Jesus the 
realisation of their search for life. He was the Life, and 
He came for the purpose of offering Himself to men as a 
fuller and more abundant life than they could possibly find 
for themselves. The gospel of the golden rule of love is 
the triumphant sublimation of the deep-seated search for 
life through the metal and the material gold.
Had Freud succeeded in building up a psychology 
on this higher basis of love, rather than on the level of 
s«x, he might have filled a need which Christianity still 
feels, the need of interpreting in terms of modern dynamic 
categories the living spirit of its Founder.
i, p.313 2. p.318 3. p.318
Rtligion as Projection.
We have still to consider tha new psychology's
most sinister threat to the Christian valuation of man. 
Christianity affirms man's uniqueness in tha fact that his 
spiritual aspirations are objectively grounded in a real 
God Who is at once the source and conserver and enricher 
of all his values. Man has his desires,consoious or 
unconscious, but he is also convinced that he is really 
desired. The age-long struggle for the realisation of his 
.spiritual possibilities is to be understood only in the 
light of this Godward affinity and attraction. Negate this 
and the axe is laid at the roots of the human tree of life.
It is just at this vital spot that the new
psychology threatens to apply the axe. The objective reality 
of the God and Father of Jesu : Christ is dissolved in the 
mists of man's subjective imaginings. To put it bluntly,our 
notion of God is nothing more than the outward projection of 
a 'father 1 image,carried over from infancy. To escape from 
the pressure of our inner discordance,we objectify the unity 
we are wishing for, and call our projection God. Once the 
projection is complete it takes to itself all the validity 
of objectivity,but its outwardness and reaMty is nothing 
more than an illusion, a 'wish-fulfilment' in the interests 
of mental unity. "In projection, as in repression, the mind 
refuses to acknowledge part of its own contents; but instead 
of refusing attention to the existence of the content in
question, it recognises its existence,while denying the 
ownership."
To the illusionist,we reply that the description 
or explanation of a method of experiencing is no test of the 
validity of the content experienced. Psychology is free to 
describe the method of experiencing the idea of God as a 
'wish-fulfilment 1 , but the description of the mental mechanism 
operating in the experience of God is quite a different 
matter from negating or establishing the reality of the God 
Y/ho is the object of the experience. Classified knowledge, 
which adds to the sum of human information, without taking 
into account the deeper needs motivating the desire for know­ 
ledge, is dealing only with, a second hand situation.
Actually, of course, as many have pointed out, to 
discredit the validity of the religious object on the score 
of projection, leads inevitably to the impasse of discrediting 
the validity of all knowledge whatever. For in a very real 
sense, all knowledge is a 'projection 1 experience. The trend 
of modern scientific interpretation is decidedly in the 
direction of a symbolism which recognises that the various 
laws descriptive of nature's behaviour are mental constructs 
conditioned by certain characteristics of the perceiving mind. 
But the scientist,in thus 'building up his world, does not 
thereby destroy its reality.
i. The New Psychology, p. 133.
f
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Behind the psychology of projection, there is a 
fallacy of faulty abstraction. It presumes that the self 
may exist apart from its object. But no self is ever an 
isolated self, functioning apartfc from the subject-matter 
of its own experience. Every experience involves a reciprocal 
activity of experiencer and experienced. In the act of 
experiencing there necessarily emerges, as distinct from 
the real content of experience, an interpretation, Tsfoich•*- f JL F
thougi distinct is never separate. It may be isolated for 
the purpose of psychological analysis, but the real self 
is never at any time apart from its "experienced".
The difference between religious and ordinary 
experience is not absolute. It is mainly a matter of the 
interpretation placed upon the content of experience. The 
self at all times has an inseparable continuity of contact 
with its "other than self", without which it could not be
a self at all. For religion, this "other than self" is
i 
interpreted as God.
This religious interpretation of experience, like 
any other, has to express itself through the mental mechanism 
available for the purpose. If this is to be called 'projection 1 , 
we shall have no quarrel with the name. But it must be 
insisted that the reality of God, or of any other experienced 
object is not invalidated by reason of the projection 
element which operates in the experience. There is no 
other way possible to human beings but to think of God in 
terms of our own personality. But the fact that we think of
1. c.f. later on in connection with feyn
r^^*~ -^ ri A n yv^•fc-Ai \J J^ Jj j »
2. this of course does not exhaust the divine nature.
Him in terms of what we know of our own personality is no 
more an argument that our thought is illusion thai the 
relativity of our spaoe-time conceptions of the external 
world is an argument that if you destroyed all the people who 
believe in the world you would destroy the world itself.
"Ho answer to the question how we come to hold a "belief is of
i 
itself an answer to the question whether the belief is true."
The noteworthy feature of the 'God-projection 1 lies 
in the religious fact that it has power to evoke in man value- 
responses which are sui generis,and not otherwise obtainable. 
Tht religious experience, from the very beginning, has been 
nourished 'sub specie aeternitatis 1 , conditioned by the 
sublimity of that 'Other 1 Whose presence alike pervaies 
natural phenomena and halnts human aspirations. Blended 
with this sense of the sublime there has been a profound 
intuition that the good itself was true. These rising 
religious experiences, bearing upon man with the full force 
of their imperative, have convinced him that they are not 
earth born. Man's own heart tells him that they are beyond 
his power to create, let alone achieve. The height of the 
high and the holy, the depth of the moral compulsion, the 
span of the lovely, these are man's despair rather than his 
creation. They are from above,not from beneath. Hence our 
recognition of Christ's command to Nicodemus to be born again, 
'from above'
i. Taylor. Evolution in the Light of Modern Knowledge p.474
at/
Man can appreciate absolute values, but he 
cannot create or conserve tliem. His 'projection'of them is 
contingent upon the reality behind them vfcich has quickened 
his own spirit into newness of life t so that finally men have 
been able to say 'by the grace of God, I am what I am. 1 
H.H.Farmer sums this up succinctly. "Onl£ the thought of 
God as the Father Whom Jesus knew can present man with the 
environment in which progressively fear is exorcised, the 
sting of death removed, the surges of egotism subdued, the
remorse of conscience assuaged, the claims of the intellect
i 
sufficiently satisfied." Man's apprehension of value is
a paradox apart from the reality of God. For the Christian, 
the paradox resolves itself in the historical objectivation 
of the Supreme Spirit in Jesus. In Him,fact and value were 
merged^nd objectively manifested whan the Word became Flesh 
and dwelt among us.
If it is true that man has'proje ct«d' his 
experience of God, we welcome 1his new vindication of what 
religion has always held to be the distinctive feature of 
m«n;for the projection can have been made possible only 
because there is within man's make-up a God experience which 
can be projected. This is one valuable lesson which Christian
M<«t<l»A
philosophy may learn from the new psychology. As 3airn|3 has
i. The Experience of God. p.181.
argued,"The Idea* must precede "the idea", "The Infinite" 
must precede "the infinite". This is the ground upon which 
God and man may meet. "The divine purpose is that values
should "be realised in man's- nature, and it can be attained
i
only "by man making this purpose his own." The psychological
analysis of projection is net deep enough to explore the 
depths of what is involved in man 'making the divine purpose 
his own*" The valuable element is the experience,and it is 
always primary.
In the light of this we understand the'crude
functioning' of the spirit, in primitive religions. Primitive 
man does not first 'create' his gods out of wood and stone, 
and then 'project' into these a supernatural significance. 
The reverse is rather the truth. Man experiences- in proport­ 
ion to his power to assimil^te-and then endeavours to inter­ 
pret his experience as "best he may with the mental equipment 
at his disposal. The interpretation becomes richer as the 
experience expands, but the religious experience is primary, 
and objectively conditioned.
To sum this matter up, the vital distinction 
between 'projection', considered psychologically and 
religiously lies in the quality of the compulsion which 
motivates the 'projection 1 . Psychologic ally,man projects 
what he would like to be; religiously, he projects what he 
ought to be$ The psychological projection depends finally 
i~. tf.B.Sorley. Moral Values & The Idea of God." p.492.
upon an unconscious instinctive urge, the illusory appeal 
of a temporary physical desire; the religious projection 
depends upon a conscious moral imperative, the eternal 
conviction of a spiritual need. Doubtless it could often 
be charged against some forms of religious projection that 
"thou thoughtest I v:as altogether such an one as thyself"; 
but the genuine religious experience of God cannot be so 
charged. For the God of the religious man is a jealous God, 
and a stern task-master. He imposes upon his worshippers 
moral restraints and sacrificial burdens such as no 
subjective wish-fulfilling projection would dare to do.
"Above and beyond all things the religious life is not a
i 
research after comfort".
This implies in the long run that man's 
'projection 1 of God is not the free creation of his own 
imagination but the spiritual symbol of his responsiveness 
to the divine aggression.
i. 7/hitehead. Science & the Modern Tforld. p.275
Conscience.
Psychologists have hesitated to grant to
religion this claim of the sui generis nature of the moral 
imperative which we have held to be the objective background 
of religious experience, and have sought to explain conscience 
in terms of naturalistic categories. The attempt has not 
proved successful.
"576 have already argued for the ^mergence of 
self-consciousness as the new departure accompanying and 
characterising the emergence of the distinctively human. 
We suggested that self-consciousmss carried with it the 
potent seed of the moral conscience. At the same time we 
admitted that the moral consciousness, while a unique 
emergence, required a social milieu within which to develop 
and expand its function. But to grant that the moral 
conscience arose in,and flourished in,social conditions, 
is not to admit* that'the ought 1 is thereby a social product, 
any more than to recognise the evolutionary affiliations 
of man is to confess that his present condition is a direct 
continuity of sub-human antecedents. The whole evolutionary 
process,psychically as well as physically, is bristling with 
constant nev/ starts all along the series. Ho matter when or 
how or vi/here the sense of moral obligation emerged,it implied 
the dawn of a new life synthesis, a-new ability to traffic 
with the environment on the level of 'value-discovering 1 , a 
nev; power to cooperate with personality-enriching factors 
previously unavailable-not "because of their absence-but 
through lack of articulated organs of outreach.
Conscience is neither emotion, nor social product,nor 
herd instinct. It has affinities with all three but identity 
with none.
It is not emotion. It is rather a selective principle of 
self conscious Judgment which has its own peculiar feelings 
of satisfaction or dissatisfaction according to the outcome of 
the whole activity which is under surveillance. This ability 
to select and criticise and discriminate arises out of the fact 
that self-consciousness,even in its most primitive form,is 
never an isolated consciousness, but a fellowship of the private 
self with that 'more than self whose continuous environing 
represents that progressive degree of cosmic enrichment which 
the self is able to appropriate in proportion to its owns 
articulateness and its growth in experience. We are not born 
with a finished moral code. But we are born with a degree of 
integrated intelligence, and this intelligence is able to 
exploit its autonomy in the moral as well as in the perceptual 
sphere of experience, with increasing efficiency.
Neither is conscience mere social custom, since it 
depends largely for its genuine growth and expansion upon its 
ability to criticise and transcend social conventions and taboos. 
Moreover we beli9ve,with Sorley, that there is sufficient 
material in the individual life integration- apart from its
overflow into the social milieu-to furnish data for a 
qualitative value judgment out of the relative values of 
the different personal desires and volitional systems 
experienced within the self. "Even if religion and
morality were dismissed -is illusion," declares 3d ding ton,
i 
"the ought still has sway". Apart from the social content
of conscience there is an experiential unit of value in 
the moral imperative which evades naturalistic analysis. 
The self, "before it can know itself as such, must have 
social affiliation, "but the self has value nevertheless as 
a unique, though not an isolated, core of life-. This unique­ 
ness is shared "by the moral conscience. We take it that 
this sense of the self f s private worth is involved in 
Whitehead's paradox that 'religion is what the individual 
does with his solitariness."
Again, conscience cannot be assimilated
into the instinctive life of man. It undoubtedly shares the 
oonative impulse of instinct, for conscience is creative,not 
static. But the urge of instinct is from beneath; the urge 
of conscience is from above. Its critical function is not 
confined to discrimination through former stereotyped 
standards; it creates new norms of value in proportion as 
the whole self absorbs enhanced worth, from the environment 
through experience. Hence it is legitim-^ to expect 
changing standards of obligation and duty in relation to 
changing life-situations, without compromising the fast that 
i Science & the Unseen Vforld.
there is just as much content of duty in the new situation 
as in the old. The imperative of duty remains as an integral 
part of the whole self throughout all its changes in time. 
Conscience is that function of the self which criticises 
its own metaphysical nature and stimulates it into new 
cosmic direction. It is humanity's most subtle instrument 
for integrating potencies and perversities.
Conscience transcends instinct or desire 
in the quality of its motivating compulsion. Desire is
experienced as an activity of the self proceeding wholly
g 
from within. It is different with the moral obligation.
Its autonomy may be self imposed, in the sense of being
personally accepted, but the imperative of conscience
e 
contains a 'without 1 as well as a'within 1 . Our very acceptanc
of its demands implies objective significance.
•
The coupling of conscience with the 'herd- 
instinct 1 is ori a par with conscience and social custom. The
•
criticism is similar. ThoullesJ acknowledges the part 
played by the 'herd instinct' in developing the religious 
consciousness, but rightly points out that the development
of this experience calls for a complementary activity,
ct 
namely the instinct to suppress and antagonise the herd instil
This is a legitimate criticism, for it rarely happens that 
'vox populi' is'vox dei f . The men of true conscience-and
1. Introd. to Psychology of Religion, 
chapter on the Herd instinct.
2. c.f J.B.Turner Ihilosophical Basis of lloral Obligation. 
p.222.
hence of true worth- have "been those with the courage 
to listen to the true self, and to obey its demands 
rather than those of the"herd*. -
Finally, anthropology refuses to admit 
the concept of a 'primal horde 1 or a 'herd-instinct'.The 
evidence reveals no trace of the assembling of any herd
of primitive man,other than the family group,either for
i 
self defence or any other purpose." -
Each stare in the evolutionary process
must be taken for what it is now, rather than what is has 
been$ not so much what it has developed out of as what 
it has developed into and has the power yet to become. 
Bach new life synthesis carries within itself the norm 
of its om interpretation. The Christian interpretation 
of conscience recognises the presence of that'responsive 
otherness 1 without which all religious experience is a 
paradox. Kan's developed sense of the eternal values, 
experienced in part through the instrument of conscience, 
testifies to genuine kinship wi th a value enriching eleifcent 
in the cosmos. God does not implant a full grown conscience. 
He is we believe the sustaining background of those 
conditions of experience with which man can cooperate 
towards the enrichment of the personality for which 
he has been made responsible.Through conscience,we recognise 
ourselves as citizens of some larger spiritual world in 
which the imperative of morality is necessarily grounded.
i.Elliot Smith History of Man. p. 255
In arriving at a description of the fundamental 
religious experience we are not yet accustomed to the thought 
of imbibing inspiration at the springs of science. But we art 
indebted to Whitehead,nevertheless, for a clear perception of 
the primary paradox which lies at the heart of the Christian 
consciousness. "Heligion is the vision of something which 
stands beyond and within the passing flux of immediate things, 
something which is yet real,and yet waiting to be realised; 
something which is a remote possibility and yet the greatest
of present facts; something which gives meaning to all that
i 
passes and yet eludes apprehension".
This lure of the Infinite, proportionately
apprehended as the organism is spiritually integrated, affirms 
the presence of the Eternal in the present moment of experience. 
Here the human element in the 'God projection 1 ia transcended, 
In the religious experience both God and man literally come 
into their own. There are real truths which are only spiritually 
discerned,even if they are psychologically described. "As many 
as art led by the spirit, they are the sons of God."
1. Science and the Modern World, p.275
2. Romans, viii. 14.
8, The Positive Contribution of the New Psychology.
The new psychology has not yet received the right 
hand of fellowship from Christian theologians, and it has 
scarcely merited it. The Christian philosophy of man was 
bound to tak» up arms against a foe which invaded its 
"sanctum sanctorum", threatening to desecrate the ark of 
real religious experience. Humanity,voided of a genuine ' 
religious consciousness grounded in a real God, loses all 
its distinctive worth.
Nevertheless Christi/siity is indebted, and deeply 
obligated to psychology for a faesh insight into the worth
of man, and a profound appreciation of the processes at work
i 
within his moral personality.
Behind the pictorial diagram of the "unconscious", 
and the instincts, there lies a very real religious truth 
which Christian theory oannot afford to neglect. Man's 
religious vrorth is not understood apart from the knowledge 
that 'beneath 1 the consciously controlled moral and spiritual 
motives of his life, there is the surge of "repressed personality" 
seeking expression through other than consciously motivated
i. For an excellent appreciation, in readable form, of the 
contribution of psychology to the understanding of 
religious personality c.f. "Psychology's Defence of The 
Faith". D. Ytllowlees. 1-ublished by the S.C.M.
behaviour. Tht hypothesis of the unconscious has the pragmatic 
efficacy of reminding us that racial as well as individual 
traits form part of our mental and spiritual equipment,and that 
the seemingly integrated personality might be harbouring,under- 
neath the surface-a very real mental conflict. "Forgetting" is 
not necessarily nor always to be regarded as a mere lapse of 
time experience. It might be the symptom of a desire to escape 
from mental and spiritual discord,which succeeds only in 
repressing, but not in satisfying the discordant elements in the 
experience. Until the real way of life is consciously opened 
up, the repressed personality will strive for satisfaction, 
probably in illegitimate ways. The importance of this for the 
problem of sin is at once obvious.
The discovery of the 'natural man 1 is of course not 
confined to the domain of psychology. Certainly it is as old 
at least as Christianity itself. The 'complex 1 phraseology 
of psychology may give more expressive force to the facts in 
a modern scientific language, but it deals with exactly the 
same human nature which Christianity has always had to wrestle 
with.
The recorded activities of Jesus show quite clearly 
His understanding of the truth that life cannot move forwards 
into the fuiness of its possibilities until certain harriers 
of repressed personality have been removed. To consider a 
familiar instance, Jesus on one occasion frankly explained to 
the wealthy young ruler,who inquired about eternal life, that 
the conditions of entrance included a conscious breaking down
of the inner barrier which was keeping the man out. Part of 
his lift possibilities were cramped and repressed by his self- 
imposed powerlessness to adventure into a life where economics 
were not the finally important factor. The story,as we read
it, is not intended as a stricture against wealth as such. The
i 
inhibiting factor might have been anything. The story is a
religious interpretation of life which takes its stand alongside 
the modern psychological judgment that the free course of the 
more abundant kind of life may be repressed by loyalties to 
lesser things. We may focus our personalities about'slave 
sentiments 1 rather than 'master ideals'. The pull of the 
natural man may sidetrack the expression of the spiritual 
possibilities.
i. c.f Luke 9. 57ff.
where Jesus deals with various 'defence mechanisms' 
which rationalised rnens 1 hesitation to accept His 
invitation to follow Him.
Most of all, it is in their mutual insistence 
that the real life is a whole life, that religion and 
psychology may join foroes. Psychology, in its prosaic 
scientific categories,dwells upon the need of an integrated 
personality. Christianity, in more poetio though not less 
insistent terms .emphasises the same need when it challenges 
the worth of a man with the kind of life which declares
that if the eye "be single, the whole tody will he full of
i 
light. It also urges the same plea for functional
wholeness when it draws an analogy between the Kingdom of 
God, and the action of a man who, finding a pearl of great
price,goes and sells all that he has in order that he might
2 
possess it. And he can possess it at no less a price
than everything that he has*
The progressive exorcising of the complexes 
which impede the free play of this larger life in terms of 
wholeness is as much the care of Christianity as it is the 
concern of the psychologist. Psycho-analysis, at its highest, 
is a sincere attempt to set the whole man free that he may 
live and love with undistracted heart and mind and soul. 
Psychology reminds us that 'fear is the great inhibitor of
action 1 . Jesus in his own way counsels us to 1 take no thought
3 of the morrow 1 . Psychology draws a vivid picture of the
danger of the split personality. Jesus draws attention to the
same peril when he declares that we cannot serve God and
4
Mannion.
i. 2. 3. 4. c.f Matt. ch.6.
The riiole Sermon on the Mount is most illuminating in this
connection.
The supreme values of Christianity are
suggested by the Kingdom of God, a conception which,like the 
diamond has many facets. Most of all this idea gleams with 
the Uaougit of human brotherhood. Both psychology and religion 
are deeply implicated in the effort to remove the impediments 
which prevent the expression of the kind of character necessary 
to this brotherhood. Using its own technique,psychology traces 
the remote and immediate causes of such barriers as self-assertior 
and prejudice, seeking to sublimate their energy around the 
focus of some ideal sentiment. Christianity is no less urgent 
in its effort to release the larger life. The command that we 
should forgive not once,but seventy times seven, is onlay one 
of many practical warnings that until the barriers of pride 
and prejudice are down, the new life cannot come flooding in 
like the main.
J.A.Hadfield points out clearly the truth that 
nature will not give of her strength to those who will not 
expend their owi energy, the law of the spiritual life being 
that only by giving may we ourselves receive. Psychology in 
this regard simply confirms the verdict of Christianity in 
its estimate of the worth of a man. "To him that hath shall be
given, and from him that hath not, shall be taken away even
i 
that which he hath."
i. c.f. Matt. 25. 29.
The Christian valuation of man seeks its practical 
expression in personality integrated and motivated by the 
religious ideal, that is, in men and women who live and move 
and have their "being in God. It is here that Christianity 
goes "beyond psychology. Bach presents a focus for the ideal 
integration of personality, but over Against the "master- 
sentiment" of psychology stands the "Master-sentiment" of 
Christianity. The final sublimation of personality for 
Christianity is not a mere asceticism of the flesh; it is 
self-expression in and througi and for the sake of the larger 
self. This larger self is conceived as operating in the 
living Personality which commands the whole-hearted service 
of those who recognise and accept its imperative. This life 
in the larger self marks the emergence of a new level of 
personality where psychological categories cease to be 
explanatory. It is only from within the religious experience 
itself that this new worth of man can be evaluated. Moreover 
the emergence of the new creature may be characterised by that 
abruptness which distinguishes all "emergence". On the other 
hand, the expansion of- the new emergence mays be a matter of 
education.
The advent of the new psychology has also brought with
it a fresh emphasis upon the feeling element involved in
i 
experience. Instinctive behaviour is seen to be coloured by
the peculiar emotion which accompanies it and at the same 
timt characterises its expression. This feeling-tone brings 
satisfaction to the self when instinct is functioning properly
o.f. Shand.The foundation of Character.p.57
for the feelings accompanying conscience.
around the focus of the ideal or sentiment with which 
the self has chosen to identify itself in action. It
passes over into happiness 'when all the instinctive
i 
emotions are expressed in harmony 1 Happiness, for
psychology is the accompaniment of the well ordered 
life.
It will at once be obvious that in 
this emphasis upon right emotional satisfaction, 
psychology and religion are at one. The most character­ 
istic note of the New Testament is joy; not the f joy 1 
which is usually associated with complacent quiescence 
or pietistic somnambulism, but the joy of achievement 
which comes when the religious individual has associatied 
himself with a programme of right living and conduct. 
This was the joy which Jesus offered to those who were 
willing to accept the ideal of the Kingdom of God and
to organise their lives in terms of its inspiration.
2 
In the parable of the talents, the reward of the working
servants was the invitation to enter into the joy of their
Lord* The first-fruits of the spirit are love,joy and
3 
peace.
1. Hadfield. Psychology & Morals, p.86
2. Matt; 25. 14ff. 3. Gal. 5;22.
9. Sin, Tht Negative Element in the Heligious Worth of Man 
So far as our argument has gone, we have discerned 
in man nothing but positive values. This however, has been 
possible only because we have deliberately ignored until 
now a v*ry profound negative assessment of the worth of 
humanity which religion itself has arrived at. We refer 
to the fact of sin. Tradition theology has been so 
tragically impressed by the magnitude of this flaw in 
human nature that it has not hesitated to hold up man as 
the signal failure in the universal scheme of tilings. The 
whole oreation fell from grace in Adam. To deny this final 
tenet was to undermine the very foundations of faith. 
Evolutionary theory has simply opened up a new 
perspective witiiout invalidating the reality of the fact of 
sin. The Adamic anthropolog7, with its primitive psychology 
of corporate guilt, has been replaced by a sense of 
individual and social responsibility in which each man is his 
own Adam. It is interesting however, to see an optimistic
trtnd in certain schools of anthropology, wb»ere natural man
i 
is again hailed as nature's gentleman. Elliot Smith, and
2 
H.J.Massingham, both see in primitive man a state of
innoeency, unsophisticated as yet by contact with civilisation, 
and they leave us with the suggestion that man would be better 
than he is if he had been left to the free unfettered sway 
of his instinctive life. "No interpretation of human
i. History of Man. 2. Golden Age.
character can possibly conform to the principles of 
scientific inquiry unless the Justice,veracity,and fidelity 
of natural man is admitted as a fact of observation, 
and any departure from such innate morality as the result 
of some specific int«rf erence ,physical,psychical,or social, 
with the natural process." "There is implanted,in every 
human being, an innate sense of honesty and goodness*-which 
Elliot Smith locates in the thalamus-"quite apart from the
conventional ideal of morality "-located in the cortex and
2 
hence secondary*
Instructive as it might prove to follow up this 
highly suggestive lead, we prefer to let it stand just as it 
is. We have committed ourselves to the principle that each 
new phase in the evolutionary series carries within itself 
the norm of its own interpretation. Opinions differ as to 
the character of primitive man. We are not now dealing with 
primitive man but with man as we find him today, and man as 
he is cannot be trusted with the free unfettered coursing of 
his instinctive tendencies. The moral consciousness, when 
not blinded by its owi conceit, confesses to an urge within
the self which does not make for righteousness. There is
3 
that, "from within", "out of the hearts of men", which has the
power to trace the bar sinister on the shield of humanity's 
high lineage. Whatever explanation we shall finally arrive 
at, sin for us is a real,ugly and a tragic fact of human 
experience everywhere.
i. Human History, p.196. 2. ibid. p.180 ff. 3 Mark.7.21
Evolutionary Interpretations of Sin.
How are we to explain the presence of this 
negative factor in personality? Why do we sin? Evolutionary 
is ready with its replies, offer ing as a variety from which 
to choose. Our sin is merely the sign of a faulty adjustment 
to the changing life situation. Here the explanatory concept 
is the "biological category of organism and environment. Or 
our sin may "be an atavistic thro whack to the subhuman 
condition, the inescapable consequence of the strength of 
the instinctive urges within us. Sin thus becomes a natural
*,
impulse rather than a. moral choice; under the guise of
incompletely controlled appetite it evades the condemnation
\ 
of the outraged conscience. Again,it may be nothing more
serious than custom, since to err is human. Here "the 
touch of nature that makes the whole world kin takes the 
form of confessing a common weakness", and supposes that 
in confessing its weakness is has glosset over the heinous- 
ness of the sin. The contribution of psychology is much 
more profound, making for a much needed distinction between 
sin and moral disease. We have "been brought to see that 
what was formerly attributed to deliberate evil-doing may 
be better understood in terms of dissociated personality 
induced by repressions and complexes for which the conscious 
aspect of personality should not be held responsible.
To our way of .thinking, neither anthropology 
nor biology nor psychology can furnish the categories 
which penetrate to the heart of the problem of sin. 
Anthropology has furnished us with a more intelligent 
understanding of the history of our development as human 
beings, but history never has the last word in any 
interpretation of living personality. Biology has given 
revealing insight into the mechanics of our inheritance, 
but it is bad biology to think that the ancient strands 
of our personality still persist in their pre-human 
texture. The organism is a unity,constantly renewing 
itself. The old threads of inheritance were well knotted 
when humanity emerged to take over the loom of life. It 
is sound logie that the higher cannot be interpreted in 
terms of the lower. Psychology in its turn has saved us
from the erro* of identifying the psychopathic and the
i ' 
neurotic with the sinning and the perverted, but it has
been compelled to pause on the threshold of a religious 
experience into wliich it cannot enter. The problem of sin 
can only be dealt with through essentially religious 
categories since it involves a factor which tra/nscends 
the space-time schema.
i. The Freudian theory of neuroses is criticised and a
constructive account of their nature offered in as." 
Lancet 1 July. 17. 1926. by A.B.Davis,"Psychic Traum-
Sin as Religious Belationship.
All evolutionary interpretations of sin are
incomplete, in our opinion, because they evaluate human worth 
in terms of morality rather than in terms of religion. The 
distinction between these two brings us close to the crux of 
our problem. The essence of morality is the striving for 
successful adjustment of our mutual human interests,insofar 
as these are compatible with the maximum of social well being. 
Thus morality is free to interpret itself through the biological 
concepts of organism and environment. But the Christian 
valuation of man leads him into a higher destiny than merely 
taking care of himself and his group interests, for the simple 
reason that man is something more than a biological organism. 
This higher destiny of man is discerned only in the 
strictly religious relationship. Religion means living not 
only for the sake of successful adaptation to human interests; 
it involves also the adjustment of our human interests to that 
more than human responsive ness in the cosmic environment, upon 
which we are dependent for the awakening of our richest 
personal experiences. And so far is religion above the moral 
plane that the religious adjustment may impose upon the moral 
and the social relationship a sacrificial imperative which 
outs rigbt across the morality level. It is 
a hard saying, nevertheless for Christians a very profound
and necessary truth,that f he that loveth father
i 
mother more than me is not worthy of me" T7e personally
"believe that the moral and the religious factors in 
experience are never at any time separate, "but morality
cannot "be called upon to do the complete work of religion*
There is a supra-human element in life which awakens 
and nourishes our religious experience. This is the objective 
background Whose response to our spiritual outreach removes it 
from the taint of subjectivity. Sin is never anything less than 
a deliberate human breach of the relation between the two. Sin
is not merely 'treachery to the whole scheme of things'. 
It might involve that as one of its many consequences,"but 
the God against Whom man sins is not to "be identified with 
the generally evolving cosmos. We mean by God that supra- 
personal and extra-human activity in the general cosmos 
whose actuality and possibility of good answers to our 
human efforts in the same direction. It is against this 
good personality that we sin,'against thee and thee only 1 . 
Hence the truth that our despair and our sense of futility 
mark our human greatness rather than our cosmic insignificance 
Our sin at the last is the bar sinister on our high lineage, 
for in his deepest sin man stands face to face with God 
Himself.
i. Matt. 10. v.37
In this religious relationship, the divine imperative- 
which wt soripturally recognise as the Will of God- is 
that man shall seek to foster the possibilities of 
personality within themselves and respect them in others, 
all the while aiming at the fulfilment of these possibilities 
of personality in terms of the divine goodness which was 
objectively revealed in the life of the historic Jesus.
Once a man has stepped out of this high communion, he 
has sinned. It needs no very profound searching of the 
human heart then,to confess that none of us may make claim 
to any merit here. This is the religious core of the 
primitive theological dictum that we are "horn in sin" 
and n§ed to be "born from above". Once this discovery has 
been personally appropriated-and discovery is never isolable 
from its complementary experience of revelation-then, as 
Professor Macintosh has pointed out, "it is all over with 
self-satisfaction.. .we must either sink or swim, or we must 
find God. We are undone except as there is made free to 
us the forgiving love of God."
The final resolution of sin ana the restoration of the 
religious status lies with the transcendent activity of the 
divine side of the relationship. Man is worth so much to God 
that He is unwilling to leave the links of the love chain 
broken. But man must oome to the forge of his own freewill.
If this experience of divine forgiveness has 
no objective significance, we are ready to admit that 
nothing else in heaven or earth is ultimate;the silver 
cord is loosed and the golden bowl is broken. ..and the 
dust shall return unto the earth as it was.
Sin thesis the deliberate violation of a personal 
relationship with the divine. It necessarily involves 
the deliberate choice of a human agenttv/ho by his very 
nature as human, is free to cooperate Y/ith, ot to set 
himself against, the divine good will, but not in the 
end to overthrow it. 7/e have sourht to show the strength 
of this subjective striving throughout the whole evolut­ 
ionary process. 17e believe that it holds the key to the 
interpretation of the whole historical development of 
life. The evolutionary process is not a mere generalised 
capricious flowing through time; it is a genuine movement 
with sustained direction depending for its reality upon 
the ability of the organism to select-or reject-meaningful 
experiences out of the traffic with vitalising aspects 
of its environment. The culmination of the process is 
the moral freedom of man to labour with or against God. 
Human purpose finally emerges above natural selection. 
The seed that was sown and nourished in the garden of 
nature has blossomed intcma tree in th e garden of life.
Behind the fact of man's real freedom to rebel we
lA^fMjL,
find ourselves,to penetrate. There is an unanalysable datum 
in man which deliberately sets itself in opposition to the 
rest of human nature, which fights even to the point of 
destruction a great part of the total structure of human 
existence. The apostle Paul was so impressed "by the presence
of this alien element in man that he was driven to declare,
i 
"it is no more I that do it, but sin that dwelleth in me".
But the practical faul never for a moment finally dissociated 
this "sin" from the actual agency of the sinning personality. 
Sin is always a personal responsibility. It is extra-human 
and alien to life only in so far as man is unable to 
harness for good the power of its constructive might which 
motivates the freedom to sin. Sin may be starved out by 
diverting to healthier tasks the energies which have to be 
used by the self in exercising or resisting it.
Human experience confesses sin as a universal 
fact, yet not an inevitable one. It is doubtful if Jesus 
considered sin as unavoidable. He simply took for granted 
the obvious fact that humanity had sinned, thereby cramping 
its possible worth in God, Inevitability of sin would deny 
human autonomy and rob sin of its meaning. Man need not fall. 
His nature as man implies the freedom to risk a fall, and 
the power has been freely exercised universally. Yet behind the
i. Horn. 7; 17.
negative dignity ot human worth implied In the freedom 
to rebel and to fall, there is the positive power of the 
goodwill to surrender and to rise again. The final worth 
of a man is bound up with this ability of the vfcole will 
to reassert its autonomy by leading back into the 
convalescence of the spirit the fragmented will which has 
elected for the time to live apartfcfrom the healing influences 
of the divine.
Sin is the great destroyer of human worth 
because it arises out of the decision to live apart from
the Good.
Beligious Value of Defective Personali 1s
Our interpretation of sin as a deliberately
willed violation of the religious relationship has exposed 
us to a problem which still awaits systematic treatment at 
the hands of Christian philosophers of human values. How 
are we to estimate the worth,religiously, of the individual 
whose will is defective, in such oases for instance as 
insanity and imbecility? W.R,Matthews reminds us that "in 
religion we are dealing with an experience which begins with 
the most primitive state of consciousness and does not have 
to wait for the development of full moral personality and 
self conscious reasoning. The first spring of religion is 
some immediate intuition or 'feeling 1 which lies below the 
ordinary conscious mental processes."
We agree fully that the religious experience is
i. God in Christian Thought and Experience, p.9.
a primary datum of personality,nevertheless a real problem 
emerges when the will itself proves abortive,perhaps from 
"birth, and unable to appreciate its own value.
Speaking as a practicing psycho-pathologist, 
De Sanctis states that 'the conception of God is always 
lacking in idiots' • We have personally known of such an 
aberrant 'personality 1 , born limbless,remaining- to all 
outward appearances nothinr more than a drooling idiot 
till its death at the age of 19. Obviously of course such 
concepts as sin are outlawed here. But just how are we to 
assess the religious worth of such abortions? The social 
problem may be,and is,solved on a biological basis, by 
the'removal'at birth, of micro-cephalic monsters, but the 
religious predicament as to the assessment of their 
religious -worth still remains.
It will not do of course to relegate these 
'unfortunates' to the faith that every evil has a divine 
providence concealed within it. Stated bluntly the final 
implication of such a creed is the demoralisation of God. 
Th«re is * partial approach to the problem in the recognition 
of the reality of human agency in the evolutionary provess. 
The corjdfi-ary to man's freedom to sin covers every aspect 
of life,implying the ability to mutilate as well as to 
create, and to introduce consequences into every act. More­ 
over the weakest link in the chain of consequences is not 
necessarily the last. At the same time,when all due allowance
i.Religious Conversion. London. 1927.p.7
boa "been made for the power of free human agency to make 
or to ma* personality.it still remains possible to ask in 
counties* oases "who did sin, this man or his parents?"
In admitting the problem of defective
human worth, we are now compelled to lay our metaphysical 
cards upon the table, since there is an underlying meta- 
physic in all things.
Life,for human beings,becomes valuable 
through the categories of birth,development and Aeath- 
although of course it need not necessarily part with its 
value outside of these categories* Ho philosophy of man 
oan escape consideration of Beginnings and endings,along 
with the fact of real value existence, which emerges in 
the growth and deoay maintained "between these two horizons* 
These are,so to speak,the loom on which man weaves the 
pattern of his earthly destiny.
But the pattern of our human destiny is little 
more than a jig saw puzzle until set in the framework of 
eternity. Seen from the standpoint of the totality of 
things,insofar as these are capable of human apprehension, 
the motif of the universe-if we read it aright- is the 
maintenance of those creative life conditions in cooperation 
with which our humanity may produce its own peculiar 
values and progressively increase its richness. Belief
in a law of necessary prog**** is no article in our
»
religious creed, but itfacademics commonplace that science 
today is opening up to us in nature a living reality in 
which the whole is more than the sum of its parts, and 
things are not only what they have become, but also what 
they might yet become. The evolutionary process is not a 
simple re-arrangement of previously existent constituent 
elements; it is a holistic activity which constantly issues 
in and facilitates the emergence of new and richer realities. 
Man is now compelled to acknowledge that he lives ifl and is 
organically related to a universe where the door is thrown 
open to possibilities hitherto unimaginable. The category 
of potentiality is objectively grounded in the experiential 
fact that the creative forces of the cosmos have found in man 
a responsible partner fit to be entrusted with the privilege 
of cooperative creativity.
The vital factor in this creative partnership 
is that the relationship is free, not determined. Man, if 
he so wills it, may refuse to let the creative process 
function througi his personality. He takes the choica-and 
its consequences. He may even destroy the laborious gains 
of evolution which have issued in himself, and in the 
beginnings of a i&iifft rU relationship with his fellow-men. 
Again the choice anft the consequences are inseparable. The
limned! a tt result is a stultification of personality-what 
other results may be is not given to us to determine. On 
tht positivt side, man may vindicate the worth of his 
humanity by discovering in the heart of nature the secret 
of its own creative process and undertake to collaborate 
with it towards the establishing of the Kingdom of God upon
the earth* 
10. The Modern Recognition of a Meaningful Environment,
This recognition of the importance of the part
played by environment in evolutionary advance is one of the 
recent significant admissions in evolutionary theory. The 
chief sin of Neo-Darwinian was not so much its naturalisation 
of man as its assertion of a meaningless universe in which 
man himself was nothing but a meaningless accident. Time was 
when to admit meaning and purpose into the universe was to 
be guilty of a soientifie'faux-pas 1 . That day has gone. 
Science today is not ashamed to offer itself as the instrument 
through which the spirit of man may enter into creative
affinity with the value-stimulating forces in the universe.
Renderson*—————— The restricted 'adaptedness 1 of the ^aleyan type
is of course gone. But it has been replaced by a wider 
ttleology of the whole which more and more impresses the 
investigating mind. The 'new teleology 1 o£ Lawrence J. 
Henderson is a case in point. Hendetson, interested in 
physical and chemical processes, rather than in strictly
religious values, concludes as the result of his study of 
the order of nature that the environment betrays a fitness 
for the maintenance of life hitherto unsuspected. His f new 
teleology 1 arises out of the fact that had the physico- 
chemical properties of the earth's crust been anything 
different from what they are-particularly in the matter of 
water and carbonic acid-then organic life would have been 
impossible. Between the properties of matter and the 
phenomena of life he discovers a 'peculiar ahd unsuspected 
relationship 1 , which does not disclose itself when the 
properties of matter are studied abstractly and analytically* 
But when viewed in the light of the whole scheme of things, 
both cosmic and biological, it has a dynamic significance 
in time. The whole evolutionary process is then seen to yield 
results "not merely contingent, but resembling those which 
in human action we recognise as purposeful."
i 
Hence this investigator concludes his book with
the declaration that "the whole evolutionary process, both 
cosmic and organic is one, and the biologist may now rightly 
regard the universe in its very essence as biocentric."
i. Fitness of the Environment. New York. 1913. 
o.f. also his The Order of Nature.
Evolution and Potentiality*
Broadly conceived in the light of this whole movement,
evolution suggasts to us a dramatic description of life's 
striving to establish this 'biooentricity' of the universe, 
in an ascending ratio of increasing intensity. The effort 
begins in the'material'matrix trough which life first 
functions. Its present attainment is the integrated self- 
oonsciousness of man. Between these two events in the time 
scale the life stream has moved away from matter towards 
spirit, from the temporal to the eternal. But we have 
obtained our freedom at a great price, for nature has 
traversed the 'via crucis 1 . By reason of causes not wholly 
explicable in terms of human agency, life may fail to achieve 
successful integration in its embodying medium and attain 
only partial and abortive personality.
Yet even the arrested personality has its own value;
there may be discovered the key which will unlock its prison
i 
doors* However, if not, so long as there has emerged a
private core of life, furnishing the necessary ground of 
fin individual "being-for-oneself", there is present a life 
integration which possesses potential as well as actual worth. 
Ultimately, the difference of degree of worth resident tS82£5&$ 
in the normal and the subnormal,is relatives, not absolute. Each 
life core lives its own particular moment of meaning with 
greater or less intensity,not only for its own sake, but
i. c.f. the fact that the administration of the active 
principle of the thyroid gland can transform 
certain types of idiot into normal people in a 
very few days.
but in the greater life of the whole. This is the finally 
significant worth of personality, not so much its present 
actuality as its potentiality .arising cut of its affinity 
with the value^increasing phase of the cosmos. For this 
1 greater-than-self 1 is not conditioned by the space-time 
categories which hamper the f£ee expression of human 
individuality. When it is conceived as eternal,love, its 
contribution to the enrichment of man's life is not even 
limited to what man can earn for himself. For the Christian, 
God so loves that he must give.
We come then to recognise the force of
potentiality as a decisive factor in estimating the worth 
of personality. This,we consider, is a critical issue in 
any intelligent conception of evolution. "There is more 
in movement", declared Bergson, 'than the successive 
positions attributed to the moving objects, more in 
becoming than in the forms passed throu^a". There is as 
a matter of fact the process as a whole,stimulating and 
conserving values richer than those yet actualised in 
the- events of the human time schema. To quote the words 
of Whitehead, "The passage of nature-which is only another 
name for the creative force of existence-has no narrow 
ledge of definite instantaneous present within which to
operate. Its operative presence,which is now urging nature
^__________ _ ___ ______ _______-———~~—^*^i*i*^i^^^mmn*^UHHBrmi*fatsfxm
i. Creative Evolution. Sng. tr. p.310.
forward mast be sought for throughout the whole,in the 
remotest past,as well as In the narrowest breadth of any 
present duration. Perhaps also in the unrealised future.
Pwrhaps also in the future which mi$it he as well as the"i. 
actual future that will he.
In other words,life holds infinite 
possibility,as well as limited actuality.
Potentiality & Entropy.
In claiming potentiality as a primary
postulate of the evolutionary movement in life and nature, 
we are not unmindful of the threat to potentiality in the 
law of increasing entropy. Seen from the standpoint of the 
physicist, some are convinced that the universe is ordained 
to a progressive degradation of its energy. The end of the 
matter is simple, universal equilibrium,and final annihilat­ 
ion. Potentiality confronted with entropy seems a broken crutch 
for life to march upon.
!7e are not persuaded however that the second 
law of thermodynamics may be legitimately converted into a 
universal proposition covering every manifestation of real 
experience, nor that the degradation of physical energy 
necessarily coincides with and involves the dissipation of 
the eternal values. For us there is a more ultimate 
question, namely Aether the universe is a cosmos,and therefore 
possessing knowable intelligibility. TCe believe that it is.
We ourselves are not competent to evaluate
i» The Concept of Nature, p.73.
the implications of the Einstein Theory. Some who are, have 
held that the pessimistic co smological G onelusions of the
law of increasing entropy are avoided "by the theory of
i 
relativity. furthermore,it is strongly urged "by Hillikan-
though denied "by Jeans and Eddington-that there is positive 
evidence of tremendous energetic synthesising processes at 
work in outer space t making for the re-organisation of 
finally disintegrated energy into a new condition of integrat­ 
ion and complexity. Hence the ultimate fate of energy is 
reasonably conceived as a rhythmic ebb and flow into newness 
of expression.
TVhatever be the final outcome of the disaggee- 
ment among the experts, certainly in the biological segment 
of the cosmic circle there is a downright tendency on the 
part of the developing organism to shun degenerate change, 
and to avoid equilibrium, since equilibrium involves stabilised 
adaptation,and hence organic death. From the cell upwards, 
there is an anabolic process at work, constantly setting itself 
in antagonism to the katabolic process of physics. The 
organism is ever renewing itself, taking in new substances, 
replacing waste tissues, and regenerating itself in the germ- 
plasm.
In the supra-biological field of experience, 
the human organism escapes the degradation of physical 
katabolism by exploiting its affinity with the personality-
i. Urban. The Intelligible World, p.40". footnote.
This book-especially from p.273ff-is a valuable criticism 
of the concept of evolution in relation to values.
expanding elements in the environment which defeat equilibrium, 
The end result of the human anabolic reciprocity with life 
is the emergence of 'the new creature 1 , liberated from the 
corrosive influences of time by kinship with the eternal.
The words of Julian Huxley are a cautious 
but candid admission of iiiis anabolic movement in living 
things. "There exists a certain general direction of movement 
in the evolution of living things....we find(this) is movement 
towards a realisation of the things judged by the human mind 
to have value* It is a movement towards increase of power, 
of knowledge.of purpose,of omotion.of harmony,of independence. 
what is important is that the human idea of value finds its 
external counterjart in an actual historical direction in
4
phenomena."
i. Essays of a Biologist. p.59 f.
garl Helm's Doctrine of the Perspective Figure*
Our analysis of the significance of the evolutionary 
theory for the Christian doctrine of human worth had led 
us to r«iterat« the claim that this worth finally depends 
upon the fact that the spirit of man is at all times 'en 
rapport 1 with a creative "background of extra-human experience 
which nourishes it and cooperates with it at every phase of 
its developing career.
This we believe expresses the essence of the Christian 
vindication of personality. At the same time we hold it to 
be the raison d'etre of the whole evolutionary process* The 
private self is a real participant in all the living reality 
that is* Each present moment of its temporal consciousness 
is pregnant with the presence and the potency of the eternal. 
The Kingdom of God is within us* How are we sons of God* 
Such is the truth dimly intuited in Samuel Butler's 
identification of heredity with memory, leading to his 
displacement of the continuity of the germ-plasm by the 
continuity of experience. We are each a real part of the 
sum total of experience* Boaonquet leads us to a similar 
conclusion, but by a different approach, whmn he declares 
that "it seems well within the mark to say that a careful 
analysis of a single day's life of any fairly typical human 
being would establish triumphantly all that is needed in 
principle for the affirmation of the Absolute."
i. Individuality & Value, vol. 1. p.377
This conception of the self as finally concrescent 
with the sum total of living reality is philosophically 
supported today "by the doctrine of "The Perspective Figure" 
propounded by Professor Karl Heim of Ttibingen. Professor 
Heim considers that the "Relativist Movement" t seen in Spengler
rather than in Einstein, is one of the most significant facts
i 
of our day, along with the collapse of the "Dogma of Progress".
He opposes the moral caprice of the relativist movement with 
an experiential perspective rooted and grounded in the 
inexorability of the "Hon-Objeetive".
The apologetic of Heim advances from the 
predicament in which Kant left the self. The philosopher 
of Xfinigsberg bequeathed to modern epistemology a notion 
of the pure ego or 'ion' as tht subject of knowledge void 
of all objectivity, this emptying of the self being the 
logical outcome of a prosess of denudation which began
•
wilti the criticism of the external object sponsored by 
naive realism.
The valuable element of the f ioh f for Heim, 
is the fact that it represents a f non- object if i able f 
remainder of experience. The'ich 1 , as the operative 
agent in a|l processes of objectification of knowledge 
is able to escape disintegration into the process which 
it suatains. This was the great contribution of Kant to
i. Glaube und Leben. p.406.
personal values, literally a rehabilitation of self- 
respect 1 .
But Kant, in reality, went no farther than to 
restore to us the self as an empty form essential to 
all experience, presumably reached by a process of 
intellectual abstraction. The self of Heim is richer 
than the 'ioh 1 of Kant. Kant's 'ieh 1 is cognitive, and 
lies behind a block universe. The self,for Heim, is 
intuitive, functioning through the whole will, and operating 
in the modern dynamic situation. Hence the fundamental 
distinction drawn by Heim,between the 'disinterested 1 
judgments of science-valuable only for the detached 
calculations of the objective world,-and the 'trust 1 
judgments of personal relationships,-which lift us into 
a realm of experience transcending the world of observation 
and calculation, since they unite us with the trustworthy 
element in Life itself.
Heim pounces upon this 'non-objectifiable 1 phase 
of the self as a striking weapon to bludgeon the relativism 
irhioh has overflowed from modern science into modern morals. 
The absolutes of space and time having disappeared, it would 
seem that each individual is free to choose hfts own centre 
of reference in the space-time continuum, and to maintain 
it as unique for himself. Moral relativism concludes by 
analogy that the unconditioned is likewise banished from
its particular realm of experience, that each individual 
is free to select his own locus in the moral world, and 
that his capriciously selected standard has equal validity 
with any other. Hence the modern throwback to the Old 
Testament chaos when "every man did that which was right in 
his own sight".
Bat since the real self cannot he objectified, it 
is obvious that the objective knowledge of science cannot 
claim to exhaust the continuu$ of total real experience. We 
cannot,fox instance, stand outside of our own unity of 
consciousness and regard it as a reified entity apart from 
ourselves. The 'ioh' cannot he objectified, for it is 
always the 'ich 1 which is presupposed and necessary in the 
process of objeetification. Hence there is possible to us- 
in fact always present to us,thou$i so olose as to be over- 
looked-a realm of immediate experience which carries its 
own absolute certainty, reaching beyond the realm of mediate 
experience objectively attained through the approximations 
and relative certainly of science. The certainty of 
faith is surer than the knowledge of science, for our 
experience of the self is the most intimate and immediate 
experience we have, and the inner self impinges upon a core 
of non-objectifiable experience where the cause and effect 
categories are non-operative.
Soienoe, in other words, is unable to cope with the hinter­ 
land of the self, thmt penumbra of the non-objective eternal 
within which it originally lives and moves and has its being, 
before the process of objective knowledge emerges. Science 
has no immediate point of contact with this non-objective 
environing of the inner self, being once removed from it by 
the very fact of its objectivity. The self is already, and 
always, within this absolute experience, and intuits its 
relationship by the certainty of the faith element which 
distinguishes the'trust judgment 1 as against the calculation 
of the'disinterested judgment 1 .
All our experience then,. according to
Heim, is rooted and grounded in the background of a non- 
objective environment, and it ranges itself perspectively 
around its various centres of personal interest.
Consider,by way of illustration, the
application of the perspective figure to the matter of our 
time experience. The perspective centre of reference here, 
of course, is the present moment of experience. Considered 
objectively, the present moment is an arbitrarily selected 
point, emaciated to the verge of annihilation in that film 
of consciousness which separates past and JOMSWHX- future.All 
we experience in the present moment, objectively interpreted 
is the meagre 'now 1 , narrowed down to a static pinprick of 
division between what has been and what is yet to be.
Perspeotively viewed, the present moment is the 
crisis ojf experience, rather than its vanishing point.The 
richness of its context is guaranteed "by the presence of 
the eternal non-objective, the hinterland of experience, 
which is constantly breaking i&to the present moment, 
diffusing it with a measure of fulness in proportion to 
the ability of the self to participate in the wealth of 
its background.
Hence the true evolution of experience, for Heim, 
is a perpetual transition from within ou-twards, from the 
immediacy and certainty of the primary experience of the 
non-objective, to the mediaoy and probability of the 
secondary objective. The certainty of the immediate 
experience is primary and it underlies all experience.
The actual present moment of experience-when 
the self is so immersed in its non-objective milietf as to 
be inseparable from it- is likened by Heim to a f dark 
chamber of consciousness 1 . This phase of the self's 
experience is too immediate for objective description; 
it can only be intuited througi the function of'faith 1 . 
The only description possible in objective terms is that 
the non-objective-or for the religious man,God- is never 
so farxaway from us even to be near. This is the experience 
in which only spirit with spirit may meet. It has the same 
imnediacy in its own degree as that which Jesns meant when 
he declared,"! and the Father are one" .
Henoe the fundamental ground of all experience 
is a region of immediate certainty and continuity with the 
eternal non-objective, ?foich is not at the mercy of the 
calculating approximations to truth discovered in the 
objective categories of science. This realmof real experience 
is intuitively apprehended "by faith, never exhaustively 
catalogued by psychology.
The attainment of the objective is a movement 
away from this primary experience* In the dynamic context 
of the present moment,the elements of experience caught up 
into it are 'stressed 1 or coloured by the distinctive 
quality of the individual f ich f , thus receiving the impress 
of its particular individuality. Hence,with the passage 
of time, there arrives a stage of experience when 'things 1 
emerge from the veiled chamber of consciousness. This passage 
of time involves a movement away from foe immediacy of the 
non-objective into a region of 'memory 1 , where the 'ich- 
stressed' content of experience is now viewed objectively, 
and may be studied and analysed according to the laws of 
an objective science. Memory, on this basis, is no longer 
a mere remembrance of former things which have passed away; 
it is now seen for wh>it it is, the living witness to our 
immediate and unbroken communion with the eternal source of 
all life and experience.
A. H« Whitthtad, Orgfcnismal Thtory of Evolution 
oonaidtrtd aa an application of Tat Ftrsptotive Figure Haturt. " ————— —————— B —
Htim's dootrini of Tht Ptrsptetivt Figurt in
txptritnot suggtsts to us a valuable clue for tht inttrprttation 
of tht prootss of naturt as wtll. it is.wt btlieve, implied
in th« organismal th«oiy of tvolution tnunoiAttd in th«
i 
phllosopbioal works o| A.H.Whit«h«ad. Tht "organismfi"of
Whitthtad, art in rtalily so many modes of Tht Perspective 
ligurt. Thty art tht ptrsptctivt ctntrts whost variant 
intensities givt meaning to tht whole evolutionary process.
Whitehead's philosophy of tvolution is roottd in
tht fertile concept of organism. "The enduring eoncrttt
Z 
tntities art organisms". "Tht evolutionary theory is
nothing tlst than an analysis of tht conditions for tht3 
formation and survival of various types of organisms*" 4 
"Haturt is tht locus of organisms in process of development."
This concept of organism in nature is supplied by 
tht concrete idea of organism as given in our own immediate 
•xptrltnct. lflf you start from tht immtdiatt faottf of our
psychological txptritnct..you art at onct ltd to tht organic
5 
conctptton of naturt. w In othtr words, wt rtach an
inttlligihlt undtrstanding of tht evolutionary prootss only 
from tht human ptrsptotivt, and as wt ha^t setn, tht human 
ptrsptctivt is illuminattd and txpandtd "sub sptoit aeternitatis
1. tsptcially inw Scitnct and the Modtrn World"
2. p.115 3. p. 149. 4.p.l08 5.pl07 
all references to 1926 td.
The organismal perspective applies to all the events 
and unities in nature, from the human organism right down 
through the scale of life into the minutest details of the 
inorganic. Efery unity in nature manifests some degree 
of organiamal perspective, maintaining its own centre of 
rtference and activities within a hierarchy of organisms
from electrons to personality. Even the atom is "trans-
i 
forming itself into an organism" And"we find, in analysing
the character of nature, that the emergence of organisms 2 
depends upon a selective activity which is akin to purpose."
This 'selective activity 1 would represent, in our interpretat­ 
ion, the ad hoc perspective of the organism at its particular 
stage of development.
The atom, in fact, is an amazingly intricate organism, 
possessing many inter-related parts, and exhibiting many 
functions and properties-energetic, radiating and wave 
properties-along with others whose nature make* its movements 
inexplicable apart from the recognition of a 'mind 1 property.
So that even at this primitive stage of evolutionary• 
beginnings, there is seen to be some rudimentary analogue
of the perspective figure. For when we seek the character
of the 'primary entities' we find that "we must start with3 
the event as the ultimate unit of natural occurrence."
4 
Thi8 lf event" has'contemporaries'-a pastj and 1 a future 1
In fact, "an event has to do with all that there is*" 5 
i. p.149. 2. p.157-8. 3. p.151. 4. p.106. 5t p.151.
In other words,long "before the processes of 
conscious thinking are released on the level of clear 
recognition, there is exhibited in the'primary entities' 
of evolution, a modicum of perspective**01" the electron and 
the atom have a distinct perspective life of their own. 
Their activities imply real relationships and functions. 
These in turn operate within a higher perspective than 
that which is manifested within themselves, as electrons 
and atoms. This'higier perspective 1 is discoverable in 
the 'plan of the whole 1 , outside of which no event has
actuality. "The plan of the whole influences the veryi 
character of the various subordinate organisms." This
principle of cosmic perspective is 'perfectly general
throughout nature...it represents no property peculiar
2 
to living bodies."
Starting from "our own psychological fielcl",
Whitehead finds that "self-knowledge discloses a prehensive3 
unification of modal entities beyond itself." This outreach
of the self becomes significant when we realise that "the
organism is a unit of emergent value-a real fusion of the4 
characters of eternal objects-emerging for its own sake."
Q!he analysis of this 'interfusion of events' reveals the
fact that these'eternal objects* represent characters "which5 
are required for nature",but"not emergent from it."
i.p«115. 2.p.116. 3.p.107. 4. p.157. 5.p.151.
Tht "specious present" of an event, represented 
"by its "total temporal duration" manifests not only "the 
enduring entity which has emerged as a real matter of fact"
but also " the individualised embodiment of the underlyingi ——————— — 
energy of realisation". This energy is bound up with
the eternal objects, "the elements required for the very
2 
"being of the process of emergence of organisms", and with
"the possibilities of value in respect to the synthesis of
3 
eternal objects"*
The whole process of evolution, it would seem, 
represents for Whitehead an interlocking human and divine 
perspective, a fusion of the organism with its other than
natural background* 4 
Whitehead 1 s hierarchy of "organisms of organisms"
is paralleled by Heim f s hierarchy of perspective 
centres. The ground forms of experience, for Helm, are space, 
time and other personalities. Within these relationships 
the various perspective centres rise in a hierarchy of 
increasing intensity. For Whitehead there is an increase 
in intensity from the "low type of self-identity attained
by the electrons, to the life of the spirit "attained by the
5 
human.
Bach perspective centre, for Heim, is characterised 
by the common element of inexorability . The present moment, 
for instance, is not whimsically self chosen. It comes from 
the Hon-Objective, to be received by the self. Time moves with
1.2.3. o.f. p. 153-4. 4. p. 161. 5. p. 289.
a relentless inevitability, characteristic of the 
unquestionable majesty of the eternal hinterland of 
the whole evolutionary movement. For Whitehead.the
progress of the organism is towards farther retreat into
i 
"the deeper reoesses of the total fact."
fhe continuity of the evolutionary process 
is not violated by the hierarchy of perspective centres 
any more than it is disrupted by the hierarchy of organisms* 
But the series is progressively enriched,at different levels, 
in an ascending scale, by fiequent outcroppings of 
intensified experience,proportionate to the ability of the 
organism to expand its horizons through an increased power 
of reciprocity with its creative background. Hence the 
higher .while not an outgrowth from the lower, is in a sense 
its fulfilment; it incorporates the significant features of 
the lover,while emerging for its own sake on a higher level.
fhe human organism,from the Christian point of 
view, finds its highest perspective, and hence its supreme 
value, centred in the creative spirit of Jesus Christ. Life, 
centred about this perspective, moving outwards into the 
objective world of social relationships, carries with it 
the same inexorableness which characterises all communion 
with the eternal. This is the unconditioned imperative
1. p.289.
summed up in the statement that"he riio has put his hand
to the plough and turned hack, is not fit for the Kingdom."
The Significance of Jesus:
"We have endeavoured to gather the
various threads of our argument about the conclusion 
that man,regarded from the perspective of evolution, 
more especially through the categories of biology, 
psychology and anthropology, has fulfilled a genuinely 
creative role in cosmic development. We have noted 
the growing reluctance of modern biologists to interpret 
man as anything less than a self'conscious organism 
en rapport with a non^material environment which elicits 
and nourishes his peculiar spiritual potentialities. 
We have surveyed the trend of anthropology towards a 
full recognition of the antiquity and the uniqueness of 
humanity within the evolutionary series. Man is a 
genuine child of the far away past yet aloof from his 
fellow creatures in his possession of a distinctive 
combination of mental and physical characteristics 
denied to the rest of the animal creation. Tn breaking 
with the past he has retained an elasticity of form 
and function which facilitates adaptability and therefore 
guarantees development. The emergence of'homo sapiens" 
did not entail any break in evolutionary continuity but 
it did involve a totally new venture in the developmental 
history of life. Finally we have s^en the spiritual 
singularity of man confirmed by modern psychology. The
human mind and spirit include a deposit of racial 
inheritance held in common with some of the lower orders 
of life but the ancient srands were well knotted "before 
being woven into the texture of the new human personality. 
Man is thereby endowed with all the benefits of accumulated 
past experience and at the same time ensured a genuinely 
new prospect for the future.
It is not part of our task to trace
here the evidence of this uniqueness of man in other 
regions of research. The words of H.^ildon Carr,however, 
are significant of the modern swing of scientific thought 
in general trwards a full recognition of humanity 1 s 
unique status within the time   series."The central basic 
fact..on which everything depends and from which the 
whole scientific Ftructure is reared is the observer 
attached to his system of reference.....the principle
of relativity and the new scientific concept of the
1. 
universe start from this and revert to it. 11 In our
summary of ^hitehead's philosophy of the organism, and 
Heim's doctrine of the perspective figure,we have 
noted the significance of this "system of; reference" 
for our Christian valuation of man.
1. The Unique Status of Man. pp.170-1.
By the exercise of his genuinely creative 
^ 
role in organic development man has given a spiritual
meaning to the whole movement of life. He has thereby 
achieved a pride of place which is peculiarly his own. 
^Vith the emergence of human consciousness history took 
a deliberate step forward into something new. Human 
consciousness has changed the motive and altered the 
pace and direction of evolution. It has generated a milieu 
within which the social and spiritual genius of man can 
expand. This advance into richer life finally has been 
made possible because the growth of spiritual personality 
established a value enhancing reciprocity with those 
suprahuman energies within the cosmos which minister 
in a personal way to the outreaching spirit of man.
In the language of the Scriptures,man lives and 
moves and has his being in God.
Hence the active presence of God in human history 
and experience is ultimately discovered to be the key to 
the riddle of human development. This is the supreme 
fact which confers dignity upon the spiritward trend 
of the human personality. It is within this transcendent 
communion of man with God,which nourishes and educes 
humanity's spiritual possibilities, that we find the 
ultimate foundation for the Christian claim of the 
fundamental worth of man. Man is now revealed for 
what he is, the discoverer and the discovered of God.
Above all other creatures within the compass of creation 
man possesses such possibilities of personality that he 
thereby becomes an object of desire for God Himself. The 
final guarantee that humanity's spiritual explorations 
will be satisfied lies in the fact that man's need of 
God functions complementary to God's need of man.
This divine human complementariness is 
in the nature of a spiritual symbiosis.
are compelled thVi by the logic of our 
thesis to explore the significance of Jesus in relation 
to the claim of human worth. For Christian tradition 
declares that in Him we have not only a positive guarantee 
of the activity of God within the time series but 
objective evidence of His nature as well. In Jesus,the 
Man of Nazareth, the Logos of God is declared to have been 
made flesh and dwelt among men. In Jesus therefore we 
ought to discover the supreme clue to the worth of human
life.
How is Jesus to be related to the evolution- 
ary series? We dismiss at once the idealising tendencies 
of interpretation which neutralise His personality in " 
"the spirit of creative evolution". New Testament criticism 
has made it abundantly clear that Jesus of Nazareth was an 
historical personage. The Spirit was objectively 
manifested in a real human personality. The problem
before us is to estimate the quality of that Life in which 
G od is declared to have been genuinely revealed and to see 
how it affects the worth of man.
Theoretically it is possible to include
the historical Jesus within the evolutionary series'as its 
highest factor to date. On this basis He might be 
interpreted as the peak of personal evolutionary achieve- 
ment. We are all,so to speak, potential Christs in the making 
The idea is attractive but all too flattering to humanity 
as we have come to knov it. Moreover we are still confronted 
with the problem that a strictly humanitarian view of His 
life fails to do justice to the admitted facts of New 
Testament tradition. We are compelled in all honesty to 
seek a more profound interpretation of the experience 
which led the followers of Jesus to declare what religion
at 3ft*-6 best has always confirmed,namely that "if any man
1 
be in Christ it is a new creation."
Our argument has already recognised the
existence and stressed the importance of crises or turning 
points within the history of organic life. It has also
*
maintained that these are not inconsistent with the 
doctrine of continuity in evolutionary development. From 
time to time the evolving organism has found itself 
confronted with perplexing situations in its environment,
1. c.f Moffatt"There is a new creation whenever a man
comes to be in Christ." 2 Cor; 5. 17.
whether physical,biological or psychological,which could be 
surmounted only by a complete change of front. The"volte 
face" has meant a definite advance into complexity of form 
and richness of functions not hitherto demanded nor possible. 
Life has advanced holistically as well as by means of 
uniformly graded series, depending upon the nature of the 
circumstances. Such phenomena as mutation and quanta 
are now regarded as evidence of this sporadic tendency in 
life and nature. At the same time we are careful to 
dissociate ourselves from the theory that these "gaps" in 
evolutionary continuity are overcome by"ab extra influxes" 
of an extrinsic agency. Life we believe to be t! all of a 
piece." Its unity may manifest itself in a diversity of 
form and function and method but it still remains a unity. 
The sporadic element in nutation and quanta are not 
evidence of haphasard change. They are simply expressions 
of a higher uniformity in life and nature which undergirds 
the cosmos but is free to express its nature in such diversity.
We are prepared then by our interpretation of 
evolution to recognise that the appearance of Jesus Christ 
in the flesh heralded the emergence of a new spiritual fact 
in history. For the first time in experience there was 
revealed in its richest possible concreteness the quality 
of that hinterland of life in which all existence is 
sustained. Christian tradition affirms that the appearance
of Jesus within the time series was historically real. 
*n our opinion it was also redemptively necessary.
The eternal "background which sustains 
all life and nature obviously includes factors making 
for moral redemption as well as factors supporting 
natural development. The proof of this is simply 
an appeal to the well attested facts of spiritual 
regeneration. Psychological studies such as James'
"Variety of Religious Experience 1* introduced a
, *et*n4j'ttL 
modern poyoHologiool recognition of the reality of
that "larger life" which provokes and at the same time 
nourishes man's spiritual outreach.
Tn the natural order,when confronted 
with developmental crisis,the growing organism has 
"been stimulated to discover richer channels of form 
and function through whi*h it might evolve in order to 
overcome the crisis. We believe that crises develop 
also within the moral and redemptive order of human 
experience. The growth of spiritual consciousness is 
doubtless contingent upon the successful solution of 
such crises. These have called forth from time to 
time new types of spiritual personality fitted to 
ccpe with the challenge of the situation. Discussing 
the growth of the will in development ,Hobhouse points 
out how "a succession of gifted men..seize for the first
8*4
time the nature of certain of the fundamental conditions 
that underlie the life of the individual..they reach 
down to the life of the soul and the spiritual order., 
their teaching is an exposition not merely of the nature 
of man but of the being of God or the laws of existence."' 
Their revelation of course is mediated through the 
intellectual level of their time,but at the bottom it is 
essentially an interpretation of spiritual life. The great 
prophets and reformers of the world are all of this order, 
boin to cope with the crises of their generation and to 
lift life to new levels.
The moral crisis,however,may be of
such a nature that the human organism,in itself, especially 
in view of its relatively recent emergence within cosmic 
history,does not possess the requisite equipment to cope 
successfully with the situation. In our own strength we 
cannot always stand. The pull of the past is both long 
and strong. It is constantly operative within us although 
the inherited nature of man is overcast with the mantle 
of the spirit. We may create for ourselves situations 
which humanly speaking we are powerless to control. Tn 
the exercise of that freedom of will which involves 
our downfall as w^ll as our uprising we may endanger 
the forward movement of life as a whole. No one will
1. "Development and Purpose. p. 187.
to recognise the truth of this in the realm of personal 
experience. And history is but personal experience writ 
large.
In proportion as life increased in self- 
consciousness it increased also in its reliance upon the 
spirituality of the cosmos. The need "became greater in 
proportion as humanity exercised it* freedom to move awpy 
from rather than towards God. Immediately prior to the 
coming of Jesus Christ the factors in history governing 
moral and spiritual crisis were beginning to concentrate 
in the Orient. The growth of apocalyptic ideas is but 
one of the many evidences of this. Dr Charles,discuss ing 
the conception of the Messianic kingdom in the Old Testament 
has shown that the notion was transformed from a material 
into a spiritual kingdom about the first, century B.C,
because "at this period the earth had come to be regarded
1 
as wholly unfit for this kingdom. 11 k study of the
social and religious life of the Orient will,we believe, 
confirm the verdict that the coming of Jesus was coincident 
with the necessity of a new spiritual beginning for the 
races of the earth. Humanity stood at the cross roads. 
The moral crisis was such that it required the aid of 
a more than human agency to lead it into richer channels 
of religious development. To safeguard the fulfillment 
of humanity's high destiny God Himself in the person 
of Jesus Christ stepped into the arena,compelled by 
the exigency of His own nature as Love to confront men 
with the challenge of a fuller and a more abundant way 
of life.
Hence in the fulness of time came Jesus of 
Nazareth,the Word of God made flesh. To ensure the 
ultimate spiritual development of the race God in 
Christ reconciled the world uhto Himself.
By His emergence in the time series it has 
been made plain for all time that the soul of man is 
of infinite and eternal worth in the sight of God.
This is the paradox of historical Christianity 
and the rock of offence upon which primitive paganism 
split. "The root of Christianity, 11 declared Celsus," 
is its excessive valuation of the human soul and the 
absurd idea that God takes an interest in man. H 
Christianity is intellectually perplexed by the 
paradox but it insists that experience confirms its 
truth. Apart from the conclusion that God was in 
Christ reconciling the world unto Himself the significance 
which the early Church applied to the person and the work 
of Jesus is meaningless. Humanity in Him was made the 
vehicle of a full manifestation of the spirituality 
that pervades the cosmos . Henceforth it was charged with 
a fresh dynamic so that if any man be in Christ it is 
literall^ a new creation. Now are we sons of God and it 
is not yet manifest what we shall be.
The doctrine of the Logos with which
Jesus is identified in the fourth gospel carries with 
it all the modern implication of a creative leascn per- 
vading the universal scheme of things. This doctrine 
is in course of being rehabilitated by modern scientific 
philosophy. The Christian view of life will welcome 
the return of the Logos category as an instrument of 
scientific interpretation but it will do well to 
insist that the scriptural doctrine of the Logos 
goes deeper than the modern intellectual conception 
in that it attaches a redemptive significance to the 
appearance of God within the time series. Frr the 
Christian at any rate Jesus is not simply the strongest 
link in t e evolutionary chain. To estimate the 
meaning of the Incarnation in terms of biological 
evolution without recognition of its redemptive 
efficacy is merely to be blinded by a successful 
scientific hypothesis wh-'c'h is thoroughly well 
documented in the natural order but by no means 
exhaustively explanatory of the real facts of 
spiritual experience.
Jesus came in the fulness, of time,
in more ways than evolutionary categories can apprehend. 
At different times ar.d in different ways God had
already reved-ed Himself in past history. In the spiritual 
crisis of the first century lie revealed Himself in 
person in Jesus Christ. The intuition of faith is 
confirmed by the processes of experience that man with 
all his unworthiness is worth enough to God to necessitate 
His personal intervention >n in history, to save him 
from the consequences of his wwn folly.
The seal of the divine appraisal of
human worth was set upon humanity by the Incarnation. 
This is the inescapable logic of the felt experience of 
the Church that God gave His only &KK begotten Son that 
whosoever believeth on Him should not perish but have 
everlasting life. Jesus becomes at once the vindication 
of human worth in the sight of God and the foundation of 
Christ'an theism,for the Logos doctrine is an interpretation 
of Jesus and man which depends for its final truth upon 
the nature of God Himself.
"Because God is what He is, man is what
he is, and he is endowed with freedom to become the new 
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c . f G.G.Jung. C ollected Papers on Analytical Psychology p.452 
"The collective unconscious is the sediment 
of all the experience of the universe of 
all time and is also an image of the universe 
that has been in process of formation for 
untold ages."
The works of Jung furnish much collateral 
evidence for the id^a of "racial memory".
